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ABSTRACT

Author: Fuqua, Jonathan, S. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: Metaethical Mooreanism
Committee Chair: Michael Bergmann

This dissertation is an attempt to apply the Moorean response to radical skepticism to moral
skepticism. In a nutshell, I argue as follows. Assume that the following Moorean response to, say,
BIV skepticism (the worry that I don’t know I’m not a brain in a vat) is roughly correct: “I know I
have hands, so I’m not a BIV; any argument to the contrary must have a flaw somewhere.” If so,
then such a Moorean should respond as follows to moral skepticism: “I know that recreational
genocide is wrong, so it’s false that there are no moral facts, and that I don’t have any moral
knowledge; any argument to the contrary must have a flaw somewhere.”
In chapter 1, “Moore for Almost Everyone,” I explicate the Moorean response to radical
skepticism. I begin by outlining the main responses to skepticism currently on offer, and then
move to a discussion of Mooreanism. I argue that Mooreanism is a metaphilosophical response to
skepticism that essentially boils down to these two claims: (i) it is more rational for us to believe in
the Moorean truths than it is to believe the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises (a conjunction
which entails the negation of a Moorean truth), and (ii) in virtue of (i) we can use our knowledge or
justified belief in Moorean truths to provide a rational basis for rejecting skeptical premises. I
proceed by discussing what it is to be a Moorean truth as well as how my conception of Mooreanism
fits within the commonsense tradition.
Chapter 2, “Metaethical Mooreanism,” extends Mooreanism to the metaethical dispute
regarding whether we have moral knowledge. I begin by arguing that there are good reasons to
include some moral truths in the domain of Moorean truths. I then spend a significant chunk of space
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applying metaethical Mooreanism to the evolutionary debunking argument. What we see in this
investigation is that the evolutionary debunker has need of a host of controversial commitments, a
bloated conjunction which is epistemically inferior to Moorean moral facts. I close by responding to
Tristram McPherson’s objection to the Moorean strategy, which boils down to the claim that there
are evidential asymmetries between the two skeptical contexts which prevent the successful
application of Mooreanism to the moral domain.
In chapter 3, “Moore on the Problem of Moral Disagreement,” I apply metaethical
Mooreanism to the problem of moral disagreement. I begin by giving a brief overview of the
problem, after which I explain metaethical Mooreanism and show how the metaethical Moorean will
look at the problem of moral disagreement. The basic idea is that the skeptic’s argument from moral
disagreement fails in the same way that arguments for radical skepticism fail, including skeptical
arguments from disagreement: they are less rationally compelling than the Moorean truths they seek
to overturn. No Moorean should stop with this metaphilosophical assessment, however; rather,
Mooreans need to go on to diagnose which premise(s) in the skeptical arguments are false. My
diagnosis challenges two of the skeptic’s assumptions: (i) that we are in a position to say who our
moral-epistemological peers are, and (ii) that there is significant disagreement on the metaethical
question of whether there are moral facts.
In the final chapter, “Moore on the Argument from Empirical Moral Psychology,” I apply
metaethical Mooreanism to the alleged skeptical problem generated by empirical moral
psychology. Roughly, the problem is that we seem to form many of our moral beliefs on the basis of
our emotions, which are held to be epistemically suspect bases. After a discussion of the problem I
show how the metaethical Moorean will look at the matter. The point the Moorean makes here is the
same point the Moorean makes in defense of other Moorean truths: the Moorean truths have more
going for them, epistemically, than do the skeptic’s premises. The Moorean will not stop here but
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will go on to give a diagnosis of the problematic premise(s) in the skeptic’s argument. I carefully
work through the skeptic’s argument from empirical moral psychology, ferreting out the
controversial requirements needed by the argument. What we see once again is that the moral
skeptic relies on a nest of controversial philosophical principles that pale in comparison,
epistemically speaking, to Moorean moral facts, such as that recreational genocide is wrong. At the
end of the day, our knowledge of such moral facts is as epistemically secure as our knowledge that
we have hands.

1

CHAPTER 1. MOORE FOR ALMOST EVERYONE

1.0 Introduction
In this dissertation I will apply the Moorean response to external world skepticism to
moral skepticism. In this chapter I will explain the Moorean response to external world
skepticism and some of the advantages it has over its competitors.1 In chapter 2 I will
argue for a view I’m calling “metaethical Mooreanism,” which is that some moral truths
are Moorean truths; I will also apply this view to the evolutionary debunking argument
for moral skepticism. In chapter 3 I will apply metaethical Mooreanism to the problem of
moral disagreement. Finally, in chapter 4 I will apply metaethical Mooreanism to the
problem of empirical moral psychology.
In this first chapter of the dissertation I will explicate Mooreanism as a response
to external world skepticism. This chapter will be purely epistemological – before I
apply Mooreanism to moral skepticism I need to say something about what I take
Mooreanism to be. The explication will proceed in three stages. First, in section 1.1 I
will lay out the non-Moorean ways in which one may respond to the skeptic. Second, in
section 1.2 I will lay out the Moorean response to skepticism and then make some
remarks about the relationship of Mooreanism to the debate between liberalism and
conservatism in the epistemology of perceptual belief. Third, in section 1.3 I will make

1

In this dissertation I make no attempt to give an overview of skepticism itself. That would take us too far
afield, for the literature is gargantuan and spans the entire history of Western philosophy. As Fumerton
(1995: x) notes, “There probably has been as much philosophical work written on skepticism as on any
other topic in philosophy.” Two excellent resources on the overview-ish stuff, both of which cover
historical and contemporary issues, are Greco (2008) and Hazlett (2014).
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some remarks on the advantages of Mooreanism over its competitors and then I will push
the suggestion that most epistemologists are implicitly committed to Mooreanism.
1.1 Non-Moorean Responses to Skepticism
There are many different arguments for skepticism, and many different things one can be
skeptical about, and thus many skepticisms. An argument that seems to get a lot of
attention these days is the BIV (“BIV” for “brain in a vat”) Argument:
The BIV Argument
(1) I can know I have hands only if I can know I am not envatted.
(2) I cannot know that I am not envatted.
(3) So, I cannot know that I have hands.2
The BIV Argument is at once simple and fascinating, but it is only one arrow in the
skeptic’s quiver. Consider this Humean argument, reconstructed for us by Greco (2000:
33):
The Humean Argument
(1) All of our beliefs about the external world depend for their evidence on
the way things seem to be via the senses, together with the assumption
(A4) that the way things seem to be is a reliable indication of the way
things are.
(2) But (A4) is itself a belief about the external world.
(3) Therefore, assumption (A4) depends for its evidence on (A4).
(4) Circular reasoning cannot give rise to knowledge.
(5) Therefore, (A4) is not known.
(6) All of our beliefs about the world depend on an assumption that is not
known.
(7) Beliefs that depend on unknown assumptions are themselves not known.
(8) Therefore, no one knows anything about external reality.

2

To be envatted is to be a brain in a vat. As Steup (2011: 105) explains, “If you are a brain in a vat, your
brain was removed from your skull and is kept alive, floating in a vat. The nerve endings of your brain are
stimulated in such a way that you have exactly the sort of experiences you would have if you had a normal
body and were enjoying a normal life.”
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The BIV Argument and the Humean Argument target propositions about the external
world. That is bad enough, but there are skeptical arguments which target every
proposition, skeptical arguments which tell us that any knowledge whatsoever is
impossible. Here is one such argument – which I’ll call the “Methodist Argument” –
reconstructed for us by Huemer (2001: 13):
The Methodist Argument
(1) All my beliefs are formed by some method.
(2) I am justified in accepting a belief formed by method M only if I first
know that M is reliable.
(3) I do not have an infinite series of belief-forming methods.
(4) Thus, all my beliefs must rest on beliefs formed by methods whose
reliability has not first been established.
(5) Therefore, none of my beliefs are justified.
These arguments have implausible conclusions but, arguably, a set of plausible premises.
For the sake of concreteness, let us focus on one skeptical argument, the one that is the
most commonly discussed nowadays: the BIV Argument. We may distinguish three sorts
of replies to the BIV Argument: concessive, partially concessive, and non-concessive.
The concessive reply is represented by skepticism itself, an option most of us
won’t be very congenial to – most of us are quite partial to the idea that we know we
have hands. We should only take this concessive route if all the other roads are closed
off. The partially concessive replies are represented by denying closure, contextualism,
and contrastivism. Premise (1) of the BIV Argument is an instance of the closure
principle that S can know that P and that P entails Q only if S can know that Q. Closure
deniers reject this, arguing that I can know I have hands even if I can’t know that I’m not
envatted.3 Closure denial is a partially concessive response in that it retains mundane
hands-knowledge but concedes that we lack anti-skeptical knowledge. One problem with

3

For a denial of closure, see Dretske (2005).
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denying closure is that it allows “abominable conjunctions” such as that I know I have
hands but I don’t know that I’m not a handless BIV or I know the Easter Bunny doesn’t
exist but I don’t know that I’m not being deceived by the Easter Bunny.4
Another partially concessive response is represented by contextualism.
Contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions vary with
the ascriber’s context. On this view, the ascriber’s context determines what the standards
for knowledge are in that context. Applied to the BIV Argument, contextualism says that
in mundane contexts the statement “I know that I have hands” is true, and this because
my reasons for thinking I have hands are sufficient to meet the standards associated with
the word “knowledge” which are operative in mundane contexts. However, in the
skeptical context the standards associated with “knowledge” are higher, and my ordinary
reasons no longer cut it, hence in the skeptical context the claim “I know I have hands”
would be false. Contextualism is a partially concessive response to radical skepticism
because it tells us that sometimes the claim “I know that I have hands” (made by a
handed person who sees her hands) is true and sometimes it isn’t.5
A third partially concessive reply to radical skepticism is the contrastivist one.
Contrastivism says that knowledge is a three-place (ternary) relation rather than a twoplace (binary) relation. That is, whenever S knows that P, S knows P rather than some
contrast proposition Q.6 This opens up the possibility that S knows P rather than Q but
not P rather than R. And this is exactly how contrastivism handles the problem of BIV
4

The phrase “abominable conjunction” comes from DeRose (1995). The Easter Bunny example comes
from Steup (2011).

5

6

My characterization of contextualism follows Cohen (1999, 2008).

As Schaffer (2004: 77) notes, “this implies that all knowledge ascriptions contain a syntactically real
contrast variable q in their logical forms.”
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skepticism. The contrastivist says that I know I have hands rather than stumps, but insists
that I don’t know I have hands rather than vat-images of hands. Contrastivism is a
partially concessive reply because it retains hands-knowledge but gives up anti-skeptical
knowledge.7
I make no attempt here to argue against these partially concessive replies, to
demonstrate their falsity. The broader focus of the dissertation is an application of the
Moorean response to external world skepticism to moral skepticism. Trying to convince
the reader that these partially concessive responses are no good would take us too far
afield. I have brought them up and briefly discussed them for two reasons. First, I think
that one can best understand the Moorean view by situating it in its proper
epistemological context, which is alongside competing responses to skepticism.
Mooreanism is really, at its heart, a metaphilosophical response to skepticism and is best
understood by situating it alongside other anti-skeptical theories. Second, I think that one
can best appreciate the merits of the Moorean view by seeing what its competitors say to
the skeptic. In philosophy it is often the case that one way to motivate a view one thinks
is true is by comparing and contrasting it with its alternatives. As we often find ourselves
arguing, “You may think my view is implausible, but look at the other options!”8 And
here I should like to pause briefly and note that because our three partially concessive
responses are partially concessive they are less than ideal qua responses to skepticism.
What we should like, I think, is a response to skepticism that is more robust, one that

7

My characterization of contrastivism, and the example of hands rather than stumps vs. hands rather than
hand-images, comes from Schaffer (2004).

8

As Pryor (2004: 356) notes, one way we can defend our own favored response to skepticism is by
“highlighting how unconvincing other answers to skepticism are.”
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preserves both mundane hands knowledge (for example) and anti-skeptical knowledge.
If we cannot get a robust, non-concessive reply then we shall, perhaps, have to make do
with one of these partially concessive replies. One advantage of Mooreanism over these
partially concessive replies is that it is a robust, non-concessive reply to skepticism.
1.2

The Moorean Response to Skepticism

A Moorean is someone who subscribes to Mooreanism, which consists of two theses:
Mooreanism
● Commonsense Thesis (CT): Some truths are Moorean truths and it is more
rational for us to believe in the Moorean truths than it is to believe the
conjunction of the skeptic’s premises (a conjunction which entails the
negation of a Moorean truth).
● Transmission Thesis (TT): In virtue of CT we can use our knowledge or
justified belief in Moorean truths to provide a rational basis for rejecting
(conjunctions of) skeptical premises.9
Philosophers refer to the things the Moorean thinks are safe from the skeptic’s premises
in a variety of ways. Lemos (2004) refers to them as “common sense propositions,”
Kelly (2005a) as “Moorean facts,” and Armstrong (2006) as “Moorean truths.” I shall
use all of these locutions. In fleshing out Mooreanism I should like to discuss six things:
(1) Moorean truths (what they are like, what some good examples are, etc.), (2)
Mooreanism’s status as a metaphilosophical claim, (3) the relationship between CT and
TT, (4) the superior epistemic status of Moorean truths, (5) the connection between my
characterization of Mooreanism and the commonsense tradition, and (6) the connection
between Mooreanism and the recent debate between liberals and conservatives in the

9

My Mooreanism is very similar to Bergmann’s Commonsensism (2012: 10): “Commonsensism: the view
that (a) it is clear that we know many of the most obvious things we take ourselves to know (this includes
the truth of simple perceptual, memory, introspective, mathematical, logical, and moral beliefs) and that (b)
we also know (if we consider the question) that we are not in some skeptical scenario in which we are
radically deceived in these beliefs.”
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epistemology of perceptual belief (discussing this debate and this connection will help us
to get and remain clear about just exactly what Mooreanism is).
1.2.1 More on Moorean Facts
The first thing to say here concerns Moorean facts or truths, what Lemos calls “common
sense propositions” – these things it is more rational for us to believe than it is for us to
believe the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises. Clearly, Mooreans stand in the
commonsense tradition in philosophy, a tradition that includes Reid, Moore, Chisholm,
and many others.10 I will not here attempt to give a definition of commonsense
propositions or Moorean truths, but I should like to say some things about them. (You
don’t have to have a definition of a Moorean truth to know one when you see one any
more than you need a definition of canīnus to know a dog when you see a dog.11)
Moorean facts, though readily accessible to “the vulgar” – and thus not too complicated –
need not be widely held. For example, I believe that my name is Jonathan Scott Fuqua,
but presumably not too many people in the world hold this belief, yet it seems like a good
candidate for a Moorean fact. As this example also suggests, Moorean facts need not be
psychologically irresistible (though perhaps many are): I could come to doubt what my
name is. Moorean facts do not necessarily include anything anyone might think of as a
matter of commonsense; thus, that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects is not a
matter of commonsense. The fact that something is widely believed in a given culture or

10

11

See Lemos (2004) for an explication and defense of the commonsense tradition.

Huemer (2001: 33) suggests that we can define “common sense beliefs” as those that “have the highest
initial plausibility of all beliefs.” I think that commonsense beliefs do have this kind of plausibility, but I
don’t here take a position on whether we should define them in this way.
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society is not, by itself, enough to make it a Moorean truth.12 Moorean facts concern the
common affairs of ordinary life, not the “expertise-admitting” (Nicholas Rescher’s
phrase) domains of physics, economics, neuroscience, and so on.13 Moorean facts will
typically be things that are believed in the basic way, i.e. noninferentially. However, I
don’t want to rule out the possibility of an inferentially believed Moorean fact.14 And
Moorean facts, though typically believed in the basic way, can be argued for, it’s just that
in the typical case this needn’t be done, the reason being that the premises of the
argument for a Moorean truth would be less obviously true than the Moorean truth
itself.15 Moorean facts can be necessary truths (e.g. 1+1=2) or contingent (e.g. I have
hands) – and a priori or a posteriori, as the parenthetical examples show. Though
Moorean truths need not be widely held, many will be. Many believe, for instance, that
there are other minds, and that 1+1=2. Moorean truths may very well not be uttered very
often, mainly because uttering them would communicate that which everyone already
knows, the taken-for-granted truths of ordinary life. If we think – with Audi (1999) – of
a self-evident truth as a truth that one comes to know just on the basis of understanding it,
then we can say that some Moorean facts will be self-evident, but others won’t. Moorean

12

As Bergmann (2008: 62) says, “We tend to classify as ‘common-sense beliefs’ beliefs that are peculiar to
our own culture or upbringing. Reid does not -- or at least does not want to. His intention is to include
only propositions that almost everyone believes (and knows) non-inferentially – things that are immediately
accepted by sane persons once considered and understood.”
13

As Rescher (2005: 37) nicely puts this point, “The structure of the-earth-as-a-whole, the material
composition of the moon, and the causative basis of sea-storms all represent issues that transcend the
resources of common sense as we here understand it. None of these are matters which figure patently in
the common experiences of great masses of peoples.”
14
According to Rescher (2005: 24), “even if reasoning is involved...the matter can still be one of common
sense provided that the reasoning is sufficiently obvious that its availability is effectively universal.”
15

As Rescher (2005: 33-34) puts it, “The fact that common-sense beliefs are obvious and evident means
that they do not require further substantiation because no substantiating consideration could be markedly
more evident and unquestionable than that belief itself.”
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truths can be singular propositions (e.g. Harry is bald) or general propositions (e.g. rape is
bad). Moorean facts, when not explicitly acknowledged, will be things we nearly always
take for granted, such as that material objects continue to exist when unperceived by us.
They are things we are disposed to believe, things we would readily assent to were they
to be brought before the mind’s eye – things we do assent to when they are brought
before the mind’s eye. The denial of a Moorean fact will come off as absurd, and even
those who profess to deny them will (typically, at least) act as if they believe that they are
true. In fact, we may often find ourselves questioning the cognitive competence of those
who don’t believe Moorean truths: something has clearly gone wrong with someone who
denies that no number is flexible or who affirms that she no longer exists. 16 Importantly
– and as indicated by CT – Moorean facts have more going for them, epistemically
speaking, than the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises.17 We might say, with Rescher
(2005: 29), that Moorean truths are, due to their solid epistemic status, “beyond
reasonable doubt.” Because of this, we can say that Moorean truths should be accepted,
in the normal case, even if, for some strange reason (a worldwide skepticism revival,
say), they would not be widely accepted. Finally, Moorean truths, though epistemically
superior to the skeptic’s premises, are not infallible or immune from any refutation

16

17

This example, and the point it is meant to illustrate, come from Rescher (2005: 22, 27).

As Rescher (2005: 90) puts it, “we are well advised to concede the credibility of common-sense
teachings not because we happen to like them but because there are good reasons for doing so.” In the
fourth chapter of his (2005) Rescher makes the interesting point that accepting commonsense propositions
is the best way to make progress in the “project of inquiry” (98). If we don’t deign to accept commonsense
propositions until we have come up with an independent validation of them, we shall be hamstrung in our
attempt to get at the truth – this seems to be his idea. He calls this the “functional rationale for relying on
common sense” (99), but it is clear that this functional rationale is a kind of epistemic reason: the most
efficient way of getting truth is to proceed by accepting commonsense propositions until we’ve got a reason
not to.
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whatsoever: they can be defeated. For example: like Neo, I could get excellent evidence
that the external world as I have known it is an illusion.18
1.2.2 Mooreanism is Metaphilosophical
A second thing to say about Mooreanism is that it is a metaphilosophical claim that can
be endorsed by epistemologists who have different views about such things as the nature
of justification and the proper resolution of the Gettier problem.19 Lemos (2004: 7) notes
the way that Mooreans respond when faced with a skeptical argument that runs counter to
a commonsense proposition: “(1) P is a common sense proposition that I and many others
know. (2) Theory T implies that P is false. (3) Therefore, Theory T is false or
unreasonable.” Mooreanism is a metaphilosophical response to skepticism, a response
telling us what we (epistemically) should do when we encounter a skeptical argument
that runs counter to a Moorean or commonsense truth. The Moorean response doesn’t
diagnose the malady afflicting the skeptic’s premises, nor prescribe a cure – these things
need doing, of course, but they are not done by Mooreanism.20 Thus, Mooreans may
differ among themselves about just exactly where the skeptic goes wrong, and they may
draw different epistemological lessons from the same skeptical argument. So, Mooreans
need not share the same views about, say, whether the sensitivity condition or the safety
condition is a more plausible requirement for knowledge: sensitivity theorists (e.g. Black
[2008]) and safety theorists (e.g. Sosa [1999]) can both be Mooreans. And internalists

18

My characterization of Moorean facts in this paragraph owes a great deal to and combines elements from
Wolterstorff (2001), Grant (2001), Lemos (2004), and Rescher (2005).
19
I am tempted to say that Mooreanism is a metaepistemological claim, but Fumerton (1995) has already
used “metaepistemology” to refer to the analysis of epistemic concepts, and that is not what I am doing
here, and that is not what Mooreanism is.
20

A point also made by Pryor (2004: 370).
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(e.g. Huemer [2001]) and externalists (e.g. Greco [2002]) can both be Mooreans.
Mooreanism does not commit one to any substantive views about such matters.21
1.2.3 CT and TT
A third thing to say about Mooreanism concerns the relationship between its two theses,
namely that it is the superior epistemic status of the Moorean truths (CT) which allows us
to reason from them to the negation of the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises (TT).
We need to follow Lemos (2004: 6-14) here by underscoring, as he does, that Moorean
truths have their anti-skeptical powers by virtue of their epistemic status rather than by
virtue of their commonality status, i.e. the fact that (in many cases) they are widely
believed. Mere popularity is not what makes a proposition a Moorean fact. The
Moorean says that we may infer the falsity of the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises
on the basis of our knowledge of or justified belief in the Moorean truth the skeptic seeks
to overturn. The only way this would seem to be possible is if we have more justification
for Moorean truths than we do for conjunctions of skeptical premises. According to
Mooreans, we are more justified in believing commonsense truths than we are in
believing the skeptic’s premises. Mooreans maintain that commonsense truths have more
going for them, epistemically, than do the skeptic’s premises. This is why, when there is
a conflict between the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises and a Moorean truth, it is
more rational to stick with the Moorean truth and reject the skeptical conjunction.
1.2.4 The Superior Epistemic Status of Moorean Facts
One obvious question here is why we should think that Moorean truths are better off,
epistemically, than the skeptical arguments that seek to overturn them. Why do we have

21

Madden (1983) explicates and argues for the idea that commonsensism is a metaphilosophy, or at least
includes a metaphilosophy, in his “The Metaphilosophy of Commonsense.”
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more justification for a Moorean fact than we do for the conjunction of skeptical premises
which entail the negation of that fact? Different Mooreans may answer this question in
different ways, depending of course on how they think about epistemic justification.
Moore himself seems congenial to an evidentiary answer, i.e. an answer that appeals to
evidence.22 In his “Proof of an External World,” Moore contends that he has “conclusive
reasons” and “conclusive evidence” (169) that is he awake and not dreaming. Moore
concedes that he can’t say just exactly what this conclusive evidence is, but this needn’t
imply that he lacks this evidence, nor that he doesn’t know that he has it. As Lycan
(2008: 98) explains, Moore doesn’t need a theory of evidence to know that he’s got
evidence for P. If we follow Moore himself, then, we should be led to say that we have
much better evidence for commonsense propositions than we do for the conjunction of
the skeptic’s premises. Moorean truths are of different kinds, and thus admit of different
sorts of evidentiary support. I believe that I have hands, a belief I hold on the basis of my
perceptual evidence. I also believe 2+1=3, a belief I hold on the basis of rational
intuition. As I close my eyes and then raise my left hand over my head, I can tell by
proprioception that my left hand is over my head. The Moorean epistemologist may of
course go on to develop a theory of evidence and may therefore have quite a few things
to say about evidence in general and about evidence in these three examples. But the
Moorean qua metaphilosopher needn’t have such a theory at her disposal to be able to say
that she does indeed have strong evidence for her belief that she has hands, that 2+1=3,
and that her left hand is over her head (when she raises it over her head, of course).

22

For a nice discussion of all four of Moore’s anti-skeptical essays – “Hume’s Theory Examined,”
“Certainty,” “Proof of an External World,” and “A Defence of Common Sense” – see Lycan (2008).
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By comparison, note Mooreans, our evidence for the philosophical theses the
skeptic needs to negate Moorean truths is paltry at best. Let’s work with an example, to
make this concrete and vivid – premise (2) of the Methodist Argument, from above: I am
justified in accepting a belief formed by method M only if I first know that M is reliable.
Call this the “Methodist Requirement.” What could the skeptic’s evidence for the
Methodist Requirement be? It looks like it would have to be an intellectual seeming or
rational intuition. Now the Methodist Argument entails, in conjunction with some other
premises, that I don’t know I have hands. My evidence for my hands is, let’s say, a
perceptual seeming that I have hands plus the testimony of others.23 Now, my own
perceptual seeming, plus the testimony of others, is very strong evidence for my belief
that I have hands. Insofar as I do have an intellectual seeming in favor of the Methodist
Requirement, I do have some evidence for it. But it seems clear that my total evidence
favors my having hands over the truth of the Methodist Requirement, and this for five
reasons. First, my seeming that I have hands is much stronger than my seeming that the
Methodist Requirement is true. Second, I have testimonial confirmation that I have
hands, but very little if any testimonial confirmation in favor of the Methodist
Requirement. Third, the Methodist Requirement has, in conjunction with some other
premises, very bizarre, counterintuitive consequences – such as that no one knows
anything – while the claim that I have hands does not. Fourth, the Methodist
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The Methodist Requirement targets my knowledge that I have hands, but I’m here saying I have good
evidence for the proposition that I have hands. The former is an epistemic proposition, the latter isn’t.
Does this matter? I don’t think it does, for two reasons. First, as Lemos (2004) and others point out,
simple epistemic propositions such as that I know I have hands are also matters of commonsense: they are
also Moorean truths. Second, the evidence for my having hands also functions as evidence for my knowing
that I have hands; so, the same evidence can do epistemic work in the service of both Moorean truths. For
these reasons, the differences between these two Moorean facts – that I have hands and that I know this –
are frequently ignored in many discussions of these matters.
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Requirement is highly controversial and mostly rejected by the people who have thought
most about it: epistemologists. Finally, I can confirm, by making predictions and then
seeing if they come true, my belief that I have hands; I can’t do the same for the
Methodist Requirement. At the end of the day, then, it seems that my belief that I have
hands has much more evidential support than does the Methodist Requirement. And,
assuming – as Kelly (2005a, 2008) does in this context – that I should believe what my
total evidence indicates, it seems that the choice between I have hands and the Methodist
Requirement is true is fairly easy: I should believe that I have hands, and reject the
Methodist Requirement.
The problem gets worse for the skeptic when we take note of the fact that the
Methodist Requirement and other similar principles entail radical, revisionary skeptical
claims only when they are conjoined with other propositions. What we are really
comparing, then, are conjunctions of skeptical premises with Moorean truths. On our
total evidence, Moorean truths seem to come out way ahead of these skeptical
conjunctions. I have much more evidence for my own hands than I do for (1) – (7) of the
Methodist Argument. The BIV Argument only has two premises, but this is misleading.
The second premise, which claims that I don’t know I’m not envatted, depends on a
theory of knowledge, and so is only as plausible as that theory of knowledge.24 Thus,
when it comes to the BIV Argument, what we have to compare is a Moorean truth and
the conjunction of the first premise with a particular theory of knowledge. In general,

24
Does the second premise really implicitly depend on a theory of knowledge? After all, couldn’t someone
affirm it on the basis of intuition rather than a theory of knowledge? Yes, they could, meaning that it
doesn’t depend on a theory of knowledge in the sense that no one can believe except but by basing that
belief on a theory of knowledge. It depends on a theory of knowledge in this sense: it’s not true that I can’t
know I’m not envatted unless some specific theory of knowledge is true. And the skeptic will ordinarily
defend the second premise by an appeal to this theory of knowledge.
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then, when we encounter skeptical arguments, what we really have to do is make a
“Moorean plausibility comparison,” as Lycan (2008: 94) puts it, between the Moorean
fact at hand and the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises. When we do this, the
Moorean facts win.
But will Moorean truths always win, or are they sometimes defeated? Mooreans
don’t deny that Moorean truths can be defeated, though they do say, with Rescher (2005:
59), that the “burden of proof” borne by the skeptic “can only rarely be discharged.”
What Mooreans do typically deny is that purely philosophical arguments can defeat
commonsense propositions. Let’s say that a skeptical argument is purely philosophical
just in case none of its premises present any evidence that our faculties are
malfunctioning or otherwise unreliable, or that the commonsense proposition in question
is false. Purely philosophical skeptical arguments do their work by pointing to the
conflict between Moorean truths and philosophical principles in metaphysics and
epistemology. Thus, the Methodist Argument highlights the conflict between the
Methodist Requirement and the Moorean claim that we know things. The Humean
Argument highlights the conflict between the Moorean claim that we know some things
about external reality and its first premise, which includes what we’ll call the
“Assumption Principle:”
Assumption Principle
No perceptual belief is justified unless its holder also assumes that his or her
perceptual faculties are reliable.
And for those comfortable with closure – for premise (1) of the BIV Argument is an
instance of the closure principle (as noted above) – the crucial move in the BIV
Argument is premise (2)’s denial that I (can) know I’m not envatted. This denial is
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predicated on a particular theory of knowledge, and so the BIV Argument highlights the
conflict between the claim that I know I have hands and a particular theory of knowledge.
Chisholm (1989: 3) suggests that BIV skepticism is implicitly committed to the following
principle, which we can call the “Possibility Principle”:
Possibility Principle
If those of your experiences which you think are perceptions and memories are
such that it is logically possible to have those experiences without perceiving or
remembering anything, then you are not justified in believing that you are now
perceiving external things or remembering past events.
The BIV Argument pits the Possibility Principle against my claim to know I have hands.
Mooreans argue, then, that commonsense propositions are much more plausible –
better evidentially supported, to put it evidentiary terms – than the skeptic’s favored
philosophical principles, such as the Methodist Requirement, the Assumption Principle,
and the Possibility Principle. What Mooreans typically do affirm – e.g. Armstrong
(2006), Kelly (2008), and Lycan (2001) – is that arguments utilizing “careful empirical
investigation and scientific theorizing” (Lycan [2001: 40]) can sometimes overturn
commonsense propositions. Kelly’s (2008) explanation of this asymmetry between
purely philosophical arguments and those that utilize empirical investigation and
scientific theorizing is that scientific theories can use prediction to get confirmation in a
way that abstract philosophical theories cannot. Whether one accepts this explanation of
the asymmetry or not, it is not hard to see that there is a big difference between a BIVstyle argument which utilizes empirical observations that point to my actually being a
BIV and one that merely highlights the conflict between I have hands and a particular
theory of knowledge.
1.2.5 Mooreanism and the Commonsense Tradition
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My definition of Mooreanism, as consisting of CT and TT, fits well with the
commonsense tradition. Though I cannot give an overview of this tradition here, I would
like to try and briefly highlight this fittingness. The goal of highlighting this fittingness is
simply to help the reader see that my conception of Mooreanism isn’t stipulative or
idiosyncratic, that my understanding of Mooreanism fits well with the views of those
typically identified as commonsense philosophers.
I shall begin with Reid, who is perhaps better known for his commonsense views
than any other philosopher in the Western intellectual tradition.25 Here, then, is Reid
(1764: 7) on the authority that commonsense has over philosophy:
In this unequal contest between common sense and philosophy the latter will
always come off with both dishonour and loss; nor can she ever prosper until this
rivalry is dropped, philosophy gives up encroaching on the territory of common
sense, and a cordial friendship is restored; for, in reality, Common Sense holds
nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But, on the other hand (if I may be
permitted to change the metaphor), philosophy’s only root is the principles of
common sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them; when
it is cut off from this root its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots.
My CT is meant to capture this very idea. What then does Reid do, when faced with a
philosophical argument that contravenes a commonsense truth? He makes precisely the
move that Lemos cites as characteristic of the commonsense philosophers: since
philosophical theory T contradicts commonsense proposition P, theory T is false. TT
says that, in virtue of CT, we may infer the falsity of the skeptic’s conjunction; Reid
(1764: 11) would appear to concur:
A traveller who has good judgment may mistake his way, and be led unawares
onto a wrong route; and, while the road is fair before him, he may go on without
suspicion, and be followed by others; but when the road ends at a coal-pit, he
doesn’t need much judgment to know that he has gone wrong, and perhaps to find
out what has led him astray.

25

For an overview of Reid’s epistemology, see Wolterstorff (2001). Greco (2014) is also instructive.
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Reid, then, appears to be a Moorean – to speak anachronistically.
Here is Moore’s (1962: 144) proof of the external world:
Moore’s Proof
M1: Here are two hands.
M2: If hands exist, then there is an external world.
M3: So, there is an external world.
Now just exactly what was Moore up to when he gave this proof? Greco (2002) argues –
correctly, I think – that in giving this proof Moore is following Reid on a number of
points, two of which are pertinent here. The first is that commonsense has authority over
philosophy, the second is that, when there is a conflict between commonsense and a
skeptical argument, we should examine the skeptic’s arguments to see where he has gone
wrong. The claim that commonsense has authority – or “epistemic priority,” as Greco
(2014) elsewhere puts it – over philosophical principles is entailed by CT: if it’s more
rational for us to accept the Moorean fact over the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises,
then the Moorean fact has epistemic priority over the skeptic’s conjunction. Moore
concurs, arguing that his knowledge of mundane commonsense propositions is more
certain than the skeptic’s premises. In “Four Forms of Skepticism,” Moore (1962: 221)
says the following in response to Russell’s skeptical argument:
What I want, however, finally to emphasize is this: Russell's view that I do not
know for certain that this is a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I am right,
on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I don't know these things
immediately; (2) That they don't follow logically from any thing or things that I
do know immediately; (3) That, if (1) and (2) are true, my belief in or knowledge
of them must be “based on an analogical or inductive argument”; and (4) That
what is so based cannot be certain knowledge. And what I can't help asking,
myself is this: Is it, in fact, as certain that all these four assumptions are true, as
that I do know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious? I cannot help
answering: It seems to me more certain that I do know that this is a pencil and
that you are conscious, than that any single one of these four assumptions is true,
let alone all four.
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Moore’s Proof, I submit, is an example of TT in action, of reasoning from a
commonsense proposition, which has epistemic priority over or superiority to,
philosophical principles, to a rejection of a skeptical philosophical argument which
implies the negation of the commonsense proposition.
Many philosophers in the last several decades, including a number of
contemporary epistemologists, have concurred with Reid and Moore. Chisholm (1989:
3-4), for instance, after introducing the Possibility Principle as the implicit
epistemological principle at play in BIV skepticism, makes the following (Moorean)
remarks:
At this point we should be sophisticated enough to challenge the skeptic’s
premise, “And what is your ground for affirming that? What justification do you
have for thinking that your complex philosophical proposition is more reasonable
for me than the belief that I am surrounded by familiar physical things?” It is not
easy to think of any plausible reply that the skeptics might make.
Lemos, in his 2004 book, Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense, says the following
(11):
Philosophers in the common sense tradition assign a great deal of weight to
various of their considered judgments. They assign a great deal of weight, for
example, to the judgments that there are other people, that they have bodies, that
they think and feel, and that we know such things. Of course, that much might
also be said of the follower of Zeno and the philosophical skeptic. What is
significant, though, is that the common sense philosopher does not regard such
judgments as merely claims that might weigh against some philosophical theory,
but that might, all things considered, be reasonably abandoned in favor of the
theory. The weight he assigns such propositions is not outweighed by any
competing philosophical view or criterion of knowledge. It is in this spirit that
Moore says we can safely challenge any philosopher to bring forward an
argument against our knowing such propositions that does not rest on a
proposition less certain than that it is designed to attack.
Lemos then spends the rest of the book defending the commonsense tradition on this and
many other points.26 Notice the fittingness between what Lemos says and my CT and
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See especially Lemos’s chapter 5: “Moore, Skepticism, and the External World.”
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TT: we can use Moorean facts as data in assessing philosophical theories (TT) because
they are more certain than the propositions that attack them (CT). Rescher (2005: 59)
makes similar remarks on the epistemic advantages enjoyed by commonsense:
The salient point is that in going against the indications of common sense one
encounters a burden of proof so heavy that it can only rarely be discharged, seeing
that this would require something decidedly powerful and rather special.
Greco (2002: 553-554), as noted, argues that Reid and Moore both subscribe to the
following two principles, and then defends them on these (and other) points:
Rather than trying to prove that external things exist, or that we know that
external things exist, we should take a close look at the sceptic’s reasons for
saying that we do not know this.
Common sense has defeasible authority over philosophical theory.
Greco doesn’t draw this connection, but it seems safe to say that if one accepts the second
principle, one has good grounds for accepting the first. I said earlier that CT seems to
imply the second principle: because Moorean facts are more rational (for us to believe)
than philosophical principles, the former have authority over the latter. But perhaps the
second principle is really just a way of restating CT. And the first principle seems to be
implied by TT: because we can use our knowledge of a Moorean truth to rule out
skepticism, we should – instead of worrying whether we really know whether we have
hands or not – look at the skeptic’s argument and see where it has gone wrong. Huemer
(2001: 43) makes similar Moorean suggestions:
When you have standards of justification that impugn practically every belief you
have, then it becomes more reasonable, to think that the standards of justification
are in error than to think that almost all of your other beliefs are the product of
error. After all, there is no reason why beliefs in epistemological standards
should be any more immune from error than other kinds of beliefs, and one
symptom of such an error is that the belief would fail to cohere with the rest of
our beliefs about what is known/justified…. If a principle about what conditions
are required for knowledge turns out to conflict with our judgments in almost all
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the cases when we normally say someone “knows” something, the principle
should be revised.
Huemer certainly displays the common Moorean strategy: commonsense truths are more
reasonable, hence we should reject the skeptic’s principles. My Mooreanism also bears
striking resemblance to Bergmann’s Commonsensism (2012: 10):
Commonsensism: the view that (a) it is clear that we know many of the most
obvious things we take ourselves to know (this includes the truth of simple
perceptual, memory, introspective, mathematical, logical, and moral beliefs) and
that (b) we also know (if we consider the question) that we are not in some
skeptical scenario in which we are radically deceived in these beliefs.
Armstrong (2006: 160), a self-avowed Moorean, gives the following advice to us when
we consider revisionary theses such as Zeno’s paradox:
If we take the premisses of Zeno’s arguments, and compare them with the
conclusion ‘motion does not exist’ then we are very much more sure of the falsity
of the conclusion than we are of the truth of the premises. Zeno’s arguments are
really very tricky—he was an excellent philosopher—but the rational response to
them is not to give up on motion but rather to conclude that there must be
something wrong with the argument in each case even if we cannot spot what is
wrong with it. That, I think with Moore, is the correct strategy for turning away
attacks on Moorean truisms.
Lycan (2001: 41), in a series of comments worth quoting at length, makes essentially the
very same point as Armstrong and the other Mooreans:
Common sense must yield to evidence, as I have said, but it need not yield to bare
metaphysical pronouncement. Moreover, as is notorious, a priori metaphysical
views historically have little staying power; one philosophical era’s fundamental
principles are often rejected in the next era as ludicrous superstition. No purely
philosophical premise can ever (legitimately) have as strong a claim to our
allegiance as can a humble common-sense proposition such as Moore’s
autobiographical ones. Science can correct common sense; metaphysics and
philosophical “intuition” can only throw spitballs.
Just as there is no such thing as an idealist argument that does not appeal to some
abstract metaphysical or epistemological principle that is simply assumed without
defense, there is no such thing as a skeptical argument that does not do the same
thing. Which is to say that there is no good reason to accept the argument; the
unargued principle is only philosophy stuff. Even if the principle does seem true
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to us when first we consider it – at the particular temporal and geographical point
in the history of philosophy, and well cossetted amid the philosophical
community we happen to inhabit and its defining fads – there is no rational
ground for pledging allegiance to it in preference to a plain truth of common
sense.
My conception of Mooreanism also lines up nicely with Kelly’s (2005a: 181)
characterization of the Moorean view:
My own sympathies lie with the Moorean. I believe that there are very substantial
limits on how radical a change in our views philosophy might legitimately inspire.
For example, in epistemology—the domain on which I’ll focus in what follows—
I suspect that, ultimately, the skeptic simply cannot win. The sense in which the
skeptic cannot win is not that he will inevitably fail to persuade us of his
conclusion—that, after all, might be a matter of mere psychological stubbornness
on our part, which would, I think, be of rather limited philosophical interest.
Rather, the sense in which the skeptic cannot win is that it would never be
reasonable to be persuaded by the skeptic’s argument. Moreover, I think that this
is something that we can know even in advance of attending to the specifics of the
skeptic’s argument: in a sense, the skeptic has lost before the game begins.
I could go on: Moorean-friendly passages that fit well with my conception of
Mooreanism abound in philosophical discussions of skepticism. My main point in this
subsection, in quoting all these passages, is again simply to demonstrate that my
conception of Mooreanism as a metaphilosophical response to the skeptic is not
idiosyncratic, but fits well with how those within the commonsense tradition think about
the Moorean response to skepticism.27
1.2.6 Mooreanism, Liberalism, and Conservatism
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I could call my dissertation “Metaethical Reidianism” rather than “Metaethical Mooreanism.” After all,
Moore is really a Reidian when it comes to skepticism. However, in the contemporary epistemological
literature on skepticism, the commonsense answer is usually discussed under the rubric of Mooreanism
rather than Reidianism. One reason this is so, perhaps the main reason, is that many contemporary
discussions focus on Moore’s Proof, the proper way to understand it, and its merits and demerits. Since I
am, here in this dissertation, explicitly taking the response referred to as “the Moorean response” in
contemporary epistemology and applying it to moral skepticism, it seems best to go with “Metaethical
Mooreanism” rather than “Metaethical Reidianism.”
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Before moving on to the third and final section of this first chapter I should like to say
something about the relationship between Mooreanism and the recent debate between
liberals and conservatives in the epistemology of perceptual belief. In some – many,
really – of these discussions Mooreanism is explicitly invoked, usually either to contrast
it with conservatism or to make the point that Mooreanism is compatible with both
liberalism and conservatism. I think this latter point is correct, and that getting clear on
all this will help us to better understand Mooreanism itself.
Recall Moore’s Proof:
Moore’s Proof
M1: Here are two hands.
M2: If hands exist, then there is an external world.
M3: So there is an external world.
Let’s work with a variation on Moore’s Proof, what I’ll call “Moore’s Argument:”
Moore’s Argument
C: If I am justified in believing that I have hands, then the skeptic’s argument to
the contrary fails.
H: I am justified in believing that I have hands.
~S: So, the skeptic’s argument to the contrary fails.
Conservatism says that Moore has justification to believe he has hands (or, that H is true)
only if he has some independent justification to believe ~S. Liberalism denies this,
affirming that your perceptual experience that you have hands can, all by itself, give you
justification to believe ~S.28 The Moorean response to skepticism is sometimes regarded
28

There are minor differences in how these positions are formulated, but my formulations capture the way
these terms are typically used. For discussions of liberalism and conservatism, see Pryor (2004), Silins
(2008), Tucker (2010a), Neta (2010), and Willenken (2011). The choice of the terminology here is
unfortunate, in my view, for Huemer (2001) had coined the term “phenomenal conservatism” just before
those engaged in debate about perceptual justification started using the phrases “liberalism” and
“conservatism.” Huemer used, and uses, “phenomenal conservatism” for the view that, roughly, a seeming
that p gives one prima facie justification to believe that p. Owing to Pryor (2000) and Tucker (2010b) that
view is often called “dogmatism.” A dogmatist about perceptual justification says that a perceptual
seeming that P is enough, all by itself, to give one justification to believe that P – no independent
justification to rule out skeptical hypotheses incompatible with P is needed for one’s perceptual seeming
that P to give one justification to believe that P.
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as a liberal response: the thought is that the Moorean denies that justification to believe
that one has hands depends on having independent justification to believe ~S.29
A number of epistemologists – such as Silins (2008), Tucker (2010a), Neta
(2010), and Willenken (2011) – have pointed out, however, that Mooreanism is not
incompatible with conservatism. The explanations in each case are different, and I won’t
attempt to rehearse them here. What I would like to point out is that it should be clear
that, as I have defined Mooreanism, it is fully compatible with conservatism. Neither CT
nor TT include or entail a rejection of conservatism. TT might look to be incompatible
with conservatism as it says that it is in virtue of CT that we can use our knowledge or
justified belief in Moorean truths as a rational basis to reject skeptical arguments which
conflict with them. This might make it seem as though the Moorean takes the liberal
view and denies that we need independent justification for ~S to have justification for
believing that we have hands. In reality, though, Mooreanism is neutral with respect to
liberalism and conservatism. A liberal Moorean will say that we can use our knowledge
of or justified belief that we have hands to rule out skeptical arguments to the contrary
(and so affirm ~S), and also that having justification for the thought that we have hands
doesn’t depend on having independent justification for ~S. A conservative Moorean, by
contrast, will say that we can use our knowledge of or justified belief that we have hands
to rule out skeptical arguments to the contrary (and so affirm ~S), and also that our
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This thought seems to be due in large part to Pryor (2004), who entitled one of his defenses of liberalism
“What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?”, and Wright (2008), who pits conservatism against
Mooreanism.
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perceptual experience that we have hands justifies the proposition that we have hands
only if we also have independent justification for ~S.30
Conservative Mooreanism seems like a strange view: if having justification for I
have hands entails having independent justification for ~S, how can I reason from H to
~S? Let J1 be my justification for I have hands, and J2 my justification for ~S. We’ll
say that J1 is my perceptual seeming that I am handed, and that J2 is the justification I
have for the proposition that my belief-forming faculties work reliably. Where this
justification comes from isn’t relevant here as this is just an example. If I don’t have J1
unless I also have J2, then two things look to follow. First, J1 is justificationally parasitic
upon J2; if so, then it doesn’t look like J1 can provide any support to ~S on its own – all
its justificatory power comes from being conjoined to J2. Thus, once you’ve got J2, you
don’t need J1 to get to ~S. Second, reasoning from H to ~S (assuming C, of course)
looks like a strange inference; given J2, why not just reason straight from J2 to ~S?
I’ll tackle the second issue first. To do so, I need to introduce an idea from
Tucker (2010a), that of an inefficiently structured deduction. This is how Tucker
explains it (511):
Let us say that a deduction P therefore Q has an inefficient structure just in case
(i) the subject has…evidence E that warrants both P and Q, (ii) P entails Q, and
(iii) the subject bases his or her belief in Q on his or her belief in P, a belief that is
itself already based on E. This structure is inefficient in that, other things being
equal, the subject could have appropriately based Q on E without using P as an
intermediate step.

30

There are two ways that having an independent justification for ~S might bear on having justification for
H. First, it might be that the independent justification for ~S is an enabling condition on having
justification for H; second, it might be that independent justification for ~S is part of the justification for H
itself. These distinctions, and others, are drawn in Silins (2005).
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Now it seems clear that reasoning from H to ~S is inefficient, for J1 justifies both H and
~S – it’s just that, on the conservative view, it only possesses justificatory power in
tandem with J2 (or when J2 is on the scene as well). So, it’s inefficient because I could
reason straight from J1 to ~S rather than from H to ~S. (We’re here abstracting away
from the consideration that we don’t normally reason from perceptual seemings to
perceptual beliefs.) But it’s inefficient in another way too, for, given J2, I don’t need to
reason from H to ~S; I can reason straight from J2 to ~S. Two things can be said here.
First, as Tucker points out, the fact that this deduction is inefficiently structured doesn’t
imply that one cannot come, through it, to have first-time doxastically justified belief in
~S. And though this may seem unduly artificial, in this context it’s really not. If a
skeptic challenges me to produce a justification for my belief that there’s an external
world (let’s say), Moore’s move is certainly quite natural: “here’s one hand, here’s
another.” I may never have formed a belief that ~S before, and may do so now on the
basis of a belief in H. If so, then I can come to have first-time doxastically justified belief
that ~S on the basis of H – so long as J2 is in place (on the conservative view). Second,
there doesn’t seem to be anything epistemically untoward about reasoning from one’s
justified belief that one has hands, which is based on J1, to ~S simply because J1 doesn’t
do epistemic work without J2. Suppose that I don’t have justification to believe that rape
is bad unless I also have independent justification to believe that my moral faculties
(those cognitive faculties of mine that produce my moral beliefs) are reliable. This
dependency relation doesn’t make it epistemically untoward to reason from my (justified)
belief that rape is bad to the conclusion that skeptical arguments to the contrary must fail
in some way. Again: suppose that I don’t have justification to believe in other minds
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unless I also have justification to believe that my cognitive faculties are reliable. This
dependency relation doesn’t undermine an inference from a justified belief in other minds
to the conclusion that the skeptic’s argument that, say, no minds exist must be flawed in
some way or another.
The conservative Moorean says that J1 doesn’t do justificatory work on its own,
without J2. I said that this makes J1 parasitic upon J2, and thus that it can’t justify I have
hands all by itself. But of course this is no independent problem, for this just is the
conservative view! A conservative Moorean will say that, given CT, there is an
independent justification J2 for ~S, i.e. a justification for ~S independent of J1 (which is
the perceptual seeming of being handed): namely, that ~S, and H and other propositions
which imply ~S, have more going for them than any skeptical alternative, any
conjunction of skeptical premises. CT is, in effect, what J2 is the justifier of for the
conservative Moorean. So, Mooreanism is perfectly compatible with conservatism. The
conservative Moorean can say that a perceptual seeming of being handed justifies I have
hands for some agent A only if A has justification for CT, which of course A does
(assuming that A is a normal cognitive agent), on the Moorean view. In virtue of this
perceptual seeming and CT, A can rationally infer that something is wrong with the
skeptic’s conjunction. We can think of it this way: conservatism answers the question,
“When will a perceptual seeming that P give one justification to believe that P?” The
conservative answer is: “When one also has some independent justification to reject
skeptical arguments that ~P.” Different conservatives will say different things about
what this independent justification must be. Mooreanism answers the non-identical
question, “Am I in a position to reject skeptical alternatives to P?” The Moorean answer
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is: “Yes, for P is more rational for me, has more going for it, than does the skeptic’s
premises.” CT is independent of J1 (a seeming that one has hands) and thus can function
as J2 (the independent reason for ~S) for the conservative Moorean.
Having showcased the way in which liberalism and conservatism are both
compatible with Mooreanism, let me point to two misunderstandings of Mooreanism.
One comes from Neta (2010), on whose view Mooreanism would be the claim that the
justifier which gives me justification for I have hands – here, J1, which is my perceptual
seeming of being handed – also gives me justification for ~S. This is a misunderstanding
for two reasons.31 One is that the Moorean need not say that J1 is also the very same
thing which gives me justification for ~S. A Moorean is free to say that my justification
for ~S is independent of my justification for I have hands. A Moorean might say that
what gives me justification for ~S is my total evidence, or default entitlement, or a track
record argument, or whatever. The other reason Neta’s understanding of Mooreanism is
a misunderstanding is a point I’ll not belabor: Neta’s conception of Mooreanism fits less
well with the commonsensist, Moorean tradition than does my own conception.
Mooreanism is really, at heart, a metaphilosophical claim about the epistemic superiority
of commonsense propositions, not the view that my perceptual seeming for the existence
of my hands is also what serves as the justification for the view that, say, there is an
external world. Mooreanism is fully compatible with that claim, but it is not that claim.
The other misunderstanding of Mooreanism comes from Wright (2008), who
claims that neo-Mooreanism is the view that Moore’s Proof doesn’t suffer from
transmission failure. In a case of transmission failure vis-à-vis. justification, the premises
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of an argument, though themselves justified, would fail to pass along this justification to
the conclusion they entail. The view that Moore’s Proof doesn’t suffer from transmission
failure may be neo-Moorean, but it is not the Moorean view. Wright is correct in saying
that this view is neo-Mooreanism rather than Mooreanism. In any case, this presents us
with an occasion to further clarify the Moorean position. A Moorean need not deny that
Moore’s Proof suffers from transmission failure. We can imagine a Moorean who
endorses (i) the conservative claim that Moore has justification for M1 only if he has
independent justification for M3 and (ii) a view of transmission according to which, if
one’s justification for a premise depends on one’s justification for the conclusion, then
the premise cannot transmit justification to the conclusion (whether this is the correct
way to think about transmission is not relevant at the moment). Someone who endorses
(i) and (ii) can also endorse CT and TT. This Moorean will say that it is more rational for
Moore to believe M1 and M3 than it is for Moore to believe the conjunction of the
skeptic’s premises (CT), and also that in virtue of this Moore may reject the skeptic’s
argument (TT).
In closing, let me say something about the possibility of a Mooreanism which
rejects Moore’s Argument. The way I have set things up in this subsection, one would
naturally assume that all Mooreans subscribe to Moore’s Argument. Liberal Mooreans
argue that my having justification for H gives me justification for ~S without the help of
any independent, antecedent justification for ~S. Confronted with a BIV argument, the
liberal Moorean then reasons from C and H to ~S. Conservative Mooreans argue that I
don’t have justification for H unless I’ve got independent justification for ~S but also
that, assuming such independent justification is present, I can then reason the same way
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the liberal Moorean does: from C and H to ~S. The assumption that all Mooreans
subscribe to Moore’s Argument is something I implicitly reinforced by my attempt to
explain and offer a defense of the plausibility of conservative Mooreanism, which
featured a conservative Moorean engaged in an inefficiently structured deduction from C
and H to ~S. While I myself agree with Tucker (as noted above) that an inefficiently
structured deduction from H to ~S can result in first-time doxastically justified belief that
~S, I’d like to be sensitive to the possibility of a conservative Moorean who rejects the
notion that I could have doxastically justified belief that ~S because I inferred it from H.
The Moorean I have in mind here, to which I’d like to be sensitive, claims that the
need to have independent justification for ~S in order to have justification for H blocks
the path of reasoning from H to ~S, and thus goes on to rejects Moore’s Argument: one
can’t reason from H to justified belief that ~S if one’s justification for H depends on
one’s justification for ~S. Such a Moorean might think that Moore’s Argument is, in this
respect, like Cohen’s (2002) red table argument, where I reason from this table looks red
to this is not a white table illuminated by red lights. On this Moorean’s view, I can’t
have justification for the red table premise unless I’ve got independent reason to reject
the white table conclusion; naturally, then – says this Moorean – I can’t get doxastically
justified belief in the conclusion on the basis of inferring it from the premise. Such a
Moorean is still a Moorean, though: this Moorean affirms the possibility and actuality of
justified belief in ~S, including Mooreanism’s CT: we’ve got plenty of independent
reasons for thinking S is false as our total evidence clearly favors ~S. This Moorean also
affirms TT: in virtue of this total evidence and our evidence for specific Moorean truths
(I have hands, pedophilia is bad, 1 is an odd number, etc.), I reject skeptical philosophical
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arguments against those truths. What we see in the final analysis, then, is that CT and TT
are the real heart of the Moorean response to skepticism. One can endorse them without
endorsing Moore’s Argument as a good response to the skeptic.32
1.3 Conclusion
As a metaphilosophical view about what we are to do in the face of skepticism,
Mooreanism per se doesn’t take views on the nature of evidence, justification, when an
argument suffers from transmission failure, and so on. Of course, the Moorean qua
working epistemologist will want to think about all these things and come up with views
about them. But qua metaphilosopher the Moorean says only that commonsense truths
are more rational for us than conjunctions of skeptical premises, and that in virtue of this
we may reject the skeptic’s argument. Mooreanism is thus only the first step one takes in
responding to skepticism. Mooreans may offer diverging analyses of the malady
afflicting the skeptic’s arguments.
In my view a great many epistemologists are Mooreans, many of whom don’t
necessarily think of themselves as Mooreans. Skeptics, of course, are not Mooreans.
Those who offer a partially concessive response are not Mooreans either. Anyone who
does or would affirm CT and TT counts as a Moorean. Mooreanism so construed is a
metaphilosophical claim that fits well with the commonsense, Moorean tradition,
including many if not most of its current subscribers. One reason for thinking that a great
many epistemologists are Mooreans is that a great many are not skeptics, nor do they
offer partially concessive responses to skepticism. I take it that these philosophers, upon
seeing a skeptical argument, don’t actually doubt whether, say, they have hands. They
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may not know where the skeptic goes wrong, or may have a different diagnosis than their
epistemology peers, but they know that he does, and they set about trying to figure out
where he errs, proffering diagnoses and prescribing cures.33 I take it also that a great
many philosophers who don’t specialize in epistemology also believe that they know they
have hands and thus that skeptical arguments to the contrary are somewhere flawed, and
that they hold these beliefs under the realization that they don’t quite know how to
diagnose the malady in the skeptic’s argument. These folks would also be Mooreans, or
at least Moorean sympathizers. Interestingly, then, while many philosophers who are not
Mooreans recoil at commonsense responses to skepticism as terribly unphilosophical,
their own non-skeptical, I-have-hands affirming beliefs would put them squarely in
Moore’s camp.
In closing, I should point out the obvious: I have offered no arguments for nor a
defense of Mooreanism. A comprehensive apologetic would be out the question in a
dissertation aimed at applying Mooreanism to a metaethical dispute. My aim in the
dissertation as a whole is to apply Mooreanism to moral skepticism. That at least
requires, I think, an exposition of Mooreanism, which is what I have tried to provide in
this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2. METAETHICAL MOOREANISM AND
EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING

Metaethical Mooreanism (MM) is the view that some moral truths are Moorean truths.
Because of their strong epistemic status, as Moorean truths, they are immune to revision
in the face of philosophical arguments for moral skepticism. The MM strategy is to apply
to moral skepticism the Moorean response to radical skepticism. The basic idea of the
strategy is quite simple: just as it is more rational for us to believe we have hands than it
is to believe the premises of the skeptic’s argument, so it is more rational for us to retain
certain moral beliefs, such as that raping children for fun is wrong, than it is to accept the
premises of the moral skeptic’s argument In the first section of the chapter I’ll argue that
some moral facts are Moorean facts. In the second I’ll discuss moral skepticism. In the
third section I apply MM to the evolutionary debunking argument. I close the chapter out
with a response to objections.
2.0 Metaethical Mooreanism
MM is the view that some moral facts are Moorean facts. In the last chapter I extensively
discussed Mooreanism. I won’t repeat that discussion here. For the sake of convenience,
though, it might be helpful to have in front of us the two tenets of Mooreanism:
Commonsense Thesis (CT): Some truths are Moorean truths and it is more rational
for us to believe in the Moorean truths than it is to believe the conjunction of the
skeptic’s premises (a conjunction which entails the negation of a Moorean truth).
Transmission Thesis (TT): In virtue of CT we can use our knowledge or justified
belief in Moorean truths to provide a rational basis for rejecting (conjunctions of)
skeptical premises.
Given the characterization of Moorean facts in the previous chapter, I think we can
readily see that certain moral facts are good candidates for being Moorean truths. To see
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this, let’s work with a particular moral proposition R: that raping children for fun is
wrong. There are plenty of other examples readily at hand: that torturing babies for fun is
wrong, that recreational genocide is ethically impermissible, that sex trafficking is
morally unacceptable. But let’s focus on R for now. I say that R is a good candidate for
being a Moorean fact. For starters, let’s acknowledge that R, like other Moorean facts,
may not be widely held, and this for the simple reason that it’s possible that very few
people have ever explicitly considered R. R may be one of those truths whose veracity is
so obvious that many people may never explicitly consider or articulate it. Let’s also
acknowledge that, like other Moorean facts, R isn’t psychologically irresistible.
Someone might get talked out of R, or might be subject to some cognitive malfunction
such that she no longer believes R or never comes to believe R in the first place. On the
other hand: R is not a deliverance of any expertise-admitting domain like physics or
neuroscience. Like other Moorean truths, it concerns the common affairs of ordinary life.
As with many other Moorean truths, people will typically believe R in the basic way
rather than on the basis of an argument. Of course, as is the case with many other
Moorean facts, this doesn’t preclude the possibility of arguing for R. The point, though,
is that R, when considered, is typically believed in the basic way, and also that, as with
many Moorean truths, this seems entirely above board: I don’t need an argument for R to
be justified in believing R any more than I need an argument that I have hands to be
justified in believing I have hands. This (the truth of R) is something I can just see to be
true. Most likely, any argument for R would employ premises less obviously true than R
itself. It is worth mentioning here that this is how things typically go with Moorean facts:
philosophical arguments for them, while not worthless, usually employ premises less
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certain than the Moorean facts themselves. R is not something we typically assert
because, like many other obvious truths, it is taken for granted. We don’t need to go
around asserting R any more than we need to go around asserting that we have hands.
Those who have never considered R are, for the most part, disposed to believe R. It is
one of those things that nearly every sane (adult) person would believe were it brought
before the mind’s eye. Denying R will, like denials of Moorean truths generally, come
off as absurd, and even those who deny it (such as moral nihilists) will act as though it
were true and will express horror at those who act in the way that R says is wrong. To
those who consider it, R will seem obviously true. And, finally, I submit that R is more
justified for us than are the premises of arguments to the effect that R is false or that no
one knows R. I will argue for this below, but for now, let us sit back and take stock of
the clear similarities between R (and similar moral claims) and other commonsense
propositions. It looks as if R can be characterized in all the ways that mundane Moorean
facts can be, and thus that some moral facts, such as R, are Moorean facts. I maintain,
then, that we should think that R and similar claims are Moorean facts until we get a good
reason to think otherwise.
That is my argument for MM, though later on in the chapter I will respond to the
objection that R and other similar moral claims are not good candidates to be Moorean
truths. Before turning to moral skepticism I need to briefly ward off three possible
misunderstandings of MM. First, MM does not hold or imply that moral knowledge is
typically easy to come by. So, it’s compatible with thinking that many of our moral
beliefs fail to amount to knowledge.34 Second, MM does not hold to or imply any
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particular set of views in applied or normative ethics; it isn’t Aristotelian or Kantian,
conservative or liberal, pro-life or pro-choice. It’s neutral on these and other
controversial moral questions. Like Mooreanism, MM is a metaphilosophical view, the
claim that some moral facts are Moorean facts, and thus are things we are more rational
in affirming than we are the skeptic’s argument to the contrary. Third, MM is compatible
with the claim that the philosophically responsible thing to do, in the face of skeptical
argument against R, is to make an effort to diagnose the malady in the skeptic’s
argument. MM does not say that, since we are rational in affirming R rather than the
skeptic’s premises, we should just ignore the skeptic’s argument and refrain from taking
it seriously. MM is consistent with (but does not require) the idea that we have an
intellectual obligation to look long and hard at the skeptic’s argument in order to see
where it has gone wrong.
2.1 Moral Skepticism
Moral skeptics deny that we have moral knowledge. Whether losing moral knowledge
requires being aware of the skeptical argument depends on the kind of skeptical
argument on offer. Some skeptical arguments don’t do epistemic damage unless one is
made aware of them; others are more potent, not requiring awareness to defeat. You
might think, with expressivists, that moral beliefs are not truth-apt (they can’t be true or
false) on the grounds that moral claims do not express propositional content. Since
knowledge requires true belief, expressivism rules out moral knowledge. This kind of
moral skepticism doesn’t require awareness of expressivist arguments to be effective.
Another way to motivate moral skepticism is the idea that moral nihilism (fictionalism,
error theory) is true, i.e. that there are no moral facts, and thus that all moral beliefs are
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false. Since knowledge requires truth, nihilism implies that no one has any moral
knowledge. This kind of moral skepticism also doesn’t require that we be aware of the
revisionary argument in order to suffer from a lack moral knowledge.
There are other ways of motivating skepticism, however, which do require, for the
loss of moral knowledge, that we be aware of skeptical arguments. To get these versions
going all we need to think is that having a good reason to think that your belief B is false
(or a good reason to doubt whether it’s true) or a good reason to think it was unreliably
formed (or a good reason to doubt whether it was reliably formed) is incompatible with
rationally holding onto B.35 Perhaps you are persuaded, maybe by recent research in
empirical moral psychology, that there is good evidence that we form our moral beliefs in
unreliable ways. You might think that, regardless of how people do respond to a
skeptical argument utilizing this evidence, the way they should respond is to suspend
judgment about, or even to outright disbelieve, the contents of their moral beliefs. Then,
since failing to appropriately respond to your evidence against P implies having a
defeater for your belief that P, those who know about the best arguments against our
having moral knowledge have a defeater for all their moral beliefs.
Of course, if those who do know about these arguments do respond appropriately,
then, on the skeptical view, they’ll suspend judgment on (or perhaps disbelieve) the
contents of those beliefs, thereby not believing them, and thereby lacking moral
knowledge. Imagine that a moral skeptic gives you a reason to doubt that your moral
beliefs were reliably formed and that the epistemically appropriate response to this reason
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is to doubt that your moral beliefs were reliably formed. You’d then have a defeater for
all your moral beliefs.36 Or maybe you think that our moral beliefs, even if justified and
true, could have easily been false, thus failing the safety condition (one candidate for
being the anti-Gettier condition on knowledge), and thus failing to amount to
knowledge.37 And even if the safety condition isn’t needed for knowledge, perhaps it’s
the case that anyone who learns that her belief that P could have easily been false thereby
acquires a defeater for that belief.38 Clearly, there are many ways to motivate the claim
that we lack moral knowledge. If MM is true, though, there is a way out of the weeds
and back to the sanity of justifiedly believing, and even knowing, R and similar claims.
If R is a Moorean fact, then it won’t be rational for us to abandon belief in R on the
grounds that some skeptical argument shows belief in R to be untenable.
One question that arises at this point is whether revisionist metaethical theories such
as relativism and constructivism count as kinds of moral skepticism. Obviously, moral
nihilism is a kind of moral skepticism, the kind that eliminates moral knowledge by
eliminating moral truth.

But what if a revisionary argument ends with the conclusion

that moral facts are constructed; would that count as an argument for moral skepticism?
Don’t revisionary views like constructivism and relativism affirm first-order pieces of
moral knowledge whilst giving a non-standard account of their truth-conditions? Does
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Bedke (2014) makes the similar suggestion that finding out that your belief that P is insensitive, that you
would believe that P in the nearest worlds where P is false, gives you a defeater for that belief. He then
worries about whether this is true on the grounds that sensitivity might not be a condition on knowledge. I
think he underestimates the force of the worry he raises: sensitivity need not be a condition on knowledge
for it to be the case that learning that your belief that P is insensitive gives you a defeater for that belief. Of
course, learning that a belief of yours was insensitively formed may not always give you a defeater;
unfortunately, an account of all this would take us much too far afield.
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that non-standard account imply that we lack moral knowledge, or does it perhaps have
some other unacceptably revisionary implication? Although I myself do not incline
toward such revisionary views, they do not necessarily count as forms of moral
skepticism, at least not given the way that I am understanding moral skepticism here.
The basic reason is that it seems possible for relativists and constructivists to affirm that
we know R to be true.39 They will tell a different metaethical story about the truth of R
than does the standard moral realist, but they can still say that R is true and that we can
have non-accidentally justified true belief that R. In support of my contention that there
are versions of relativism and constructivism that need not count as forms of moral
skepticism, I should like to point out that there are relativists who argue that some
versions of relativism count as versions of moral realism and constructivists who argue
that constructivism is compatible with the claim that our true moral judgments are true in
virtue of representing moral reality.40 Scott James (2009) explicitly argues, in the context
of responding to evolutionary debunking arguments, that they fail to properly reckon with
realist versions of constructivism (more on this later). However, these are contentious
claims, the adjudication of which would take us too far afield (into the Byzantine field of
metaethical cartography); and just mentioning that some relativists and constructivists
think their views count as realist views obviously falls far short of anything approaching
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an argument for this alleged compatibility. For now, let me conditionalize my way
around the adjudication by saying that relativism and constructivism just as such can
avoid counting as versions of moral skepticism only if there are versions of these views
which can affirm that we do (or can) know R to be true. If there are no versions of
relativism and constructivism that can affirm that we know R to be true, then MM will
rule them out, requiring us to be more traditional realists, i.e. realists who affirm that
moral truth is attitude-independent.41
Relativism and constructivism may well still run afoul of MM on some other
grounds, and of course they may be deeply problematic and highly implausible in spite of
their ability to affirm moral knowledge. Street (2009), for example, herself a
constructivist, acknowledges that on “attitude-dependent conceptions of normative
reasons” (274) it follows that the “ideally coherent Caligula has most normative reason to
torture people for fun” (275). If she’s right about this then it may well also be true that,
on constructivism, some people have most normative reason to torture babies for fun.
This is incompatible with the truth of R. So, if constructivism, or some version of it,
implies not-R, then MM will rule it out.
Can the proponent of MM go further and argue that the claim that the truth of R is
mind-independent, in some robust realist sense, is also a Moorean truth? I am skeptical
that a good argument for this claim could be mounted. The idea that R’s truth is mind-
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independent does not fit many of the descriptions of Moorean facts given earlier in this
section: it is not something almost any sane person would believe on reflection, nor does
its denial come off as absurd. It strikes me more as a philosophical idea rather than as a
pre-theoretical item of common sense. It does not concern the common affairs of
everyday life but rather the truth-maker for R, a recondite philosophical matter. I do not
think this is something for the realist to lose sleep over because I think there are good
reasons for affirming a robust realism; it’s just that I’m skeptical of the idea that the truth
of R is mind-independent is a matter of common sense. MM, then, cannot function as a
stand-alone defense of traditional (robust) moral realism. To rationally maintain one’s
belief that the truth of R and similar propositions is mind-independent in some anticonstructivist way one will have to rely on philosophical arguments.
Having said that, there is one situation in which one can utilize MM to defend the
conjunctive idea that we know R to be true and that its truth is mind-independent in a
robust realist sense. The situation I have in mind is that of having independent grounds
(independent of MM) to reject relativism and constructivism. Suppose you do have such
grounds for thinking that the only way for R to be true is for its truth to be independent of
our normative attitudes. (For example, suppose that, as discussed above, constructivism
implies that one could have most normative reason to torture people for fun, and that one
has good grounds for rejecting this possibility.) Then suppose you come upon an
argument for moral skepticism, one which implies that you don’t know R to be true.
Here, you cannot retreat to relativism or constructivism to save your knowledge of R;
you’ve already ruled those out on independent grounds. In this situation you have a
choice between the idea that you know R to be true, where R’s truth is independent of
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your normative attitudes, and the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises. Utilizing MM,
you can argue that the truth of R, or your knowledge of R’s truth, has more going for it,
epistemically speaking, than does the conjunction of the skeptic’s premises, and thus that
the rational thing to do is to continue believing R. In this situation you would be using
MM to defend a robust moral realism by way of using MM to defend your realist
knowledge of R. Only in a situation like this could one use MM to defend a robust kind
of moral realism that is incompatible with relativism and constructivism.42
2.2 Mooreanism vs. Evolutionary Debunking
One thing I’ve not yet done is argue that we are more justified in believing R than we are
in believing conjunctions of skeptical premises to the contrary. I think this argument is
best made in the context of considering specific skeptical arguments. In such a context
we can compare the epistemic credibility of claims like R with the epistemic credibility
possessed by arguments for moral skepticism. So I now turn to one such argument, one
that has recently garnered a lot of attention: the evolutionary debunking argument (EDA).
The purpose here is twofold. First, to substantiate MM’s claim that that we are more
justified in believing R (and similar claims) than we are in believing the skeptic’s
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Before I go on to apply MM to evolutionary debunking arguments I should like to point out that nowhere
in my description of Mooreanism or MM have I appealed to a faculty of common sense or to a moral
faculty. I do not think Mooreans have to make use of such faculty psychology, though some in the
commonsense tradition have made use of such a psychology (Reid, most noticeably). A Moorean
commonsensism can be formulated with or without such a psychology. Having said that, I do not deny that
there is a moral faculty, in this sense: I do not deny that there is a special cognitive faculty dedicated to the
moral domain. And affirming that there is a moral faculty that all properly functioning humans possess
might make it easier to argue for the claim that Moorean facts like R have authority over philosophical
skepticisms to the contrary. For arguments in support of a “universally distributed” moral faculty, see
Smith (2010), who also argues for something he calls “commonalism,” which is the view that
“nonphilosophers’ moral beliefs are no less authoritative than philosophers’, and hence, that the task of
normative theory is not to revise, but rather to discern and explain the shared moral conception that we all
apply in our ordinary moral lives” (41).
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premises; second, to showcase MM in action, to see how it looks “in the field” when it
bumps up against a specific skeptical argument.
Evolutionary debunking arguments have been advanced from a number of
quarters: Wilson and Ruse (1986), Street (2006), Joyce (2006), Locke (2014), and Fraser
(2014), among others. Unfortunately, there isn’t just one single argument we can talk
about when we talk about evolutionary debunking.43 Because of this, critics of
evolutionary debunking arguments typically engage with one main interlocutor or attempt
to reconstruct an evolutionary debunking argument that is representative of the shared
worry pressed by the evolutionary debunkers. I will do the latter and work with a
reconstructed version of the evolutionary debunking worry, one that attempts to bring
together into one argument the related worries of the various debunkers.
Evolutionary Debunking Argument (EDA)
1. If our moral beliefs are produced by a process such that we have reason to
either (a) believe it fails to track moral facts or (2) suspend judgment on
whether it tracks moral facts, then our moral beliefs are not justified.
2. Our moral beliefs were produced by natural selection.
3. We have reason to either (a) believe that natural selection fails to track
moral facts or (b) suspend judgment on whether natural selection tracks
moral facts.
4. Therefore, our moral beliefs are not justified.44
(2) can be read in one of two ways: as the claim that the capacity to form the moral
beliefs we find ourselves with was produced by natural selection, or as the claim that our
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Moon’s (2016) assessment is correct: “Presentations of EMDAs [evolutionary moral debunking
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moral beliefs themselves are the product of natural selection.45 I will often talk of the
“moral faculty,” in a very broad way, so as to be able to talk about the EDA without
disambiguating the two ways of reading (2). Used in this broad way the phrase (“moral
faculty”) can refer to either capacities or beliefs, or both. My usage is also meant to be
compatible with there being a special cognitive faculty dedicated to moral belief and with
the view that moral belief is the product of more general cognitive powers as they are
applied to matters of right, wrong, good, and bad.
To say that natural selection fails to track moral facts, or is, as Kahane (2011) puts
it, “off track,” is to say that the development and selection of the moral faculty was not
sensitive to moral truth. Our moral faculty was selected because its doxastic outputs
helped our ancestors behave in ways that were conducive to their reproductive fitness, not
because it helped them have true moral beliefs. When I speak of moral beliefs being offtrack, or of natural selection failing to track moral facts, this is what I shall have in mind.
Now, if natural selection is an off-track process with respect to moral facts, then it would
be a dazzling coincidence were it to turn out that our moral beliefs are somehow
positively correlated with the independent moral truths. Absent a good explanation of
this dazzling coincidence, we shouldn’t believe it; some things really are too good to be
true.
Notice that I have given the debunker two routes, differing in strength. The
stronger route is based on the claim that natural selection fails to track moral truth; the
weaker route is based on the weaker claim that we have reason to suspend judgment on,
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to be agnostic about, whether our moral beliefs are truth-tracking. Both routes promise a
lot of trouble for the moral realist. On the stronger version of the EDA, we have good
reasons to doubt the reliability of the moral faculty, which gives us a defeater for belief in
its doxastic products; on the weaker version, we have good reason to suspend judgment
on the reliability of the moral faculty, which also seems to give us a defeater for our
moral beliefs.
Thus the EDA. I turn now to an examination of the way in which a proponent of
MM should think about it. The goal here is not to provide a decisive case against it, to
pinpoint the actual problem the argument suffers from and then to go on and describe the
true relationship between evolutionary theory and ethics. Rather, the goal is to showcase
MM in the field, to show what it looks like in action, and to substantiate the claim that we
are more justified believing R than we are in accepting the EDA.
2.2.1 Moore on the Evolutionary Debunking Argument
The EDA implies that we don’t know or justifiably believe that R (recall: R is raping
children for fun is wrong) is true. The metaethical Moorean will say the following about
the EDA: it is more rational for us to believe R than it is to accept the EDA. The
metaethical Moorean will explain this as follows: the EDA’s stated premises, suppressed
premises, and implications are, taken together, less epistemically credible than the truth
of R. R is thus epistemically superior to the EDA, and thus we may, on those
epistemological grounds, reject the EDA – even if we don’t yet know exactly what is
wrong with the EDA.
In what follows I note a number of problems with the EDA, problems that render
it epistemically inferior to R, defects with the EDA that make it more rational for us to
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accept R than to accept the EDA. These problems fall under three broad categories:
coherence concerns, empirical concerns, and philosophical concerns.
2.2.2 Coherence Concerns
There are a number of concerns that I group together here. In one way or another, they
all broadly concern the issue of coherence: the EDA is, in some way, incoherent. The
coherence worries are different: some amount to the charge that the EDA implies more
radical skepticisms, which its proponents are unwilling to take on board; others allege
that proponents of the EDA, in arguing for the EDA and their alternative to traditional
moral realism, help themselves to normative intuitions whilst barring their opponents
from appealing to their normative intuitions. Finally, at least one critic has argued that
the EDA is just flat-out self-defeating.
Let us begin with the most serious charge: that the EDA is self-defeating. This
argument has been made by Daniel Crow (2016) in a fascinating comparative discussion
of Alvin Plantinga’s (2011) evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) and
Sharon Street’s (2006) Darwinian Dilemma (DD). The gist of Plantinga’s EAAN is that
the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given the conjunction of
metaphysical naturalism (think: atheism) and evolution, is either low or inscrutable,
giving us a defeater for all the doxastic outputs of all our cognitive faculties, including
belief in naturalism; thus, belief in naturalism is self-defeating. In a context in which
theism and metaphysical naturalism are the only two options worth taking seriously, the
EAAN amounts to an argument for theism. The gist of Street’s DD is that the moral
realist is faced with two unacceptable choices, namely, to either (i) deny that there is a
tracking relation between our moral beliefs and the independent moral truths, in which
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case it turns out to be a near-miraculous coincidence that our moral beliefs are positively
correlated with the moral facts, or (ii) affirm a tracking relation, which is both
unsupported by our best evolutionary understanding of the development of the moral
faculty and inferior to an alternative explanation, the adaptive link account, which says
that we hold the moral beliefs we do because holding those beliefs provided reproductive
advantages for our ancestors.
Enter Crow, who argues that Plantinga and Street rely on the same claim: that the
probability that a given cognitive faculty is reliable in a specific domain is low (or
inscrutable) given that it was produced by “Darwinian forces” (141), or forces that
weren’t concerned with its truth. As Crow puts it, “each philosopher appeals to
evolutionary explanations to support a similar kind of claim: the mechanisms that explain
what we believe within target domains were not selected because any of the resulting
beliefs were true” (136). Both arguments rely on the absence of truth-tracking to explain
why the probability that certain of our cognitive faculties is reliable is either low or
inscrutable.46 It would seem that someone who accepts the relationship between off-track
evolutionary development and unreliability in the moral case would also be committed to
accepting it in the other cases. And now the problem for Street is that, in virtue of this
shared commitment to the link between off-track evolutionary development and
unreliability, her DD commits her to the EAAN, and hence to theism.47 But if theism is
true, then the DD won’t go through; for, on theism, we can say that “God has engineered
46
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the coincidence between our beliefs and the stance-independent [moral] facts” (140).
Nor is this engineered coincidence incompatible with evolutionary theory. Angus Ritchie
(2012: 174) explains:
A theistic explanation of the emergence of moral knowledge need not conflict with a
version of the theory of natural selection. The theist need not deny that the processes
described by evolutionary biology explain the generation of human convictions about
ethics, and their capacity to reason about these convictions and refine them. All that
the theist needs to add to the account given by evolutionary biology is the claim that
the world is providentially ordered so that the interaction of the quasi-teleological
process of natural selection and of the spandrel-like features it generates yield an
outcome which enables human beings to apprehend that which is of objective value.48
Street can make some moves to avoid the argument that DD implies the EAAN and thus
theism, which in turn defeats the DD – hence the problem that DD appears to be selfdefeating – but these moves undermine the DD in a different way: by adding additional
controversial commitments to the DD, commitments that won’t compare favorably to R
and its ilk.
Crow’s “Plantingian pickle” (as he puts it) brings to the fore two problems for the
EDA. First, it highlights the fact that atheism is a “suppressed premise” (as he puts it) of
the EDA. On theism, it really isn’t the case that the correlation between our moral beliefs
and the moral facts is a dazzling coincidence; rather, the correlation has a good
explanation. What this means is that, in order to defend the third premise of the EDA,
debunkers will have to claim and argue for the proposition that God does not exist (or
that, if God does exist, it remains unlikely that he would see to it that our moral beliefs
are at least minimally truth-tracking). Second, in order to avoid the argument that
Street’s DD, and the EDA more generally, imply acceptance of Plantinga’s EAAN, the
evolutionary debunker will need an argument for one of two claims: (i) that Darwinian
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forces are off-track with respect to our moral faculty but not with respect to the rest of
our cognitive faculties or (ii) that belief that Darwinian forces are off-track undermines
belief in the reliability of the moral faculty but fails to do so with the rest of our cognitive
faculties. The upshot of these two problems, for the metaethical Moorean, is that we are
now comparing R to the premises of the EDA as well as the suppressed premise of
atheism and the premises needed to ward off moving from the EDA to the EAAN and its
global skepticism. Do we really have more justification for believing all these things
than we do for believing R? That is unlikely, says the proponent of MM.
Let’s move now to a second kind of coherence worry: that the EDA implies other
forms of skepticism, forms that are less global than that implied by the EAAN, but
troubling nonetheless. Tom Crisp (2016) argues that the probability that we have reliable
insight into abstract metaphysical matters, given the truth of (metaphysical) naturalism
and the formation of our cognitive faculties by evolutionary processes, is inscrutable.
This gives the practitioner of naturalistic metaphysics a defeater for her metaphysical
beliefs. Earlier, Crisp (2011) made the same argument about philosophy in general: the
probability that we have reliable insight into “recondite philosophical matters” (116)
given the truth of (metaphysical) naturalism and the formation of our cognitive faculties
by evolutionary processes, is inscrutable. But since the EDA looks like it is itself a piece
of abstract metaphysics, or at least of piece of philosophy, it follows that the proponent of
the EDA can no longer believe its premises. To avoid this conclusion, the evolutionary
debunker will need a set of arguments to the effect that (i) the EDA doesn’t count as
abstract metaphysics or even a piece of philosophy or (ii) abstract metaphysics
specifically, or philosophy more generally, somehow evades Crisp’s worries.
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Unfortunately, the skeptical worries don’t end there. Justin Clark-Doane (2012)
argues that the EDA can be extended to math, thereby undermining mathematical
realism. In response to the claim we were “evolutionarily selected to have true
mathematical beliefs” (329), Clark-Doane argues that our ancestors were tracking logical
truths rather than mathematical truths, that logical truths were adaptive rather than
mathematical truths being adaptive (329-331). To deal with this worry, evolutionary
debunkers can accept mathematical antirealism or make an argument that the EDA can’t
be extended to math. In either case the evolutionary debunker takes on board more
highly controversial philosophical commitments.
The arguments of Crisp and Clark-Doane show that the commitments the
evolutionary debunker has to take on board are really quite extensive. She now has on
board all of the following: the stated premises of the EDA, the suppressed premise of
atheism, an argument that the EDA doesn’t commit her to the global skepticism implied
by Plantinga’s EAAN, another argument that the EDA doesn’t commit her to skepticism
about philosophy, and one of the following disjuncts: mathematical antirealism or an
argument that the EDA doesn’t commit her to mathematical antirealism. These
multitudinous commitments are or rest on highly controversial philosophical premises
about which we can nary find so much as a shred of agreement; is this set of controversial
claims really epistemically superior to R? That seems unlikely, says the metaethical
Moorean.
A third and final coherence problem for proponents of the EDA concerns uses of
normative beliefs in arguing for the EDA and in constructing alternatives to traditional
moral realism. The problem of delimiting the evolutionary debunker’s skepticism to the
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moral domain, which has been amply displayed, gets even trickier once we take notice of
the fact that the evolutionary debunker needs to offer a debunking case which meets two
further conditions: (i) it targets moral beliefs without also targeting evaluative or
normative beliefs in general and (ii) it doesn’t itself rely on normative intuitions and
judgments, be they moral or epistemic. If the EDA fails condition (i), it will undermine
itself in virtue of undercutting the domains of moral and epistemic normativity, and an
argument which undermines epistemic reasons will not be able to give us an epistemic
reason to accept it. And if it fails condition (ii), its proponents open themselves up to a
what’s-good-for-the-goose-is-good-for-the-gander reply from realists: if you debunkers
get to rely on your normative intuitions and judgments, then so do we realists. But this
spells trouble for the EDA, for if realists can rely on their normative views, they will have
good grounds for concluding that the dazzling coincidence between moral belief and
moral truth has in fact occurred.49
Unfortunately for the evolutionary debunker, the EDA does rely on normative
intuitions and judgments. Selim Berker (2014: 240) is worth quoting on this point; his
interlocutor here is Street:
Street’s argument for antirealism in general does, in fact, rely on substantive
normative judgments and intuitions. Her Darwinian dilemma against realism relies on
substantive normative intuitions of the following sort, among others: intuitions about
the epistemic relevance of tracking the truth, intuitions about the good- and badmaking features of explanations (scientific and otherwise), intuitions about the nature
of the in-virtue-of relation when it takes normative relata, intuitions about when pain
does and does not provide reasons, and intuitions about whether belief attributions
qualify as normative judgments. Moreover, Street acknowledges that the Darwinian
dilemma on its own is not enough to conclusively support antirealism; one also has to
make a case that the force of the Darwinian dilemma in favor of antirealism is not
outweighed by the counterintuitiveness of antirealism’s apparent consequence that
(for example) an ideally coherent Caligula has conclusive reason to torture others for
49
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fun. Street devotes an entire article to arguing that this consequence is not as
counterintuitive as it might seem.50
Berker is not the only critic who has noticed this. Vavova (2015) points out that the
evolutionary debunker relies on one set of evaluative beliefs to debunk another set of
evaluative beliefs: she relies on epistemically normative beliefs (beliefs about what we
should and shouldn’t believe) to debunk morally normative beliefs. Debunkers typically
hold that it is illegitimate for their critics to use their moral beliefs as part of their
response to the EDA: they say that to make legitimate use of our moral beliefs in such a
way we need independent reasons, i.e. reasons independent of our moral intuitions and
judgments (cf. Fraser 2014: 471), to think that our moral cognition is reliable. Notice that
this very claim is itself an epistemically normative proposition. The debunkers appear to
be holding their critics to a standard from which they exempt themselves.
Three worries arise at this point for proponents of the EDA, in light of their implicit
reliance on normative intuitions and judgments. First, wouldn’t the same debunking line
of reasoning that undermines realist belief in moral truths also undermine realist belief in
epistemic truths? If so, how can the EDA go through? As Vavova argues, on the
evolutionary story told by the debunker, beliefs in the domain of epistemic normativity
would be held because they are adaptive rather than because they are true; but then it
looks like they would be subject to the same off-track worries as beliefs in the domain of
moral normativity.51 The second worry, also from Vavova, goes like this: to know that
it’s possible that the adaptive moral beliefs and the true moral beliefs can come apart, the
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Schafer (2010) makes a similar point. He notes that the evolutionary debunker needs the claim that “the
properties our normative faculties track…are unlikely to have…normative significance” (477). But, notes
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debunker must have some idea of what morality is like; otherwise, how could she
justifiedly say that items in these domains could very well not line up? It looks like the
debunker is committed to using her intuitions and beliefs about the moral just to make her
own case for the severability of the adaptive and the moral. The third worry is this: if the
evolutionary debunker is entitled to use her epistemically normative beliefs in pressing
the evolutionary worry, why can’t the moral realist use her morally normative beliefs in
responding to the evolutionary worry? Why can’t the moral realist reason from her true
moral beliefs to the conclusion that there is a positive correlation between the outputs of
the moral faculty and the independent moral truth? The only conceivable answer the
evolutionary debunker could give is that the Darwinian worries which undercut our moral
beliefs do not also undercut our epistemic beliefs. So, the evolutionary debunker will
have to tell a story on which we retain justification for our epistemological beliefs but not
for our moral beliefs, a story which undermines some normative beliefs whilst leaving
others unfazed. If she can’t tell this story she won’t be able to make the EDA go through
as it relies on epistemological premises that will be undermined by the argument itself.
Here is the take-home lesson, says the metaethical Moorean: we are comparing our
justification for R to our justification for the premises of the EDA, the suppressed
premise of atheism, and the complicated stories delimiting Darwinian skepticism to the
domain of moral normativity. Almost nothing in this complicated web of propositions is
uncontroversial. Rather, at every stage of the total argument the evolutionary debunker
will have need of controversial philosophical ideas about which there is no consensus.
And it’s very difficult to see how we could have more justification for that conjunction
than we do for the notion that R is true.
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2.2.3 Empirical Concerns
Empirical concerns come from a number of quarters. The main thrust of those
concerns is that we have good reason to be suspicious that an adaptationist explanation
can be given for all of our moral beliefs. The explanation for the off-track nature of the
evolutionary development of the moral faculty is that natural selection would’ve selected
it because its doxastic products were fitness-enhancing, or adaptive, rather than because
they were true. This suggests a strategy for responding to the evolutionary debunker: if
we can find some moral beliefs that would not have been fitness-enhancing for our
ancestors, we will then have found some moral beliefs that are not subject to evolutionary
debunking. Thus, the scope of the EDA will be limited to only those moral beliefs
subject to an adaptationist explanation, which of course won’t imply wholesale moral
skepticism.
In some sense, of course, the moral faculty and its doxastic products do have an
evolutionary explanation: since we are the products of an evolutionary process, a
complete account of what we are like and why we are this way must advert to the theory
of evolution. But the claim that morality has an evolutionary explanation is ambiguous
between at least two interpretations: (i) that morality (the human moral capacity, the
moral faculty) is an adaptation and (i) that morality is a by-product. To say that morality
is an evolutionary adaptation is to say, as Zamulinski (2009: 5) puts it, that “the human
moral capacity…is assumed to exist because it increases our viability or fertility.” To say
that morality is an evolutionary by-product is to say that the human moral capacity “is a
feature that exists because it is tied to the adaptation. There is selection for the adaptation
but selection of the by-product” (22). For example (to borrow form Zamulinski), big
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brains are an adaptation, big skulls are a by-product: big brains were selected because of
their fitness-enhancing qualities, but big brains require big skulls for housing. There was
selection of big skulls, but selection for big brains. This distinction between selection for
and selection of makes room for the possibility that there was selection of a reliable moral
faculty even if there was not selection for a reliable moral faculty. “Bones were not
selected for being white,” writes Brosnan (2011: 58), “but their being so was nevertheless
selected” (58). We’ll discuss how this might go in more detail a little later, but for now
let’s note one possibility: perhaps the non-moral facts which the moral faculty was
selected to track ground the moral facts which supervene on them. If so, then there might
have been selection of reliable moral cognition even though there wasn’t selection for
reliable moral cognition.52
The evolutionary debunkers’ understanding of the evolution of morality is the
adaptationist one: they think morality is an adaptation. Moreover, the evolutionary
debunker “must hold,” as Huemer (2016: 1994) writes, “that all of our moral beliefs are
adaptations.” This assumption is needed to enable the evolutionary debunking argument
to do work. If morality is an adaptation, then, assuming that the fitness-enhancing beliefs
and the true moral beliefs can come apart, there would be selective pressure on behalf of
fitness-enhancing beliefs but not on behalf of true moral beliefs. In this case, it would be
a pure coincidence were it to turn out that our ancestors’ fitness-enhancing beliefs were
positively correlated with true moral beliefs.53 Thus, the idea that the moral faculty is an
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To borrow an example from Street (2006), believing in this positive correlation would be like believing
that “setting out for Bermuda and letting the course of your boat be determined by the wind and tides” is a
reliable way to get to Bermuda.
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adaptation is needed to sustain the EDA’s claim that we have reason to think that natural
selection is an off-track process with respect to our moral beliefs, or that we at least have
reason to suspend judgment on whether natural selection is off-track.
Zamulinksi provides an interesting argument for the conclusion that morality is
not an adaptation. The basic thrust of the argument is that adaptationism about morality
“has difficulty explaining our apparent ability to believe that all other human moral
agents are worthy of moral consideration no matter the community to which they belong”
(7). More specifically, Zamulinksi records three “recalcitrant observations” that make
explanatory trouble for the adaptationist. The first is that “some people act as though all
others are worthy of moral consideration.” The second is that “many people approve of
those who act as though all others are worthy of moral consideration.” And the third is
that “people tend to regard those who act as though all others are worthy of moral
consideration as especially praiseworthy because they go to the aid of members of an
alien group, because they help non-kin, and because they do not expect gain, reward, or
reciprocation” (7). These observations are not what we would expect on the assumption
that the moral faculty has an adaptationist explanation. Creatures who are disposed to act
in ways that fit these three observations do not enhance the fitness of their group or kin,
hence group selection and kin selection do not lead us to expect those observations. Nor
does the selection process of reciprocal altruism predict these observations, for here the
observations describe and record helping behavior that is non-reciprocal. Or at least so
argues Zamulinski. The proponent of the EDA could respond by trying to argue that a
disposition to act in these ways is adaptive after all. Obviously, this will require still
further premises, complicating the story and filling out the controversial commitments
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required by subscribing to the EDA. It is important in this context to keep in mind the
strategy being deployed by the metaethical Moorean: every attempt to make the EDA
more complete, more persuasive, and less vulnerable to serious criticism is going to come
at an epistemic cost, namely that of added controversial commitments, additions that
make an epistemic comparison with R less and less likely to come off in favor of the
EDA.
Zamulinski is not the only critic to notice that there are parts of the moral tapestry
that don’t look like they admit of an adaptationist explanation. Huemer (2016) argues the
widespread acceptance of a liberal realist view of morality cannot be satisfactorily given
an evolutionary explanation. In Huemer’s hands, liberalism is a moral view that “(1)
recognizes the moral equality of persons, (2) promotes respect for the dignity of the
individual, and (3) opposes gratuitous coercion and violence” (1987). A growing
acceptance of liberal realism over time provides a coherent account of recent moral
progress in the areas of violence, torture, slavery, racism, sexism, democracy, and
decolonization. Huemer goes on to argue that the adaptationist explanation of these
phenomena is far less compelling than the realist explanation, which accounts for them
by way of an appeal to our grasp of moral truth.
A final example: Buchanan and Powell (2015) argue that there are four features of
our morality that can’t be given an adaptationist explanation: (i) widespread recognition
of the moral value of animals, (ii) widespread recognition of the universalizability of
moral norms, such that they cover people outside our group and kin, (iii) widespread
belief in human rights, and (iv) “the emergence of a subject-centered morality that
compels us to recognize the moral standing of individuals who pose no threat to us or
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who do not contribute to cooperative goods” (50). According to Buchanan and Powell,
there is no good evolutionary account of this inclusivist morality; it’s not what we would
expect on the adaptationist story. In short, say Buchanan and Powell, a “major flaw” in
the evolutionary explanation of morality is that “contemporary morality…is strikingly
more inclusive than one would expect if selectionist explanations were the whole story,
or even most of the story” (48).54
The empirical worries just canvassed concern the scope of the adaptationist,
selectionist explanation of our moral beliefs. The worry is that it looks like some of our
moral beliefs don’t admit of such an explanation. To save the EDA, the evolutionary
debunker will have to add – to her stated premises, her suppressed atheistic premise, and
her story delimiting skepticism to the domain of moral normativity – an account of the
adaptationist selection of moral beliefs that, for all the world, don’t look like they can be
given a good evolutionary explanation. Of course, evolutionary debunkers already try to
do this, but the point is that here again we have another controversial set of propositions
to which proponents of the EDA are committed. When we compare the epistemic
credentials of R to the epistemic credentials of the EDA it must borne in mind that the
latter includes a host of controversial claims over which there is no consensus.
An even more worrisome possibility for the debunker is that the scope of the
adaptationist explanation of our moral beliefs is nil, i.e. that no moral belief has an
adaptationist explanation. According to Michael Deem (2016), no actual moral belief can
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be given an adaptationist explanation because moral beliefs are not “genetically
inheritable,” as Street (2006: 118) herself acknowledges.55 Street’s solution to this
problem is to claim that “basic evaluative tendencies” are genetically inheritable.56 So,
even if moral judgments themselves can’t be selected for, the tendency to produce these
judgments can be; in this way, perhaps moral judgments can be indirectly selected for.
Deem raises two problems for Street at this point. The first is that it is hard to see how a
capacity to make moral judgments would be more reproductively advantageous than the
basic evaluative tendencies themselves, tendencies which already produced the very
behavior called for by the moral judgments.57 That a capacity for moral judgment would
be more reproductively advantageous is yet another assumption the evolutionary
debunker needs, and one she will have to argue for, an argument which will make use of
further premises still. The second is that, if our basic evaluative tendencies are
adaptations, they wouldn’t exhibit “a high degree of flexibility and sensitivity to variation
in social learning environments” (733).
Could the debunker save the adaptationist claim about the moral faculty and its
evaluative tendencies by arguing that traits that are innate are adaptations, and then that
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Joyce would appear to concur. He writes (2006: 137) that, “No one would deny that cultural learning
plays a central role in determining the content of the moral judgments that an individual ends up making;
the claim is that there is a specialized innate mechanism (or series of mechanisms) designed to enable this
type of learning.”
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the basic evaluative tendencies operative in the moral faculty are innate? This appears to
be Joyce’s (2006: 133-139) strategy; in response to the possibility that morality is a byproduct rather than an adaptation, Joyce launches into an interesting and clever
discussion of the innateness of morality. Unfortunately, nowhere in this discussion does
Joyce argue that a trait that is innate is thereby an adaptation. And this is unfortunate
because adaptiveness and innateness come apart, in this sense: traits can be innate
without being an adaptation. Levy (2006: 613), in a critical discussion of Joyce, engages
in a thought experiment which helps us to see this point:
Consider my ability to upload songs to my iPod. The presence of this ability is to
be explained, at least in significant part, by reference to my genes, and of course
we can tell a story which explains why I have inherited those genes by reference
to the role they played in serving the reproductive interests of my ancestors.
Moreover, my ability to upload songs to my iPod might even be adaptive (perhaps
we can tell a sexual selectionist story about how it increases my inclusive fitness).
But my ability to upload songs to my iPod had better not count as innate.
And we can well add to Levy’s thought experiment the crucial point (for our purposes
anyway): that Levy’s ability to upload songs to his iPod would not count as an adaptation
even if it was innate. Such an ability could be innate without also being an adaptation.
So: it looks like our evolutionary debunkers still owe us a convincing argument
for their claim that the human moral capacity is an adaptation.58 And, unfortunately, the
EDA will only be as strong as the conjunction of that argument, its premises, and its other
multitudinous controversial commitments.
Questions about the scope of the adaptationist story naturally raise questions
about its depth: given that the best the evolutionary debunker can hope for is a
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selectionist account of the moral faculty’s basic evaluative tendencies, we have to wonder
how strong those tendencies are. According to FitzPatrick (2014: 242), this is the real
question we need to be asking: “How much influence has natural selection actually had
on the content of our current moral beliefs, by influencing ancestral moral belief-forming
dispositions to whatever extent it did?” Am I able to use moral experience and rational
reflection to resist the evolutionary tendency to take the stance toward P that might be
false but reproductively advantageous? Or is the evolutionary influence so strong as to
rob me of any and all intellectual autonomy?
For his part, FitzPatrick is willing to concede “substantial influence on crude
moral belief-forming dispositions when it operated on Pleistocene humans” (242). On
the other hand, when it comes to our current moral beliefs, FitzPatrick argues that
thousands of years of “cultural evolution…have…allowed us to engage in largely
autonomous moral thinking… [just as] when we do higher mathematics, or metaphysics,
or philosophy generally” (242). Granting partial evolutionary influence won’t do the
realist much epistemic harm. What the evolutionary debunker actually needs is not just
evolutionary influence, but the truth of the additional claim that “ongoing reflective
input” has not corrected for “distorting evolutionary influence” (245). To do this the
evolutionary debunker will have to show that none of our ongoing reflection has been
guided by an apprehension of the moral facts. Sadly, this just isn’t something that
evolutionary biology is equipped to show. There’s just no way to move, on the basis of
evolutionary considerations, from the claim that there has been evolutionary influence on
our moral belief-forming dispositions to the claim that there haven’t been any additional
influences on the formation of our actual current moral beliefs, influences that might
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correct for any distorting proclivities caused by the evolutionary influences.59 And yet
this is just what the debunker needs to argue to make the EDA work. FitzPatrick’s own
view is that evolution has given us the raw materials which we have then shaped, through
experience and reflection, into “reliable moral belief-forming dispositions” (245).
Evolutionary debunkers could try to make this case by appealing to the causal
inefficacy of moral properties and facts: if moral properties and facts are causally inert,
it’s tough to see how they could be guiding our reflection. This will come up in the next
subsection, where it will be discussed in greater length. For now, let’s just note that this
adds controversial commitments to the already bloated conjunction proponents of the
EDA have to take on board. If ethical naturalism is true and moral properties and facts
are reducible or identical to natural properties and facts, then it is difficult to see how
evolutionary debunkers could sustain a claim about the causal inefficacy of the moral.
So, evolutionary debunkers will need to argue for the falsity of ethical naturalism (as they
do, and we’ll discuss this down below). They also need to argue that non-natural moral
properties and facts are causally inert, a claim that has been disputed by certain nonnaturalists.60 The bottom line here is that the causal inefficacy of the moral is not a self-
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As FitzPatrick writes elsewhere (2015: 894), “Nothing in real science rules out this possibility, of course,
since the sciences don’t even address it.” And, a little later on: “it remains an open possibility that at least
many of our moral beliefs – like many of our beliefs in other domains – have been arrived at quite
independently of evolutionary influences…. The sciences cannot tell us how many of our moral beliefs fall
into this category” (900). See also FitzPatrick (2016). Schafer (2010: 480-481) makes a similar argument,
noting that our ability to tell that the development of our normative faculties was sensitive to nonnormative properties and facts does not imply an ability to tell that they weren’t also sensitive to normative
properties and facts. To make this leap we would need the additional claim that the non-normative
properties and facts tracked by natural selection have no normative significance. But clearly this isn’t
something one can get from evolutionary biology.
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evident truth; rather, it’s a controversial philosophical principle, one which makes
commitment to the EDA look more epistemically costly than commitment to R.
Worries about the scope and depth of the adaptationist account of the moral
faculty and its doxastic products might raise in one’s mind the question of whether the
moral realist can push the worry back one more level: is it possible to plausibly argue that
the moral faculty simply can’t be explained by an appeal to natural selection? Worries
about scope are less severe (for the evolutionary explanation of morality): they concede
evolutionary influence on some moral beliefs but question whether this can be extended
to all moral beliefs. Worries about depth are also less severe: they concede some
evolutionary influence on morality but question whether the evolutionary debunker can
rule out the presence of additional influences that might correct for evolutionary
distortion. Here we have a worry that is more serious: what if natural selection doesn’t
even explain the moral faculty at all?
This worry can be and has been pressed. The argument, made by Mogensen
(2016), is that the view that natural selection can be appealed to in a debunking argument
against realist belief in propositions like R assumes, falsely, that “natural selection
explains the traits of individuals” (1802). If I am to be epistemically bothered by the
EDA it can only be on the basis of the assumption that natural selection explains my own
belief in R, or perhaps that it explains my own strong evaluative tendency to endorse R.
But the idea that natural selection explains the traits of individuals is a highly contentious
and highly questionable assumption. The gist of the problem is that this assumption,
known as the “Positive View” in the literature, conflicts with origins essentialism.
Origins essentialism is the view that, as Pust (2001: 207) puts it, “each individual
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organism necessarily has the property of having been produced by the parent organisms
which in fact produced the organism.” Origins essentialism has the important implication
that “if a given reproductive episode had been prevented from happening, then the
organism produced in that reproductive episode would not exist” (208). How does this
conflict with the Positive View? Pust points out that the Positive View – and by
extension the EDA, we should add (following Deem) – implies the following assumption:
(F) If selection had produced an ancestral population with different traits, then we
would have had different traits. (210)
(F), however, conflicts with origins essentialism. The reason is that natural selection
“determines the distribution of traits in a population only by determining which
individuals in a given generation will contribute to the next generation” (210). And this
in turn implies that to have changed the “trait composition” of a population, natural
selection would have had to allow “different earlier organisms to successfully reproduce.”
But if different earlier organisms had reproduced, then it’s false that I would still exist but
have different traits: given origins essentialism, I would not exist at all. Mogensen (2016:
1803) draws the obvious implication for the EDA: my disposition to adopt a particular
moral belief simply cannot be explained by the fact that an ancestor of mine with this trait
had greater reproductive success. And if my tendency to adopt and believe R cannot be
explained by natural selection, then it cannot be debunked by natural selection.
But is it really credible to think that natural selection isn’t at least part of the
explanation for my possessing the basic evaluative tendencies and beliefs I do?
Mogensen is careful to point out that rejection of the Positive View still leaves it open
that natural selection can explain why a certain population exhibits a particular trait
(1803). So, his view seems to be that natural selection can explain a population’s
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possession of some trait T without also being able to explain why any particular
individual in that population has T. That does seem odd, at least at first blush, but in an
earlier paper Mogensen (2015) explains how this is possible. The explanation relies on a
distinction between ultimate and proximate causality. Ultimate causes of T belong to the
evolutionary history of the population. An insect population might have a certain
“pattern of coloration because it allows the insects to avoid predators” (198). Because of
this fitness benefit, natural selection favored this pattern over one that is less
reproductively advantageous. This fact about the fitness advantage of the population’s
pattern of coloration would be the ultimate cause of the pattern. Ultimate causes do not
exhaust the causal story, however. A proximate cause of T is one that operates within the
lifetime of the individual organism that possesses T. To return to Mogensen’ insect
population analogy, let’s imagine (with Mogensen) that the proximate cause of T’s
presence in the organisms that make up the insect population is that “juveniles eat a
certain kind of moss during a critical developmental period” (198). Clearly, ultimate and
proximate causes need not conflict; they are complementary rather than contradictory.
That T is a feature of the insect population because possession of T is fitness-enhancing
is fully compatible with the fact that individuals within the population have T because of
their juvenile eating habits. The analogy with our basic evaluative tendencies and their
doxastic products is clear: natural selection qua ultimate cause might explain the
possession of belief that R in the human population, but moral facts qua proximate cause
might explain why you and I hold that R is true.61
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Deem (2016: 741-744) makes an argument similar to Mogensen’s, one that invokes a distinction between
ultimate and proximate explanation. The essence of the argument is that whereas one can appeal to a
selectionist process that is indifferent to moral truth to (ultimately) explain the history and functional
significance of the moral faculty in the human species, one can also appeal to a truth-sensitive process to
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Any attempt to save the EDA from Mogensen’s objections is going to be costly,
epistemically speaking. To save the Positive View, which she needs to get the EDA off
the ground, she’s going to have to argue that origins essentialism is either false or,
contrary to appearances, not in conflict with the Positive View. And even if the debunker
manages to save the Positive View, she’ll have to argue for the further specific thesis that
the moral fact that R hasn’t played a proximate causal role in our belief that R – in your
belief that R, in my belief that R, and so on. Once again, things just don’t look too well
for the evolutionary debunker. Do we really have more justification for believing the
EDA’s states premises and suppressed premises, including now the Positive View and the
rejection of moral facts as proximate causes (for at least some of our moral beliefs, such
as our belief that R), than we do for believing R? That looks to be terribly unlikely, says
the metaethical Moorean.
2.2.4 Other Philosophical Concerns
In this subsection I lump together a number of different worries. The only thing they
share in common is that they cannot be categorized as coherence concerns or as empirical
worries. It is important to keep in mind what we are doing here: we are comparing the
epistemic credibility of R with the epistemic credibility of the EDA. This comparison
includes the EDA’s stated and suppressed premises. We are ferreting out those
suppressed premises so that we can try and discern whether it is more rational for us to
believe in R or the EDA. The metaethical Moorean argues that the EDA does not come

(proximately) explain the development and operation of the moral faculty in the individual members of the
species. Because these two types of explanation operate at different levels, they are not in competition with
one another.
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off favorably in this comparison. I turn, then, to a final set of suppressed premises
required by proponents of the EDA.
To get moral skepticism from the EDA we have to assume that no version of
constructivism can count as a version of moral realism. This is the first of three
philosophical worries I will canvas. If we think, with Scott James (2009), of realism as
the view that “some moral judgments are objectively true and that this truth is
independent of any particular individual’s attitude” (229), then it seems possible to come
up with plausible versions of constructivism that are also realist. James’s favored version
of constructivism, what he calls “contractualist constructivism,” says that “the truthmakers for moral claims are…facts about reasons, viz., those reasons that count in favor
of norms of behavior that no one with the aim of fixing on principles to regulate behavior
could reasonably reject” (220). James points out that this version of constructivism
should be construed as a version of realism on the grounds that it allows for the
possibility of global error: “What justifies a given principle P is not that we think P
withstands scrutiny…but that P withstands scrutiny from the relevant procedure whether
or not anyone has bothered to consider the matter” (232).
How is this relevant to the evolutionary debunking argument? Well, according to
James, an insensitivity to others’ reasons for evaluating your behavior would have
maladaptive consequences. But since the moral facts are constituted by how others
would evaluate your behavior, this insensitivity amounts to an insensitivity to the moral
facts, hence it turns out that insensitivity to moral facts is maladaptive. James’s response
is therefore best understood as an attack on the idea that natural selection is an off-track
process. Our ancestors would have faced heavy selective pressure to form true beliefs
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about the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of their actions from the perspective of
impartial others who occupy the “distinctly social standpoint” (222). Ignoring such facts
would not be adaptive: those who “systematically acted in ways that others could
reasonably condemn faced bleak futures, social and otherwise” (226). On his view, then,
natural selection would not have been an off-track process: it would have favored those
who could successfully track others’ reasons (which function as the truth-makers for true
moral propositions) over those who could not.
Street herself does not use the EDA to conclude to moral skepticism; rather, she
uses it to help motivate her own brand of constructivism.62 Unlike James, however,
Street does not see constructivism, or at least her version of it, as a version of realism.63
It looks like it is an open question whether constructivism is a realist or an antirealist
metaethical view. Earlier I pointed out that, on Street’s version of constructivism, it
might turn out that R is false, in the sense that it might turn out that some people have
most normative reason to rape children for fun. If this is correct, then MM will rule out
Street’s brand of constructivism. But in view of James’s more realist picture of
constructivism, it’s clear that the evolutionary debunker won’t be able to use the EDA to
get moral skepticism unless she can also rule out versions of constructivism that are
consistent with our knowing that R. Once again, the Moorean take-home point is not
hard to see: the evolutionary debunker will have to add to her stated and suppressed
premises a set of propositions which constitute reasons for rejecting realist
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constructivism. And to decide in favor of her debunking argument over against the idea
that we know or justifiably believe R to be true it’ll have to turn out to be the case that
our justificatory position with respect to the debunker’s total argument – i.e. her
argument combined with all the assumptions needed to make it work – is better than our
justificatory position with respect to R. That looks, by now, to be simply in-credible.
A second philosophical concern about the EDA stems from “third-factor”
responses. According to Enoch (2010: 430), on third-factor explanations of two
correlated phenomena A and B, “the explanation of a correlation between the two factors
A and B is in terms of a third factor, C, that is…responsible for both A-facts and Bfacts.” Enoch himself is congenial to such a response and identifies the goodness of
survival as the relevant third factor. The goodness of survival makes it the case that
actions that promote survival are also (pro tanto) good. Now, evolution would push us to
perform actions that promote survival, and one way of doing this is to produce in us the
belief that survival, and the actions that promote it, are good. The third factor, then, helps
to explain the correlation between our moral beliefs and the moral facts: judging that
survival and its promoters are good promotes fitness, but these judgments also tend to be
true. Why? Because of the goodness of survival and actions that promote it.
On this third-factor account, evolution would push us in the direction of moral
truth and thus would not be an off-track process. And this would hold even though it’s
also true that the moral faculty wasn’t selected because its doxastic products are
correlated with the moral truth. Third-factor accounts show us that it’s possible for the
moral faculty to be truth-tracking even though it was selected for its fitness-enhancing
effects and it wasn’t chosen because it was truth-tracking. Thus, as Berker (2014: 238)
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points out in his discussion of third-factor responses, these accounts are actually
compatible with Street’s adaptive link account, which says that our evaluative tendencies
were selected because they were fitness-enhancing. We simply need to clarify that while
there was not selection for a truth-tracking moral capacity, there could still have been
tracking of such a capacity.64 It turns out, then, that our moral beliefs can be truthtracking even though the moral truths don’t explain why we have the moral beliefs we do.
The goodness of survival doesn’t explain why we believe that survival is good, but it
does explain the correlation that obtains between our tendency to hold that belief and its
truth.
One complaint here is that third-factor theorists are relying on their moral beliefs
in responding to the EDA.65 But they can’t legitimately do this, for any “default
entitlement,” as Locke (2014: 231) puts it while making this very point, that these moral
beliefs enjoyed has been wiped out by the EDA. Maybe if third-factor theorists could
find an independent reason to think their moral beliefs were true, they could then use
them in a response to the EDA. But absent such a reason, any appeal to these defeated
beliefs is epistemically illicit.
The most sophisticated discussion of the legitimacy of relying on moral beliefs in
replying to the EDA comes from Andrew Moon (forthcoming). Moon, following
Plantinga, makes a distinction between a defeater-defeater and a defeater-deflector. A
defeater-defeater is a proposition that defeats a defeater; a defeater-deflector is a
proposition that prevents a putative defeater from doing any defeating work in the first
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This way of putting the point comes from Brosnan (2011).

See Wielenberg (forthcoming) for a discussion of third-factor responses in the literature on the
evolutionary debunking of morality. For his own third-factor response, see Wielenberg (2010).
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place. The evolutionary debunker says that the probability that the moral faculty is
reliable, given its evolutionary history, is low. The third-factor theorist, as Moon sees it,
concedes this claim but responds with the claim that the probability that the moral faculty
is reliable, given evolution and the relevant third-factor moral truths, is not low. So,
given evolution and the further claim that survival is good (for example), the probability
that the moral faculty is reliable is not low, or at least not low enough to defeat all our
moral beliefs. Locke and company complain that such third-factor moral truths have
been defeated by the EDA and so can’t do any work as defeater-defeaters. Moon raises
the possibility that third-factor moral truths can function as defeater-deflectors, in which
case they would prevent the EDA from wiping out the default entitlement we enjoy for
our moral beliefs.
The dialectic pushes us to this question: are third-factor moral truths defeated by
the EDA, such that they can’t be used to respond to it, or can they function as defeaterdeflectors, thus preventing the EDA from doing any defeating work in the first place?
Moon argues that evolutionary debunkers can block third-factor moral truths from being
used as defeater-deflectors only if they subscribe to the “Anti-Circularity Deflector
Principle:”
Anti-Circularity Deflector Principle
[I]f belief in the reliability of some source X has a potential defeater, then one
cannot use any deliverance of X to deflect that potential defeater.
The problem with this principle, says Moon, is that it is false. He proposes a
counterexample to make his case. Imagine that you take a knowledge-destroying pill,
one that abolishes the reliability of the cognitive faculties of almost everyone who takes
it. However, before you took the knowledge-destroying pill a scientist whom you know
to be reliable told you that you are one of the few people alive who is immune to the pill.
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This knowledge can be used as a defeater-deflector: it prevents your knowledge that you
took the knowledge-destroying pill from defeating the doxastic products of your
cognitive faculties. And here is the problem: if you subscribe to the Anti-Circularity
Deflector Principle, you’ll have to say that you cannot use your belief that the trustworthy
scientist told you that you are immune to the knowledge-destroying pill to deflect defeat.
The reason is simple: this belief (that a trustworthy scientist told you that you are immune
to the knowledge-destroying pill) comes from a source (your cognitive faculties) that has
a potential defeater (the information that you took the knowledge-destroying pill). But
clearly this is the wrong verdict on the case. So, the Anti-Circularity Deflector Principle
is false.
If Moon is right, then the charge of question-begging, leveled by Locke and the
evolutionary debunkers against third-factor theorists, is off the mark. So long as we do
enjoy default entitlement to our moral beliefs, there is nothing epistemically illicit in
using certain of these to formulate a third-factor reply to the EDA. To save the EDA the
evolutionary debunker will have to do one of three things. First, show that third-factor
accounts like Enoch’s are so implausible that they can’t be taken seriously as moral
theories. A second option would be to defend the Anti-Circularity Deflector Principle. A
third route would be to reject the Anti-Circularity Deflector Principle whilst maintaining
that while one can use one’s justified belief that one is immune to the knowledgedestroying pill as a deflector one cannot use one’s third-factor belief about the grounding
of moral facts as a deflector. Taking this third route would require formulating an
epistemological principle that explains which kinds of propositions can be appropriately
used as deflectors and which cannot. Every route just canvassed will imply adding
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additional controversial commitments to the stated and other suppressed premises of the
EDA.
One other possible rejoinder the evolutionary debunker might make comes from
Fraser (2014), who argues that it isn’t reasonable for us to think that our moral faculty is
reliable unless it meets certain conditions, and that there is no reason to think that our
moral faculty has met these conditions. His case for this rests on the broader claim that
we can expect an “evolved cognitive mechanism” to be reliable only if we have good
arguments for thinking that certain conditions have been met. He rejects third-factor
attempts to redeem the moral faculty on the familiar charge of question-begging: this
faculty does not meet the relevant conditions, thus we have no reason to think that it is
reliable; but this gives us a defeater for its doxastic outputs, and so they can’t be used to
do any defeating work themselves.
Obviously, Moon’s argument, canvassed above, provides a partial reply to Fraser.
I should like to add two additional points, however. First, Fraser’s argument assumes
that we are justified in believing that a cognitive faculty is reliable only if we have good
arguments that the evolutionary history of that faculty is likely to have made it reliable.
And his reply to third-factor theorists shows that he thinks it impermissible to rely on a
cognitive faculty to help you make your case for its reliability. This is precisely why, on
his view, we can’t rely on our moral beliefs in order to argue for the reliability of the
moral faculty. But these lines of argument quickly add up to global skepticism, for they
imply that, to be justified in believing in the reliability of any of our cognitive faculties
we have need of the impossible: justified beliefs that are themselves not products of our
cognitive faculties.
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Second, Fraser’s argument seems to assume that we are justified in thinking that
our moral faculty is reliable only if we are justified in thinking that it is at least
moderately probable that the moral faculty is reliable given that it meets his specified
conditions. Any belief formed by a faculty that doesn’t meet these conditions is likely to
be false. Brosnan (2011), however, makes the case against the view that a belief that fails
these conditions is thereby likely to be false. Let’s use moral proposition R (= raping
children for fun is wrong) to explain Brosnan’s case. To say that the posterior probability
of the truth of my belief that R, given its evolutionary history (P[R/R’s evolutionary
history]), is low one has to be able to assign both a prior probability to R (P[R]) and a
likelihood to the probability of R’s evolutionary history given R (P[R’s evolutionary
history/R]). The problem, says Brosnan, is that it will be very difficult for the
evolutionary debunker to make any reasonable probability assignment for the prior
probability of R. We could also add to Brosnan’s point here: it looks like it will also be
very difficult for the evolutionary debunker to say how likely is R’s evolutionary history
given the truth of R. How could the evolutionary debunker even make any kind of
probability assignment here at all?
One final philosophical worry is worth mentioning. Evolutionary debunkers think
that natural selection is an off-track process because: (i) natural selection would have
favored moral beliefs that are fitness-enhancing or adaptive and (ii) the true and the
adaptive come apart. Given (ii), it would be sheer coincidence were our moral beliefs
roughly correlated with the independent moral truths. There are two problems here, one
having to do with (ii) and one having to do with the idea of coincidence. The coincidence
claim has been subjected to thorough examination by Shafer-Landau (2013), who
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discerns and finds problems with five different interpretations of it. Allow me to provide
a taste of how this goes. One interpretation of the coincidence claim has it that there are
many possible moral systems and views, and that the odds that we hit on the right one(s)
are quite low. Shafer-Landau develops several responses, but one is that the same line of
reasoning would imply perceptual skepticism as well:
There is an indefinitely large number of psychologically possible perceptual
beliefs. Our perceptual faculties have led us to endorse only a small subset of
them. Suppose that, in order to avoid begging questions, we are not allowed to
take any such judgments for granted in assessing the reliability of those faculties.
If the original line of argument is sound, then this should lead us to conclude that
we have no perceptual knowledge if perceptual truths are construed realistically.
No debunker believes this. Almost no one else does, either. (12)
The other four readings of the coincidence claim don’t come off much better. A different
kind of critique of the coincidence claim comes from Schafer (2010: 484-485), who
argues that the coincidence claim only engenders defeat for the realist on the assumption
that if X and Y aren’t explanatorily related, then it’s a priori unlikely that X and Y both
obtain. Schafer questions whether we are entitled to make this assumption and then
points out that, even if we can make the assumption, it proves to be a problem for moral
realism only if moral realism includes more explanatorily-unrelated conjunctions than
does any rival view. Clearly, however, the EDA doesn’t establish that, and nor has
anyone else. Obviously, I don’t mean to be settling debates about the coincidence claim
in favor of moral realists here. I’m simply pointing out that the evolutionary debunker’s
coincidence claim will have to be properly stated and defended; it’s not clear what the
coincidence claim amounts to, whether it’s true, whether we aren’t entitled to believe in
such coincidences if we have reasons to think they’ve occurred, and how moral realism
would fare in a comparative analysis of the coincidences that afflict it compared with
those that afflict rival views. To resolve these worries, which will need doing to make
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the EDA go through, the evolutionary debunker will have need of even more
controversial commitments.
Let’s now briefly turn our attention to (ii), the claim that the true moral beliefs
and the adaptive ones come apart. It’s not clear that this is true. Jeff Wisdom
(forthcoming) defends a view he calls “proper function moral realism.” On this view,
facts about what human beings ought to do are grounded in facts about what conduces to
human flourishing. Wisdom argues further that the biological function of the “moral
sense,” as he calls it, is to track facts about that which conduces to human flourishing.
On his view, then, the biological function of the moral sense is to track moral truths via
tracking their truth-makers: facts about what conduce to human flourishing. Wisdom’s
view is not at all idiosyncratic and shares much in common with neo-Aristotelian ethical
naturalism, such as Philippa Foot’s well-known Natural Goodness (2001). To maintain
the severability of the true and the adaptive, and thus to maintain their view that natural
selection is an off-track process, evolutionary debunkers will have to rule out appeals to
views like Wisdom’s proper function moral realism. This could be done by arguing that
Wisdom isn’t epistemically entitled to use his normative intuitions and judgments in the
face of the EDA or by arguing that his proper function moral realism, and allied views,
are too implausible to be taken seriously. We’ve already seen how complicated things
(cf. our discussion of Moon above) can get when the evolutionary debunker tries to block
realists from making any appeal their moral beliefs. The latter option might be a good
way to go in the sense that views like Wisdom’s might be highly problematic. But it will
take arguments, and thus further controversial commitments, to establish this.
2.2.5 Preliminary Conclusion
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We’ve seen that proponents of the EDA are committed to a bloated nest of controversial
propositions in several areas of philosophy. Of course, most of us are in this position in
the sense that most of us hold controversial views across a wide range of philosophical
sub-disciplines. This in itself is not problematic. But it is problematic when a particular
combination of these controversial views implies the falsity of a Moorean truth like R. In
truth, it is often very difficult to find adequate reason for believing any one such
controversial view. It is even more difficult to find adequate reason to believe that a
particular conjunction of such views enjoys more justificatory support than Moorean
truths like R. On MM, we enjoy more justificatory support for Moorean facts like R than
we do for arguments like the EDA. Hopefully, our discussion of the EDA and the many
controversial commitments it requires has borne this out.
2.3 Objections and Replies
In this section I should like to consider objections to MM. I will not consider objections
to Mooreanism proper because this chapter assumes Mooreanism proper and then applies
that assumption to debates in metaethics. A defense of Mooreanism itself lies beyond the
scope of this essay. So, for example, I won’t consider criticisms like “we’re supposed to
follow the argument where it leads” and “Mooreanism is unphilosophical.”66 Instead, I
will consider two criticisms that pertain specifically to metaethical Mooreanism.
The first criticism attacks the strategy of pointing out that proponents of the EDA
are committed to a whole lot more than their stated premises. The worry here is that
almost every interesting view in philosophy requires a host of ancillary commitments.
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The odds that any of these networks of controversial propositions are correct is probably
quite low. Doesn’t this mean that we therefore shouldn’t believe such networks? After
all, many of these propositions won’t be properly basic for us and so will require
arguments. How likely is it that a controversial philosophical proposition, its ancillary
requirements, and the arguments in its favor will all pass epistemological muster? So,
doesn’t the strategy “prove too much” in that it undermines our ability to hold onto just
about any controversial philosophical view?
My response here is twofold. First, it may well be that, at least in many cases, we
should hold our controversial philosophical views lightly, that we should assign them
middling or moderately low probabilities, even perhaps that we should accept them rather
than believe them, where acceptance is understood as a doxastic attitude weaker than full
belief.67 It seems to me that this is the attitude that many philosophers already hold
toward many of their controversial views. Holding our controversial philosophical views
lightly may be what epistemic modesty requires of us. If so, we shouldn’t balk, but
should acknowledge the humble epistemic status occupied by our controversial
philosophical views. Second, metaethical Mooreanism doesn’t say you can’t believe a
network of propositions that has a modest probability. It does say that you can’t believe a
network of propositions that has less justificatory support than a Moorean fact to the
contrary. There doesn’t seem to be anything philosophically pernicious here. It’s not as
if the metaethical Moorean is saying that you shouldn’t hold controversial philosophical
views. She’s saying you shouldn’t hold those particular controversial philosophical
views that contravene a Moorean fact. And there are plenty of philosophical views that
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are consistent with Moorean facts. So, Mooreans are still free to be as fully philosophical
as they want to be.
The second criticism of metaethical Mooreanism comes from Tristram
McPherson (2009). McPherson claims that we shouldn’t consider any moral facts to be
Moorean facts. His argument for this claim rests on the alleged epistemic asymmetries
between non-moral Moorean facts and allegedly-Moorean moral facts. These
asymmetries are fourfold. First, unlike standard Moorean facts, we don’t see broad nonphilosophical consensus on moral facts. Second, unlike standard Moorean facts, rejecting
moral facts doesn’t require significant revision to our noetic structure. Third, unlike
rejections of standard Moorean facts (e.g. the Moorean fact that there is an external
world, that the past is real, that I have hands, etc.), rejecting moral facts doesn’t threaten
“epistemic paradigms” like science. Finally, unlike standard Moorean facts, moral facts
are vulnerable to debunking arguments.
McPherson presents a real and clever challenge to MM. A fully proper response
would require a paper of its own. At best, all I can do here is to sketch out a response on
behalf of MM. McPherson attacks defenses of metaethical Mooreanism that might be
mounted from the work of Tom Kelly and Michael Huemer. In my sketch I won’t
engage McPherson’s criticisms of Kelly and Huemer. Nor will I challenge his claim that
facts which suffer from these asymmetries can’t justly be regarded as Moorean facts.
Rather, I’ll limit myself to his charge that moral facts face epistemic asymmetries vis-àvis standard Moorean facts severe enough to warrant rejecting them as Moorean facts.
Obviously, this asymmetry claim will hold for many putative moral facts; the question is
whether it holds for R and other moral facts like it.
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Regarding his claim that we don’t see broad non-philosophical consensus on
moral facts, this just seems false when we consider moral facts like R. Almost everyone
who is not a moral nihilist or a psychopath embraces R, or at least would embrace R were
it to be brought to their attention. And, thankfully, nihilists and psychopaths seem to be
relatively few in number. In fact, R is so obviously true that it’s hard to think of
propositions that would be more widely embraced than it in any domain. And there are
many other moral propositions that are just like R in this respect, such as that recreational
genocide is wrong, pain is bad, love is good, parents should care for their children, and so
on. Our propensity to affirm moral truths like this is so deeply embedded in all of us, qua
homo sapiens, that some philosophers, such as Joyce (2006: 133-139), use it to argue for
the innateness of morality. It is true that some people are inclined to give a relativist or
constructivist account of the truth of R, but this second-order disagreement on moral
metaphysics does not necessarily undercut first-order agreement on the truth of R.
I also don’t agree that moral skepticism wouldn’t require significant
reorganization of our noetic structure. Moral beliefs like R, and many other moral beliefs
besides, are among the most important beliefs we hold. And they have tremendous
power in directing our lives. Abolitionists fought against slavery on the basis of the
conviction that slavery is fundamentally unjust. Suffragists fought for the vote on the
grounds that women have just as much of a right to cast a ballot as men. And every day,
on smaller scales, normal people make important decisions on the basis of their moral
beliefs. Should I remain faithful to my marriage vows? Should I keep my promises?
Should I skim money from the company? Should I lie? Should I give to charity? How
should I vote? And so on. If we took moral skepticism seriously many of us wouldn’t
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know how to answer these questions, let alone direct our lives. We would be reduced to
considering such questions in purely non-moral terms of base self-interest. And if
morality bears some important connection to God, then skepticism about morality might
well threaten religious belief and practice as well, or at least certain kinds of religious
belief and practice. A world without any real right or wrong is very different than a
morally loaded world. So, suspending judgment on all of one’s moral beliefs, or outright
rejecting them on the basis of one’s affirmation of moral nihilism, would seem to lead to
significant revision in belief and practice.
Regarding McPherson’s third claim, that rejecting moral facts wouldn’t lead to a
rejection of epistemic paradigms like science, we can say two things. One is that it is true
that rejecting R won’t, all by itself, lead to worrisome skepticism about successful
methods of inquiry like natural science. However, one doesn’t just reject R; one does so
on the basis of arguments, and these arguments may well threaten a broader form of
skepticism that is quite troubling. We saw this above in our discussion of the EDA and
the EAAN. If the success of the EDA does imply the success of the EAAN, then every
epistemic paradigm is in trouble. Or consider Clark-Doane’s allegation that the EDA
implies trouble for mathematical realism. Peter Railton (2000) argues, in similar fashion,
that the EDA threatens our confidence in science on account of the fact that the cognitive
faculties used there are subject to the same evolutionary pressures as our moral faculty.
The point here is that arguments for moral skepticism and views that imply it, such as
non-cognitivism and moral nihilism, rely on all sorts of controversial philosophical views
that may just pose problems for epistemic paradigms like science.
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McPherson’s fourth alleged asymmetry is that moral facts are, unlike standard
Moorean facts, vulnerable to debunking arguments. Again, whether this asymmetry
really holds is a matter of dispute. If Plantinga’s EAAN goes through, then all our beliefs
are capable of being evolutionarily debunked. And we have just mentioned ClarkDoane’s worry about the debunking of math as well as Railton’s worry about the
debunking of science. The truth is that we can mount plausible debunking arguments for
beliefs in a variety of domains. In any case, the real question isn’t whether we can mount
a plausible debunking argument against moral belief in propositions like R; the real
question is whether these arguments work. Obviously, moral realists don’t think they do,
and offer quite sophisticated arguments on behalf of this claim. If they are right and we
do have, and get to keep, knowledge of R, why should it be the case that belief in R
suffers an epistemic deficit on account of the fact that there are failed arguments against
our knowledge of it? There are sophisticated skeptical arguments against all knowledge
claims, including claims about standard Moorean facts; but nobody worries that these
standard Moorean facts can’t be items of commonsense just because there are clever but
failed arguments against them.
2.4 Conclusion
We’ve taken a look at Mooreanism and its two theses, CT and TT. We then took a look
at metaethical Mooreanism (MM). We’ve also discussed moral skepticism and then
observed how MM looks in the field when it bumps up against an actual skeptical
argument, the evolutionary debunking argument (EDA). We concluded with two
objections, neither of which succeeds. The bottom line has held: we have more
justificatory support for R and its allies than we do for skeptical arguments to the
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contrary. We obviously didn’t consider multiple skeptical arguments, but the metaethical
Moorean predicts that if we did, we’d run into the same phenomenon: the premises,
stated and suppressed, of these arguments don’t enjoy as much justificatory support as do
moral truths like R. This truth, and others like it, are immune to rejection on the basis of
controversial philosophical arguments to the contrary.
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CHAPTER 3. MOORE ON THE PROBLEM OF MORAL
DISAGREEMENT

In this chapter I apply metaethical Mooreanism to the argument from moral
disagreement, or the dissensus objection, as I will call it. If metaethical Mooreanism is
correct, then we can infer from our knowledge of Moorean moral facts, such as the moral
impermissibility of recreational genocide, that there is something wrong with the
dissensus objection. Our knowledge that recreational genocide is wrong is a Moorean
fact and thus not something it would be rational for us to give up in favor of the moral
skeptic’s argument. A Moorean who is a philosopher probably won’t, and maybe even
shouldn’t, stop there but will most likely go on to (try and) diagnose the moral skeptic’s
argument, seeing where the skeptical argument goes awry and then trying to ascertain
some positive epistemological lessons we can learn from the skeptic’s mistake(s). In
making the Moorean case against the dissensus objection I won’t, unfortunately, have
much space to try and draw out these positive epistemological lessons. Rather, I’ll focus
on deploying the Moorean strategy I used in the last chapter when responding to the
evolutionary debunking argument: namely, pointing out that the dissensus objection
relies on a host of controversial philosophical commitments which are epistemically
inferior to Moorean facts such as the wrongness of recreational genocide.
3.0 The Metaphysical Version of the Dissensus Objection
The argument from moral disagreement has been pressed over and over against the moral
realist.68 There are two ways to press the objection. First, one might argue that moral
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disagreement is best explained by moral nihilism: the reason we can’t agree on the moral
facts is that there aren’t any such facts to be found. This is the metaphysical version of
the dissensus objection. On this way of doing things, the dissensus objection is supposed
to be a rebutting defeater of our moral beliefs. Second, one might argue that moral
disagreement gives us an undercutting defeater for our moral beliefs, such that anyone
who is properly apprised of moral dissensus will then lose her moral knowledge because
she will have a reason to doubt the reliability of her own moral cognition.69 This is the
epistemological version of the dissensus objection. I will discuss and dispel the
metaphysical version of the objection first, then the epistemological version.
I should point out here at the beginning that I’m understanding the target of the
dissensus objection to be the claim that we possess some moral knowledge of some moral
facts, such as that recreational genocide is wrong, torturing babies for fun is morally
unacceptable, love is good, parents ought to care for their children, and so forth. For
present purposes I can concede that there may be skeptical reasons, from considerations
about moral disagreement or otherwise, that rob us of some moral knowledge. The
metaethical Moorean isn’t committed to the view that there is not a single skeptical
argument that has any epistemic force against even one moral belief. Rather, the
metaethical Moorean is committed to the view that we have knowledge of some Moorean
moral facts, such as the moral impermissibility of recreational genocide, and that our
assent to such facts has more going for it, epistemically speaking, than any skeptical
argument to the contrary, including the dissensus objection.
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3.0.1 Problem One
Perhaps the most obvious thing to say in response to the metaphysical version of the
dissensus objection is simply that we don’t normally take disagreement about the facts in
a certain domain D to be best explained by the hypothesis that there are no facts in D.
One reason is that there is an obvious and much less drastic explanation of the
disagreement: that we are in the dark, or are at least partially in the dark, about just what
the facts are in D. Nor do we normally take disagreement in a domain to be convincing
evidence that facts in that domain are relativistic or in some sense constructed by us. We
also don’t take disagreement in some domain D to be a good reason to think that noncognitivism about D is true, i.e. that statements about D-related things are nothing more
than affective expressions and are not truth-evaluable. In short, we don’t normally take
disagreement about the facts in a domain to be a good reason to be antirealists about that
domain.
If we did make this antirealist metaphysical move, the one that almost no one ever
makes, we philosophers would put ourselves in a very bad spot, in two ways. First, most
areas of philosophy suffer from serious and seemingly interminable dissensus, so the
antirealist metaphysical route, if applied consistently, would imply an antirealist answer
to almost every substantive philosophical question. This would undermine the very
project of philosophy itself. Second, widespread philosophical antirealism – in addition
to undermining philosophy – just isn’t very plausible. As Shafer-Landau explains (2003:
220),
If the argument from disagreement is sound, then this should lead us to an
antirealism about all philosophical views. For the extent of disagreement within
any branch of philosophy is surely as great as – perhaps greater than – that found
among substantive ethical views. Yet this sort of highest-order philosophical
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antirealism isn’t very plausible. Even philosophers who are substantively
skeptical about some domains (universals, free will, God, or moral facts) write as
if their views were correct – not just endorsed by them; not just consistent with
the attitudes they antecedently held; not just reflective of the spirit of the times,
but correct for everyone, always – correct simpliciter. It doesn’t make much
sense to say that moral realism (or nominalism or physicalism) is true for me and
false for you, or true in this epoch but false in another. And it is even less
plausible to say that endorsing realism is nothing other than a non-cognitive
expression of one’s practical commitments – that a judgment of realism’s truth is
not itself truth-evaluable.
For these two reasons, then, it would be a very bad idea for moral skeptics to try to press
the metaphysical version of the dissensus objection. In doing so they would undermine
philosophy itself and take on board a kind of higher-order philosophical antirealism that
is very implausible.70
3.0.2 Problem Two
There is a second problem with the metaphysical version of the dissensus objection, one
that can be put in the form of a dilemma. In discussions about the epistemic significance
of disagreement the phrases “higher-order evidence” and “psychological evidence,” with
respect to some proposition P, are frequently used to refer to the evidence which consists
of others’ doxastic attitudes towards P.71 Following that practice, we can put the dilemma
as follows. Either the higher-order/psychological evidence provided by moral
disagreement is relevant to the determination of the existence of realistic moral facts
(such as that recreational genocide is wrong) or it is not. If it is not, then the dissensus
objection fails. If it is, then the negative evidence provided by moral disagreement in
normative and applied ethics is offset by the positive evidence provided by moral
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agreement about the existence of moral facts. Either way, the metaphysical version of the
dissensus objection fails.
We will discuss horn 1 later in the chapter; for now, let’s grant to the moral
skeptic the idea that psychological evidence is epistemically relevant. We can also
concede (what is obvious) that moral disagreement in the domains of normative and
applied ethics is real. Call this “first-order moral disagreement.” We’ll call agreement
about the existence of moral facts “second-order moral agreement” and “metaethical
agreement.” The data from both levels count as higher-order/psychological evidence
because the data concern others’ doxastic attitudes. What I’m arguing, then, is that the
negative evidence provided by first-order moral disagreement is offset by the positive
evidence provided by second-order moral agreement.
In putting things this way I’m also conceding, for the sake of argument, that the
first-order psychological evidence at hand really does disfavor moral realism (i.e. the
existence of moral facts the reality of which is not determined by anyone’s beliefs or
preferences). Before proceeding with this concession, however, it’s worth pointing to a
problem that the moral skeptic faces even at this early stage of the argument. This
problem is that, in addition to the existence of first-order moral disagreement, there is
also a lot of first-order moral agreement, such that it’s simply not clear that the total body
of first-order psychological evidence actually does favor an antirealist metaethic. As the
literary scholar C. S. Lewis (1952: 6) once pointed out, try finding a culture where
cowardice is regarded as a virtue, where it is believed that there aren’t any moral
restrictions on sexual relationships, or that believed in honoring those who betrayed those
who were most loyal to them:
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If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of, say, the ancient
Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, what will really
strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own…. Think of
a country where people were admired for running away in battle, or where a man
felt proud of double-crossing all the people who had been kindest to him. You
might just as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five. Men
have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to – whether it was
only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or every one. But they have
always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has never been
admired. Men have differed as to whether you should have one wife or four. But
they have always agreed that you must not simply have any woman you like.
In his book, The Abolition of Man, Lewis (2015 [1944]) provided, through an
examination of literary texts from a number of different cultures, some empirical
evidence that the moral codes of all these different societies are agreed on something very
much like the Ten Commandments one finds in the Judeo-Christian tradition –
unsurprisingly, most people in most times and places do in fact think you should respect
your parents, not steal from your neighbors, tell the truth, not kill innocent people, and so
on. Lewis’s literary instincts were not, apparently, too far off the mark; recent empirical
work on moral universals seems to indicate that there is a shared core of moral values
held cross-culturally.72 Moreover, philosophers have argued that there are good reasons
for us to expect significant cross-cultural moral agreement. Smith (2010), for example,
argues that human beings share a common moral faculty and that, in virtue of this, there
is substantial agreement about what he calls “deep moral opinion.”73 Meanwhile, MoodyAdams (2002) argues that moral disagreement presupposes substantial moral agreement:
“serious cross-cultural moral disagreement is possible only against a background of basic
cross-cultural agreement on a substantial number of fundamental moral judgments and
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Smith’s explanation of “surface opinion” cross-cultural moral disagreement appeals to the following
factors: nonmoral disagreement, bias, and different views about how to weight shared moral values.
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beliefs” (7). And here is the relevance of the first-order moral agreement: the mixed
higher-order data of some disagreement and some agreement on first-order moral truths is
no more likely on the hypothesis of moral nihilism than it is on the realistic hypothesis
that we have only partial access to the domain of really existing moral facts. We have
partial access to the domain of really existing cosmological facts, a hypothesis which
makes pretty good sense of the higher-order reality that we have both disagreement and
agreement in cosmology. Why wouldn’t the same hold for moral disagreement? And if
the mixed higher-order evidence is no more likely on nihilism than on realism, it cannot
be used to confirm the former over against the latter.
We have here, then, a real problem for the moral skeptic bent on pressing the
metaphysical version of the dissensus objection. But let’s put that aside for a moment
and just grant, again for the sake of argument, that the total body of first-order
psychological evidence disfavors realism. The dilemma proceeds by pointing out that
this negative evidence is offset by the positive psychological evidence provided by
second-order agreement on the existence of moral facts. In other words, moral realism is
the default position, the folk metaethic; it is ubiquitously accepted that there is such a
thing as moral truth.74 This second-order agreement about the reality of objective moral
truth is more likely on moral realism than it is on nihilism. This is so for the simple
reason that, for any domain of inquiry about a certain realm of facts, widespread
agreement that there are such facts is more likely on the hypothesis that such facts exist
than it is on the hypothesis that they don’t. Widespread agreement among physicists that
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atoms exist is more likely on the hypothesis that atoms are real than it is on the
hypothesis that atoms don’t exist. And the same would seem to go for widespread
agreement about the reality of moral truth. The reason for this is that it seems that the
probability that one would find widespread agreement that there are facts of type G – Gfacts – is higher given the reality of G-facts than given their non-reality. If G-facts are
fictitious then one would expect divergence on their existence rather than convergence.
One might object here that widespread agreement that G-facts are objectively real
could just as easily be explained by an error theory (about why G-fact inquirers
mistakenly converge on the existence of G-facts). There are two problems with this
suggestion, at least in this context. First, if the error theory does a good job explaining
second-order moral agreement it may well leave first-order moral disagreement
unexplained, or at least not well-explained. Given the error theory, we would expect that
we are all suffering from the same illusion, not different ones. The error theory would,
then, struggle to explain the total body of psychological evidence. Remember that we are
assuming that there is enough first-order moral disagreement to make trouble for realism;
the thought is that, given realism, we wouldn’t expect to find so much disagreement. The
error theory would seem to leave it mysterious why we suffer from the same secondorder delusion but different first-order delusions. This suggests that, on the dissensus
debunker’s own terms (that is, assuming substantial first-order moral disagreement), the
prospects for a viable error theory are not good.
The second problem with this objection is that it fails to consider that, in adding
the error theory to the proposition that there are no G-facts, one lowers the prior
probability of the (now conjunctive) proposition that is in competition with the
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proposition asserting the existence of G-facts. So, let G = there are G-facts, A = there is
widespread agreement that G-facts are objectively real, and E = the error theory
explaining why G-fact inquirers suffer from a shared illusion about the reality of G-facts.
Now consider the odds form of Bayes’s theorem, using these propositions:
P(G|A)
P(~G|A)

P(G)
P(~G)

x

P(A|G)
P(A|~G)

When we consider the Bayes factor, or the likelihood ratio on the far right, without also
considering E, then my original contention looks good: surely the P(A/G) would be
higher than the P(A/~G) – surely we would be more likely to agree that there are G-facts
if there are G-facts than if there are not. However, the error theory threatens to balance
the scales; consider this revision:
P(G|A)
P(~G&E|A)

P(G)
x
P(~G&E)

P(A|G)
P(A|~G&E)

Assuming the error theory is a good one, the likelihood scales are now balanced:
agreement on G-facts no longer favors their existence. If the error theory balances the
likelihood scales, though, it does so at cost of driving up the prior probability of the
skeptical hypothesis (i.e. ~G&E), for surely the prior probability of ~G&E is lower than
the prior probability of G; this is so especially in view of the fact that, as noted in the last
paragraph, the error theory has to accomplish the task of explaining substantial secondorder moral agreement and substantial first-order moral disagreement. But once the ratio
of the priors is tipped in favor of G, then (assuming that the likelihoods of A|G and
A|~G&E are about the same) the posterior probabilities favor G as well. So, the objector
would win the battle regarding whether widespread agreement on G-facts is, all by itself,
evidence for their objective reality, but only by losing the war on the posterior
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probability, or overall likelihood, of the existence of G-facts. It seems, then, that the
objector cannot win.
Let us now pick up where we left off: the psychological evidence provided by
second-order moral agreement offsets the psychological evidence provided by first-order
moral disagreement. Here a question naturally arises: Why think that there is substantial
second-order moral agreement on the existence of moral facts? There are at least three
reasons for thinking that realism is widely accepted and is the default view about moral
truth. First, this is widely accepted in the philosophical literature, even by those who
hold revisionary metaethical views. Evidence for this can be seen in the fact that in the
three chapters of The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory that deal explicitly with
realism and its contraries, realism is characterized, in one way or another, as the “default
position.”75 Nihilism is said to be “violently contrary to common sense” and relativism to
be “revisionary of common sense.”76 “Many philosophers” are said to “fear”
expressivism because they believe that “our language, thought, and practice are premised
on the idea that there is a normative order” of moral facts.77
A second reason for thinking that most competent moral agents are realists comes
from the fact that studies on the moral beliefs of children suggest that children are moral
realists. Studies carried out on the moral beliefs of preschool-age children show that they
engage in deontological reasoning and also that they do not regard moral properties as
response-dependent in the way that they regard non-moral properties to be. These studies
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strongly suggest that children – regardless of where you think such “childhood
objectivism” comes from (evolution, social conditioning, God) – are realists.78 This in
turn suggests that realism is indeed the default position in metaethics – it is the folk
metaethic. Psychopaths, unlike children, fail to display the ability to draw a distinction
between a moral violation and a violation of convention.79 The rest of us who abandon
realism do so, it seems, because we are in the grip of a theory.
One potential problem here is that there are other studies, such as those carried
out and cited in work done by Joshua Knobe et al., which seem to indicate that collegeage students display a drift toward a kind of cultural relativism about morality.80 What
these studies seem to show is that many college students are quite reluctant to say that the
moral judgments made by people who are very dissimilar from them are wrong even
when their judgments conflict with the college students’ judgments. Those same students
display a realist mindset, however, when it comes to the divergent judgments of those
who belong to the same cultural context that they do: here they are quite willing to say
that those who disagree with them are wrong about the moral truth of the matter. Knobe
et al. seem to want argue that this divergence supports, to quote the provocative title of
their paper, “Folk Moral Relativism.” Actually, however, their stated claims are slightly
more modest: to call into question the folk realism attributed to laypersons from the
armchair and to understand why some people are pulled toward moral relativism. In line
with this latter quest, Knobe et al. hasten to add that their results are not actually
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inconsistent with the folk realism found by earlier researchers. In any case, at the very
least we have a potential problem here – the folk realism of children might well be lost
when people run off to college, thus eliminating the putative psychological evidence
provided by second-order metaethical agreement.
Fortunately, this potential problem doesn’t appear to be an actual problem. For
starters, Knobe et al. don’t actually claim to refute folk realism and state that their
conclusions are “in harmony with” those reached by researchers who have uncovered
folk realism among laypersons. Secondly, other studies indicate that as people approach
middle age, they retreat back to their pre-college realism.81 Thus, it appears that, even
among those espousing folk relativism, this is a college-era fad that most eventually grow
out of. This finding dovetails nicely with the aforementioned fact that, in the
philosophical literature on metaethics, it is widely claimed that realism is the default
view. It would be odd for philosophers to be making this armchair claim if large
numbers of people abandoned realism in college and never went back. In any case, the
fact that college students are more prone to relativistic moral judgments than are precollege and post-college folks hardly undermines the claim that most people in general
subscribe to the existence of moral facts.
Having dispensed with this objection, I turn to the third reason for thinking that
nearly all competent moral agents are realists: the origin and function of moral beliefs.
The two best candidates for the source of our moral cognitions are God and naturalistic
(unguided) evolution. Suppose God wants us to have moral knowledge (which seems
quite likely given the hypothesis that God exists) and that God made us – through
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evolution, I’m assuming – and endowed us with reliable moral cognition so as to
facilitate proper moral behavior and creaturely flourishing. If so, then it is highly likely,
at least prima facie, that most people are realists and that realism is true. When
evolutionary accounts of morality are given, however, they typically don’t invoke God;
rather, they seem premised on the idea of naturalistic evolution. Even here, though, we
have a reason to think that most people have realist moral beliefs. Here’s why:
naturalistic evolutionary accounts of morality seem to be attempts to explain (at least in
part) why people have realist moral beliefs. Now, since scientists typically try to give
evolutionary explanations for traits that are widely held, the fact they are trying to explain
realist moral belief suggests that, according to those working on evolutionary accounts of
morality, it is true that most people hold realist moral beliefs. So, whether we give a
theistic explanation for our moral beliefs, or a naturalistic evolutionary one, we have
good reason to think most people are moral realists. Those of us who aren’t are either
psychopaths or have been talked out of this default view by way of embracing a
philosophical theory which implies its falsity.82
3.0.3 Responding to an Objection
One objection to the dilemma that I’ve presented against the metaphysical version of the
dissensus objection is that I have failed to cite the relevant higher-order evidence. After
all, the disagreement we care about is peer disagreement, not disagreement simpliciter.83
And if in a given case we need to make a distinction between laymen and experts, then
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the disagreement we care about, the disagreement that might be epistemically troubling,
is disagreement among the experts, not dissensus in the laity. Here is the application in
our case: while it may be the case that most plain people (to speak in Rossian terms) are
realists, these plain people are not peers with us philosophers. And among us
philosophers, there is nothing approaching metaethical agreement: according to the
PhilPapers survey, less than 60% of philosophers accept or lean toward moral realism.84
If this is the relevant higher-order evidence, then my appeal to metaethical agreement
among the ordinary folk is epistemically impotent. In that case, my reference to secondorder metaethical agreement among the laity would have about as much epistemic
relevance as a reference to widespread agreement on the truth of young-earth creationism
among non-scientists.
In response, first, I should point out that, according to the PhilPapers survey, less
than 30% of philosophers accept or lean toward moral antirealism. A majority accept or
lean toward realism and the rest toward “other.” It would appear, then, that most
philosophers reject nihilism. Thus, there seems to be metaethical agreement among
philosophers that nihilism is false. Second, in truth we have no good reason to think that
philosophers are moral experts and thus no good reason to think that philosophers and
plain persons aren’t moral peers, i.e. peers on the question of what the moral facts are and
whether there are any in the first place. I will discuss this in more detail later in the
chapter, so for now I shall have to be cursory. Philosophers are experts at detecting
which moral propositions are implied by a set of other moral propositions. This is
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The PhilPapers survey indicates that 56.3% of philosophers are moral realists. The results can be found
here: http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl.
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because philosophers are more reliable than the general public at the broad skill of seeing
whether one or more propositions follow from some other one or more propositions. But
philosophers are not experts, so far as we know, at detecting which moral propositions
are true in the first place; nor are they experts, again so far as we know, at detecting the
existence or non-existence of moral properties. In other words, philosophers are experts
at seeing whether a set of premises imply a certain conclusion(s), but we have no reason
to think that their moral intuitions are more reliable than plain people’s moral intuitions,
and thus no reason to think that they would be especially good at seeing which moral
premises are the true ones. As McGrath (2008: 97) points out, we have no way of
independently checking to see who is getting it right on the contested moral questions and
thus no way of independently verifying that philosophers are more morally reliable than
plain people. Thus, we cannot argue that expert dissensus on the metaethical question of
whether there are any moral facts is evidence for nihilism because we are not justified in
saying that there is expert dissensus by appealing to dissensus on this score among
philosophers. In other words, we aren’t in a position to say that there is expert dissensus
just because philosophers disagree on whether there are any moral facts.
3.0.4 The Moorean Application
My criticisms of the metaphysical version of the dissensus objection can be easily
utilized when deploying the Moorean strategy against the kind of moral skepticism
suggested by the metaphysical version of the dissensus objection. To see that this is so
we need simply take note of the many controversial assumptions needed by the proponent
of the metaphysical version of the dissensus objection. We shall do this in reverse order.
For starters, the moral skeptic needs it to be the case that philosophers are not moral peers
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with plain people, i.e. that philosophers are moral experts. This is a highly controversial
claim and one that will need the support of other controversial propositions if we are to
be justified in believing it. So, there’s one set of controversial commitments the moral
skeptic has to take on board. The moral skeptic also needs it to be case that it’s false that
most people are moral realists. For otherwise, the psychological evidence provided by
second-order metaethical agreement will offset the psychological evidence provided by
first-order disagreement. To substantiate this claim the skeptic will have to overturn the
three reasons I’ve presented for thinking that most people are moral realists. Again, more
controversial commitments will be required. The moral skeptic could avoid these
commitments by arguing that second-order moral agreement is real but that it fails to
offset the evidence provided by first-order moral disagreement. But this idea is of course
controversial, as would be the arguments needed to sustain it. The skeptic further
requires that first-order moral agreement does not offset first-order moral disagreement.
Here she will again need philosophical premises in support of a controversial claim.
Finally, the moral skeptic pressing the metaphysical version of the dissensus objection
has to take on board two more highly controversial commitments. First, she has to
provide some explanation for the rationality of committing to disagreement-based
antirealism about morality without also committing to disagreement-based antirealism
about other, non-moral domains of inquiry, such as psychology, economics, history,
biology, and so on. (Otherwise, her moral antirealism will imply an unpalatably broad
skepticism.) Second, she has to either commit to an antirealist stance about all the
substantive philosophical questions (because they also suffer from interminable peer
disagreement) or provide an explanation for the rationality of committing to
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disagreement-based antirealism about morality without also committing to disagreementbased antirealism about other areas of philosophy.
The metaethical Moorean says that it is more rational for us to believe that
recreational genocide is wrong than it is to believe in the enormous conjunction of
controversial commitments required by the metaphysical version of the dissensus
objection. Things get even worse for the moral skeptic when we take notice of the fact
that, to sustain her antirealist skepticism, she will also have to provide reasons for
thinking that the positive arguments given for the existence of moral facts are somehow
fatally flawed.85 It is incredible to think that the conjunction of all these highly
controversial commitments could be more rational for us to accept than are simple
Moorean truths such as that recreational genocide is wrong. Having dispatched the
metaphysical version of the dissensus objection, it is time to turn to its epistemological
cousin.
3.1 The Epistemological Version
The specific form of the epistemological version of the dissensus objection that I’ll work
with is heavily based on McGrath’s (2008: 91-93) version of the argument.86 This is how
it goes:
The Dissensus Objection
1. If you learn that your belief that P is controversial, then you do not know that P.
2. Your moral beliefs are controversial.
3. Therefore, your moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge.
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For one such argument, see Huemer (2016). Another argument that the moral skeptic will have to
combat is that God exists and that God’s existence entails the existence of moral facts, such as that God is
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theistic argument just presented – will have to be added to the controversial commitments outlined in the
main text. For arguments for God’s existence, see Swinburne (2005).
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A belief of yours is controversial just in case it is the subject of disagreement with a peer,
or someone about whom you lack a good reason to think that he or she is more likely to
be mistaken than you are.87 Following the literature, we’ll call such a person an
“epistemic peer.” Two cognizers are peers with respect to some proposition P only if
they are roughly equals in terms of intellectual virtue, cognitive ability with respect to P,
and possession of the same P-relevant evidence. If these three rough equalities between
you and a dissenter hold, with respect to some proposition P, then they explain why it is
that you lack a good reason to think that that dissenter is more likely than you are to be
mistaken about P, and hence why that dissenter is your epistemic peer with respect to P.
The basic thought of the epistemological version of the dissensus objection is, then, that
moral disagreement with epistemic peers serves as an undercutting defeater for our moral
beliefs. Given such disagreement, you have a good reason to think that someone has
made a mistake, but no good reason for thinking your interlocutor is the one who erred.
Any justification you had for P is now defeated, once you discover peer disagreement
whether P. This loss of justification is what makes it the case that learning of peer
disagreement whether P eliminates your knowledge that P. From now on, this objection
is what I’ll have in mind by “the dissensus objection.”
To properly respond to the dissensus objection we need to have before us some
general ideas from the broader epistemological literature on disagreement.88 There are
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roughly three views one can take in response to peer disagreement about some
proposition P. Kelly (2005b) makes an argument for Steadfastness, the view that peer
disagreement is not, all by itself, a reason to abandon or significantly reduce confidence
in one’s disagreed-upon belief. We can refer to those who embrace Steadfastness as
“non-conciliationists.” Christensen (2007) argues for Conciliationism, the view that we
should abandon, or at least drastically reduce confidence in, a belief that suffers from
peer disagreement.89 Thune (2010) represents a third kind of view; he argues for a sort of
middle ground: peer disagreement is a partial defeater but does not lead to a wholesale
loss of justification. Our strategy will be to examine the dissensus objection from these
three perspectives. What we’ll see is that it fails regardless of which one we adopt.
3.1.1 What if Steadfastness is True?
The failure of the dissensus objection should be pretty obvious in the case of
Steadfastness. If Steadfastness is true, then premise (1) of the dissensus objection is
false: it’s not the case that learning that a belief of yours is controversial – i.e. subject to
peer disagreement – leads to a loss or defeat of justification for P, and thus loss of
knowledge that P. In the dilemma I presented against the metaphysical version of the
dissensus objection I said that I would say more about horn 1 – i.e. the view that the
psychological evidence isn’t relevant to a determination of the existence of moral facts –
later on. Anyone who embraces Steadfastness will want to opt for horn 1 of that
dilemma. Of course, the non-conciliationist isn’t committed to the view that
psychological evidence never has any epistemic weight. Rather, she’s committed to the
view that the mere existence of peer disagreement about P doesn’t call for significant, if
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any, revision of one’s own doxastic attitude toward P. Psychological evidence that would
be damaging to the epistemic status of moral beliefs – such as belief that recreational
genocide is wrong, and other propositions of that ilk – would consist of something like a
strong majority of experts on the existence of moral facts agreeing that there are no such
things, or that belief in them is unjustified. But the dissensus objector doesn’t have that
kind of evidence, and so that consideration carries no weight here. In any case, the truth
of Steadfastness would pose a virtually insurmountable obstacle to those pressing the
metaphysical or the epistemological version of the dissensus objection.
There are two non-conciliationist moves that proponents of Steadfastness are free
to make that must be rejected by conciliationists. The first move can be seen in work by
Bergmann (2009) and Schafer (2015). Bergmann argues that a cognizer can avoid the
problem of disagreement-induced defeat if she has high rational confidence that P and an
error theory explaining why those who reject P (mistakenly) do so. The thought seems to
be that when these two conditions are satisfied, one can rationally demote one’s alleged
peer.90 Schafer (2015) argues for something he calls the “Rational Symmetry View,”
which is the view that in a case of learned peer disagreement, you should give more
weight to your own view on the matter than you should to that of your apparent peer’s.
Conciliationists don’t like moves like these because they seem to run afoul of a principle
that they are fond of, one that Christensen (2011) endorses and calls “Independence,”
which says that you should not use your own reasons for believing that P to evaluate the
“epistemic credentials” of your peer’s belief about P. One reply here is that it isn’t clear
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that either strategy, the one by Bergmann or the one by Schafer, requires a violation of
Independence. Bergmann’s strategy involves the use of an error theory to demote one’s
alleged peer, not one’s own reasoning for P. On the other hand, Bergmann’s first
condition – high rational confidence that P – might run afoul of Independence if it
requires appealing to one’s own reasons for P as a way of demoting one’s dissenter. For
his part, Schafer’s strategy depends on an appeal to two epistemic principles, one
involving self-trust and another involving testimonial entitlement. The details need not
concern us here, for the relevant point is simply that someone using Schafer’s strategy
justifies trusting her own stance on P more than her alleged peer’s stance on P on the
basis of two general epistemic principles rather than on her own line of reasoning for P.
A second thought about Independence is that it’s not clear that we should accept it
in the first place. One potential problem here is that Christensen’s commitment to
Independence may well also commit him to the more general thought that a belief can’t
be justified unless one has an independent reason for thinking skeptical hypotheses to the
contrary are false. The reason this is problematic is that it appears to lead to a very
widespread and unpalatable skepticism. The reason for believing that Independence is
true seems to be a commitment to the more general epistemic principle that we cannot
use a doxastic source to confirm belief in that very source’s reliability. For example, we
can’t use perception to validate perception, or memory to validate memory. To have a
justified belief that perception is reliable, we can’t use our perceptual beliefs, for that
would be using perception to validate itself. Nor can we validate our perceptual beliefs
by pointing to the reliability of perception, for that would also be using perception to
validate perception. So, for example, in response to a skeptical worry about my
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perceptual belief that the wall is red rather than white and redly illuminated, I cannot use
that apparent perception itself to validate my belief that the wall is red.91 Rather, I need
an independent reason, one independent of my perception that the wall looks red, to
believe that my perceptual belief is based on a veridical perceptual experience rather than
a clever trick of illumination. Similarly, in response to a more global skeptical worry
about perception itself, I can’t simply use perception to validate itself – that is an
unacceptable form of epistemic circularity. Or so the thought goes. Anyone committed
to such a requirement of an independent reason will want to say that when you are given
a skeptical reason to worry about a belief – say, a perceptual belief, or a memory belief,
or a testimonial belief – you must have an independent reason to reject the skeptical
hypothesis in order to remain justified in holding onto the targeted belief.
The connection to disagreement should be clear. Independence looks to be
entailed by the more general idea that skeptical challenges to a belief’s source can only
be surmounted by possession of an independent reason for trusting that source. When
you learn that an alleged peer disagrees with you about P, this presents you with a reason
to doubt whether your source for your belief that P is reliable. In response to this reason,
you cannot use your source for P to validate its own reliability any more than you can use
your perceptual experience that the wall is white to reject the skeptical alternative that the
wall is white and redly illuminated.
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The problem with this line of thought, and thus with Independence, is that it
appears to commit us to an unpalatably widespread skepticism.92 If I am presented with a
global skeptical worry, one that applies to all of my cognitive faculties, it won’t be
possible for me to independently validate my cognitive faculties, and thus any of their
doxastic outputs, leading of course to global skepticism. For, any reason I could give for
the reliability of my cognitive faculties would itself rely on the operation of my cognitive
faculties, thereby failing to count as an independent reason. Proponents of Independence,
then, may well be implicitly committed to capitulating to global skepticism in the face of
a global skeptical challenge, i.e. one that applies to all of our cognitive faculties.93
However, proponents of the dissensus objection need something like Independence to be
true. The falsity of Independence would not only fully open the door to moves like the
ones suggested by Bergmann and Schafer; it would also open the door to using one’s own
reasoning on behalf of R to demote an alleged peer who dissents from R. To close the
door on this move the Conciliationist will have to commit to Independence, any untoward
consequences it might have, and any arguments needed to justify assent to it. The
doxastic package the dissensus skeptic needs to get the dissensus objection to work just
looks too controversial to overturn justified belief in R and allied propositions. How
could such a controversial cluster have more going for it, epistemically speaking, than
moral facts like R?
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Earlier I said that there are two non-conciliationist moves that proponents of
Steadfastness are free to make that must be rejected by conciliationists. The first move
actually turned out to be a family of moves – Bergmann’s suggestion, Schafer’s
suggestion, and then the suggestion that you demote your alleged peer on the basis your
own reasoning for the disputed proposition in question.

The dissensus skeptic can shut

these down by appealing to Independence, but commitment to that principle, and its
consequences and buttressing arguments, comes at quite a high epistemic cost. The
second move that a non-conciliationist is free to make involves rejecting the Uniqueness
Thesis. As Kopec and Titelbaum (2016) explain it, the Uniqueness Thesis is the view
that, “there is a unique rational response to a given body of evidence” (189). The denial
of the Uniqueness Thesis is known as permissivism. If permissivism is true, then it may
well be that in certain cases of disagreement whether P, it is rational for one cognizer to
believe that P and for another cognizer to not believe that P – even when both cognizers
are peers and thus share the same evidence. If that is the case, then there is nothing
wrong in principle with the idea that sticking with a proposition like R in the face of peer
disagreement to the contrary is rationally permissible. This possibility obviously makes
great trouble for the dissensus objection. To sustain that objection against the moral
realist, the dissensus skeptic will have do one of two things. First, she can argue for the
falsity of permissivism. Or, second, she could concede that permissivism is true in some
cases but deny that it ever applies to moral beliefs and the evidence for them; that is, she
could say that moral evidence always admits of just one single rational response. Clearly,
both options require additional controversial commitments, adding a significant
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additional epistemic strain to the already burdensome commitments required by the
dissensus objection.
Given where we are in the dialectic, I – qua metaethical Moorean – don’t now need to
try and persuade the moral skeptic that she should embrace Steadfastness or any of the
options it opens up. There are plenty of smart non-conciliationist philosophers who give
clever and sophisticated arguments for Steadfastness-style views in the epistemology of
disagreement.94 At this point in the dialectic I would recommend that the moral skeptic
pressing the dissensus objection go and take a look at these arguments. The point that I
am making here is that in order to adequately support the dissensus objection its
proponent will have to reject Steadfastness. Steadfastness is, however, a plausible view
buttressed by a number of sophisticated philosophical arguments. Thus, to reject
Steadfastness the moral skeptic will have to commit to a number of highly controversial
propositions in epistemology.95 That is obvious already, of course, but its salience in this
discussion must be pressed. These philosophical propositions are propositions which are
themselves the subject of severe controversy and cannot be empirically verified. The
moral skeptic we’re here considering will have to maintain that rationality demands that
we embrace this conjunction and suspend judgment on the wrongness of recreational
genocide. From the perspective of metaethical Mooreanism that pill is just much too big
to swallow. It’s simply not plausible to think that this nest of disputed epistemological
principles, whatever its precise contours, will have more going for it, epistemically
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speaking, than does the idea that we know that recreational genocide is morally
unacceptable.
3.1.2 What if there is a middle way?
Thune’s middle way has it that learning that your belief that P is controversial (subject to
peer disagreement) leads to partial defeat of one’s justification for P. Since justification
comes in degrees, this leaves it open that you still have enough justification for P to be
justified in continuing to believe that P. If this is correct, then the dissensus objection
won’t be very damaging to many folks’ justified belief in the reality of moral truth. If
you have a high degree of justification for believing that it is really true that recreational
genocide is wrong, then discovering that an epistemic peer disbelieves this, on account of
disbelieving in the reality of moral facts altogether, may well cause you to lose some of
your justification for believing in moral facts. But so long as your initial justification for
believing in the wrongness of recreational genocide was high enough, your belief remains
justified. And it certainly seems plausible, even right, to say that most people have an
initially highly justified belief that recreational genocide is wrong. This implies,
thankfully, that most people’s belief in this and similar propositions won’t be torn
asunder by the dissensus objection.
If we do assume Thune’s middle way, then it seems safe to say that the dissensus
objection will lead to a wholesale loss of justification for believing in moral facts such as
the wrongness of recreational genocide only in cases where one’s initial justification
wasn’t very high to begin with. So, for example, if your grounds for believing that R (=
recreational genocide is wrong) only justify your belief in R to degree 0.55, and you then
learn that your belief that R is controversial, your belief may well suffer enough

110
justificational defeat such that you are no longer justified in believing R at all. To make
the dissensus objection applicable to most people, the moral skeptic pressing it will first
have to show that most people’s belief in propositions like R has only very moderate
justificatory support. And it is very difficult to see how the dissensus skeptic will show
this. The more germane point here, however, is that showing this will require committing
to more highly contested philosophical propositions. And once these are in place one
will still have to substantiate subscription to Thune’s middle way by way of still other
contested philosophical premises. Is it really more rational for us to buy all of these
controverted epistemological principles than it is to think that recreational genocide is
wrong? Again, that’s a difficult bullet to bite.
A potential objection could be raised at this point: haven’t I conceded, on the
assumption that Thune’s middle way is correct, that some people’s belief that R can be
defeated by the dissensus objection? And even if this holds for only a few people,
doesn’t this show that metaethical Mooreanism can’t rescue everyone from the clutches
of the dissensus objection? I think the proper Moorean solution to this is to point out that
the people in danger here are those who have initially only a very moderate amount of
justification for R, and that once these folks are apprised of R’s status as a Moorean fact
they will have much more justification for believing in R, and thus should believe it to a
much stronger degree than they previously did (assuming that their degree of belief
matched their degree of justification for that belief). In other words, once we help these
folks appreciate the strong epistemic standing possessed by R, and the weak epistemic
standing possessed by arguments (rebutting or undercutting) against R, their justification
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for and confidence in R should go up. But if this happens, then their belief in R could
suffer partial defeat from dissensus whilst remaining justified.
Of course, I don’t want to rule out the possibility that some people may mistakenly
but rationally assign R a very moderate credence, and that some of these same people
may mistakenly but rationally resist the arguments for R’s possession of strong epistemic
standing, thus rationally retaining R but only to a very moderate degree, based on a very
moderate amount of justificatory support for R. For such folks, the dissensus objection
may well fully defeat their justification for believing that R, meaning that if they retain
belief in R that belief will be unjustified. Alas, we can’t save everyone. But what we can
say is that, from the perspective of metaethical Mooreanism, anyone falling into this
precarious situation is doing so only because they have misjudged the justificatory
strength of R (by failing to give it the higher credence it deserves) as well as the
justificatory strength of not-R considerations (by assigning these considerations a
credence that is too high).
3.1.3 What if Conciliationism is true?
But what if Conciliationism is true? Wouldn’t it then be the case that the dissensus
objection succeeds, and that we are stuck with moral skepticism after all? To answer
these questions properly it will be helpful to have in front of us a fuller description of
Conciliationism than I have thus far provided. Here is a good explication of the view,
provided by Rowland (2016: 4):
If we find ourselves in a position in which we should believe that there is a
substantial division of opinion amongst our epistemic peers regarding whether P,
and that we and our epistemic peers are approximately as confident as one another
regarding whether P, then, other things equal, we should suspend belief about
whether P.
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If Conciliationism is true, then it gives us a good reason to embrace premise (1) of the
dissensus objection formulated above. Unfortunately for the moral skeptic bent on
pressing the dissensus objection, the metaethical Moorean has a number of good
responses available to her.
For starters, we may question whether Conciliationism is in fact true. Obviously,
non-conciliationists and Thune-style middle way proponents will not subscribe to it, and
they do provide arguments against Conciliationism. Right away, then, we see that the
dissensus skeptic will be subscribing to a very controversial view (Conciliationism itself)
and will have to defend it by way of an appeal to still other controversial views from the
field of epistemology. Again, so much is already obvious; but again, the salience of this
point must be stressed in this context. Are we really more justified in believing in
Conciliationism, itself a highly controversial view, and all the arguments needed to
justify commitment to it, than we are in believing in truths like R? That is very difficult
to believe. How could such a controversial conjunction have more going for it,
epistemically speaking, than the idea that recreational genocide is not okay? Frankly, the
question answers itself.
One aspect of the defense of Conciliationism that is worth noting is the possibility
that the view is self-undermining. If Conciliationism is true, then, given that it is itself
subject to substantial peer disagreement, it is difficult to see how its proponents could be
justified in believing it. But if the skeptic isn’t justified in believing Conciliationism,
then she also won’t be justified in believing premise (1) of the dissensus objection. And
neither will we. But if we aren’t justified in believing the premises of an argument, then
we aren’t justified in believing what follows from those premises (assuming that we don’t
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possess some other justification for believing what follows from those premises). Decker
(2014), in proposing and arguing for this problem, calls it the problem of “selfincrimination.” The proponent of Conciliationism will have to have a good response to
the self-incrimination worry in order to allow the dissensus objection to even get off the
ground. Now there are responses out there, such as those from Elga (2010) and Pittard
(2015). Decker deals with Elga, but unfortunately there is no exchange between Decker
and Pittard. Elga and Pittard have to add some bells and whistles to Conciliationism to
avoid the self-incrimination problem. We cannot, unfortunately, adjudicate this dispute
here. We should note, though, that from a Moorean standpoint, these additions make it
even less likely that we will be more justified in accepting a Conciliation-based, moral
dissensus argument against moral beliefs in facts like R. The bells and whistles tack on
yet more controversial philosophical theses that, in tandem with all the other disputed
philosophical propositions needed by the dissensus skeptic, seem to render epistemic
comparison with R unfavorable, for dissensus skepticism. So, if Conciliationism can be
saved from self-incrimination, this will come at an epistemic cost to the dissensus
skeptic, one that is favorable to believers in R.
Unfortunately, even if we solve or just ignore the self-incrimination worry, the
truth of Conciliationism won’t provide easy aid and comfort to the dissensus skeptic. In
posing the self-incrimination problem we’ve given reasons for worrying about premise
(1) of the dissensus objection. There are also reasons to worry about premise (2), which
basically says that our moral beliefs are “controversial,” i.e. subject to peer disagreement.
To make such disagreement epistemically worrisome we need to understand the peer
disagreement at hand as, following Rowland (2016: 4), a “substantial division of opinion
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amongst our epistemic peers.” If there is some peer disagreement whether P but also
substantial peer agreement that P is true, then arguably this poses no problem for my
belief that P. Suppose that Smith believes that P and knows that his epistemic peer Jones
disbelieves that P. Suppose further that Smith also knows that almost all of his peers
(with respect to P) agree with him that P is true. This would be a case of trivial rather
than substantial peer disagreement. Here Smith would be fully justified in continuing to
believe that P. So, to make the dissensus objection work, it needs to be the case that there
is substantial peer disagreement on the existence of moral facts. If this were the case,
then, assuming Conciliationism and thus premise (1), our knowledge of moral facts like
R would be in serious epistemic jeopardy. In light of these considerations, we should
from now on understand the idea of a belief’s being controversial as that belief being the
subject of substantial peer disagreement.
Fortunately, we are now in a position to raise a serious worry about premise (2),
namely, that we are not justified in thinking that belief in R and allied propositions, and
in general belief in moral facts, is subject to substantial peer disagreement. I have
already discussed the fact that most people are realists about things like R. If this is true,
then premise (2) is false: there isn’t substantial disagreement about R and allied
propositions. I’ve also mentioned, against this point, the potential objection that the
relevant psychological evidence here is not substantial agreement among plain people
about the truth of propositions like R, but rather the evidence consisting of what the
experts think about R, the experts being the philosophers. If so, then maybe premise (2)
could be saved by pointing out that there is substantial peer disagreement about the
existence of moral facts like R among the experts (the philosophers), and thus that any
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philosopher aware of this thereby gains a defeater for her belief in the existence of moral
facts (like R and allied propositions). If this is right, it would also defeat the justification
for believing in moral facts possessed by informed laymen. For, if a P-believing layman
knows that the P-experts have substantial disagreement whether P, then arguably she can
no longer justifiably believe that P.
I’ve also already raised responses to this rejoinder, but this is a good time to take
a deeper look at those responses. For starters, I argued above that most philosophers
reject moral nihilism and that a majority lean toward or accept realism. Unfortunately,
this fact alone won’t make it the case that there is not substantial peer disagreement over
the existence of moral facts, and this for the simple reason that majoritarian agreement
that P is true is compatible with substantial disagreement that P, and this seems to be the
situation we presently find ourselves in (with regard to belief in the existence of moral
facts among philosophers). However, things look very different if we include the great
dead philosophers of the past in the peer group consisting of philosophers. Almost none
of the great dead philosophers of the past subscribed to an antirealist metaethic. Nor did
their philosopher-followers, nor did most philosophers of the past, period. Unless we’re
prepared to engage in a kind of chronological snobbery, or unless we have good reasons
for thinking they wouldn’t be peers with contemporary philosophers on the question of
the existence of moral facts – an idea which seems preposterous, to my mind – then
we’ve got to include dead philosophers in our peer group. No one would even think of
jettisoning David Lewis’s writings on metaphysics to the non-peer category viz. living
metaphysicians simply because Prof. Lewis is, sadly, no longer with us. And hopefully
no one will try to do this in a hundred years. Why would it be any different with Plato,
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Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, Descartes, Kant, and the other philosophers of the
past, whether great or just normal? Now, if we do include philosophers from the past,
then it looks like premise (2) will probably be false, at least with respect to the existence
of moral facts like R. Taken together as a whole, most philosophers in the Western
tradition have subscribed to a realist metaethic; thus, it won’t be the case that there is
substantial peer disagreement over the existence of moral facts (like R and allied
propositions). To get around this problem the dissensus skeptic will have to give us an
argument for thinking that, on the question of moral facts, contemporary philosophers are
epistemically superior to past philosophers. This seems implausible, but more pertinently
for our purposes here, it will add more controversial commitments to the skeptic’s
position, thereby further decreasing the likelihood that her total set of controversial
commitments are epistemically better off than are truths like R.
A related problem with premise (2), also raised in discussion of the metaphysical
version of the dissensus objection, is that it is very difficult to see why we should think
that there is substantial peer disagreement about the existence of moral facts like R. Let’s
begin our discussion of this problem by looking at whether we should believe that
philosophers are moral experts. I will argue that we are not justified in thinking that
philosophers are moral experts. This investigation will in turn provide us with reasons
for thinking that we are not justified in believing that there is substantial peer
disagreement about moral facts like R.
To begin with, we have no way to independently verify that philosophers are
more reliable in getting at moral truth than are plain people. We can’t check the official
books on this one to see which group has a better track record. We might think that
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philosophers are more morally reliable than plain people on account of the fact that
philosophers are better at reasoning than are plain people. Philosophers, after all, are
pretty good at detecting errors in reasoning and at telling when one or more propositions
follows from or is made probable by some other one or more propositions. The problem
with this rejoinder is that it overlooks the fact that many of our moral beliefs are held in
the basic way, i.e. noninferentially. I don’t believe in R and allied propositions because
I’ve deduced them from something else that is even more obviously true than R. Maybe I
could increase my justification for R by giving arguments for it (although perhaps not by
much), but even if I could, I don’t need these arguments to be justified in assenting to it
in the first place.
Our basic moral beliefs in propositions like R and its ilk seem to be based on
intuitions and affective states rather than on philosophical reasoning. Empirical moral
psychology, in fact, shows that many of our moral beliefs are affectively-laden, i.e. that
we frequently form moral beliefs on the basis of our affective responses to the objects of
our moral beliefs.96 It’s also the case that many moral epistemologists, following on this
empirical work, argue that intuitions and emotions can function as sources of epistemic
justification for our moral beliefs.97 We can and do, of course, then reason from these
basically held moral beliefs to inferentially held moral beliefs. And here it must be
granted that philosophers may well be experts, i.e. that philosophers are experts, relative
to laypeople, at theory building in the field of ethics. But theory-building expertise is not
the kind of expertise needed to justify the thought that philosophers are experts with

96

See Prinz (2006) and Haidt (2007).

97

See, e.g., Zagzebski (2003), Huemer (2005), Audi (2004, 2013), Roberts (2013: 38-67), and Pelser (2015).

118
respect to propositions like R, which function as the building blocks of ethical theory.
Rather, to sustain that claim one would need to show that philosophers’ intuitions and
affective states are more reliable than that of plain persons’. In other words, one would
have to show that philosophers are more reliable at detecting the moral features of the
world, that their intuitions and affections more reliably track the existence and
instantiation (or not) of moral properties than do the intuitions and affections of plain
people. It is very difficult to see how the dissensus skeptic, or anyone else for that
matter, could show something like this. Having more skill at deductive and inductive
reasoning does not make one more reliable at detecting axiological features of reality,
such as the existence and presence of beauty, goodness, justice, and so on. On the basis
of these considerations, then, I conclude that we are not justified in thinking that
philosophers are moral experts.98 This means that we cannot appeal to substantial
disagreement among philosophers as a way of justifying premise (2) of the dissensus
objection.
An additional reason for doubting premise (2) stems from the more general
difficulty attached to identifying genuine cases of peer disagreement. As a philosopher,
I’m aware of the fact that there is substantial disagreement about the reality of moral facts
like R. What I don’t know, what I’m not justified in thinking, is that there is substantial
peer disagreement among philosophers about whether R and similar facts obtain. Keep
in mind here that for peer disagreement to do any justification-defeating work on a
cognizer’s belief that P it has to be the case that that cognizer either justifiedly believes or
should justifiably believe that her belief that P suffers from substantial peer disagreement.
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(More on this later.) But is such belief easy to come by? Contrary to initial appearances,
it can actually be very difficult to obtain justification for thinking that you and a dissenter
are epistemic peers (with respect to some proposition P).
King (2012) argues that, to justifiedly believe that your belief that P suffers from
peer disagreement, three conditions have to be met. First, you have to justifiedly believe
that the disagreement in question is real rather than semantic; call this the “authenticity
condition.” Second, you have to justifiedly believe that you and your dissenter share the
same P-relevant evidence; call this the “shared evidence condition.” Third, you have to
justifiedly believe that you and your dissenter are “equally disposed to respond” to your
shared P-relevant evidence “in an epistemically appropriate way” (252); call this the
“reliability condition.” King then goes on to make a fairly powerful case that it is rare for
these three conditions to be met.
For the sake of argument we can grant what it is probably safe to grant anyway,
namely that the authenticity condition is satisfied in the case of philosophical disputes
about the existence of moral facts like R. But satisfaction of the other two conditions is
much harder to come by. If we include as evidence only what can be shared in an
argument, what is sometimes called “propositional evidence,” then it is certainly possible
for two philosophers who are in a dispute about P to share a lot of evidence. But as King
points out, it is very rare for two (or more) philosophers to be scrupulous in making sure
they have all the same propositional evidence. In the absence of such scrupulosity,
however, we can’t be justified in simply assuming that our dissenter colleagues share the
same body of evidence that we do.
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If we take a broader conception of evidence, one that includes the propositional
stuff that can be articulated in publicly made arguments but also other stuff, such as
intuitions, seemings, affective states, experiences, and background beliefs, then it
becomes much more difficult to make a justified attribution of peerage. The philosopher
Smith is a realist; the philosopher Jones is an antirealist. Does Smith have justification
for thinking that he and Jones have enough shared propositional evidence, intuitions,
seemings, affective states, experiences, and background beliefs to make it the case that
they are peers with respect to the truth of things like R? It is very difficult to see how
Smith could know this, absent a very scrupulous investigation of Jones’s epistemic life.
And even granting such an investigation, it’s pretty clear that there will be a significant
degree of non-overlap in their evidential situations. They’re not going to have the same
intuitions, affective states, or experiences. 99 They’re not going to have all the same Rrelevant background beliefs. We can drive home the salience of this point by noting
something that we’ve already mentioned before: that much of our moral cognition is
based on intuitions, affective states, experiences, and background beliefs. Given this, it
doesn’t look like Smith and Jones will share, not even roughly so, the same body of Rrelevant evidence.
We should add here that it’s important not to neglect the epistemic relevance of
background beliefs. Elga (2007: 493-94) points out that disagreements about morality
and politics are often nested within much larger disagreements about a much broader
99
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range of related issues. If Smith and Jones disagree about the truth of R, it’s quite likely
that their background beliefs about a host of related issues are very different. But this
makes it very difficult for Smith to attribute peerage to Jones on account of the fact that
Smith and Jones do not share the same R-relevant evidence. The relevance of
background beliefs is especially apropos when Smith turns from thinking about whether
he and Jones satisfy the shared evidence condition to thinking about whether he and
Jones satisfy the reliability condition. If, from Smith’s perspective, Jones is getting a lot
of R-type and R-relevant questions wrong, then Smith should probably not think that
Jones is equally disposed to respond to the R-relevant data in an epistemically
appropriate way.
What these considerations show is that a justified attribution of peerage to a
dissenter is tricky business, and probably quite rare indeed. But this seems to seriously
undermine the potency of the dissensus objection. If I am not justified in thinking that
my belief that R is subject to substantial peer disagreement, then I am not justified in
thinking that premise (2) of the dissensus objection is true. In that case, I wouldn’t be
justified in making an inference to the conclusion of that objection on the basis of my
affirmation of premise (2).
One rejoinder that is worth discussing here is the possibility that what the
foregoing really shows is that we should be agnostic about whether our dissenters are
really our peers, and that such agnosticism implies that we are not justified in thinking
ourselves to be more trustworthy than our dissenters, and that this in turn implies that our
assent to the contested proposition is no longer justified.100 It is important to note in this
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context that Conciliationism just as such doesn’t imply a view about what you should do
if you find yourself in the situation of being an agnostic about whether a dissenter is your
peer or not. Conciliationism just as such says that if I justifiedly believe that there is
substantial peer disagreement regarding belief that P, then I should suspend judgment
whether P (assuming here that I believed P to begin with). But what if I don’t justifiably
believe that there is substantial peer disagreement whether P because I’m agnostic about
who my peers are? This issue seems to be an instance of the larger problem we face
when we believe that P, are aware of an argument that not-P, but don’t know whether its
premises are all justified or not. In such a situation, am I justified in continuing to
believe that P? A conciliationist who says “yes” may not be worried by agnosticism
about peerage. A conciliationist who says “no” will be worried by agnosticism about
peerage. It seems clear that, to make the dissensus objection work, the dissensus skeptic
will have to say that agnosticism about peerage leads to a loss of justification for the firstorder belief that is the target of dispute, e.g. belief in R. But it seems equally clear that
to justify this view on the epistemic relevance of agnosticism about peerage, the
dissensus skeptic will have to provide us with an epistemology of “defeaters and higherlevel requirements.”101 This is going to complicate and add to the bloated conjunction of
controversial commitments the dissensus skeptic already has need of, making epistemic
comparison with R look more and more favorable to R.
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3.2 Disagreement Undermines the Dissensus Objection
As I draw my Moorean take on the dissensus objection to a close I should like to present
a problem for that objection, one that stems from disagreement itself. Suppose you have
a justified belief that B and then learn of a potential defeater D of B. Suppose you then
learn that D arises from an unreliable source. This unreliability knowledge, as I’ll call it,
gives you a defeater-defeater of D.102 The end result is that your continued belief that B
remains justified. I contend that this is precisely the situation we find ourselves in with
respect to belief in Moorean facts such as R (the proposition, recall, that recreational
genocide is morally unacceptable) and the dissensus objection. Let me explain.
The dissensus objection is a philosophical argument; its source is philosophy. But
is philosophy a reliable method of belief-formation? That is, does philosophy more often
than not produce true beliefs? There is reason to think not, reason stemming from
disagreement itself. Philosophy is riven by disagreement in nearly every field, and on
nearly every substantive question. Brennan (2010) argues that this gives us a good
reason to think that philosophy is unreliable. What is the right view in philosophy of
mind? The best philosophers can’t agree. How about normative ethics? Or applied
ethics? Or epistemology? Or philosophy of science? Again, here and elsewhere, the
best philosophers can’t agree. This seems to show that philosophy isn’t a reliable method
of answering substantive philosophical questions. Knowing this, we have a defeaterdefeater for the dissensus objection. Seeing as the dissensus objection arises from an
unreliable source, we have no good reason to think that it has any defeating power viz.
Moorean moral facts like R and its ilk. At the least, the poor track record of philosophy
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calls into question the ability of philosophical arguments to overturn belief in Moorean
facts like R. To save the dissensus objection, the skeptic (!) will have to respond by
showing that philosophy is in fact reliable, or else that philosophical arguments can
defeat Moorean facts even though the former are an unreliable way of answering
substantive questions. Either way, the skeptic will have to add even more controversial
commitments to the bloated conjunction she already accepts. This makes epistemic
comparison with R even more favorable for those of us who still believe that recreational
genocide really is wrong.
3.3 Conclusion
At the end of the day, the bloated conjunction of controversial commitments needed to
make the dissensus objection work simply pales in comparison with Moorean truths like
R: these truths have much more going for them, epistemically speaking, than do skeptical
premises, their requirements, and their consequences. The rational thing to do in the face
of the objection is to maintain one’s belief in R. This holds whether we endorse
Steadfastness, Thune’s middle way, or Conciliationism. Neither view gives the dissensus
skeptic what she needs to make the dissensus objection work.
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CHAPTER 4. MOORE ON EMPIRICAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

So far I have given an account of Mooreanism itself (chapter 1) and an account of
metaethical Mooreanism (chapter 2), the view that some moral facts, such as the
wrongness of recreational genocide, are Moorean facts and thus are immune to rejection
in the face of philosophical arguments for moral skepticism. I then put metaethical
Mooreanism to work, first in responding to the evolutionary debunking argument for
moral skepticism (chapter 2) and then in responding to the argument from moral
disagreement (chapter 3). I now close this dissertation with one final piece of applicatory
work: I apply metaethical Mooreanism to the argument from empirical moral psychology,
once again arguing that the moral skeptic has need of too many contested, controversial
propositions to make the argument go through. At the end of the day, belief in the
wrongness of recreational genocide has more going for it, epistemically speaking, than
does the bloated nest of controversial propositions needed by the argument from
empirical moral psychology.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 4.0 I explain the argument from
empirical moral psychology. There are roughly two non-skeptical ways of responding to
the argument. One way, which I discuss in section 4.1, involves conceding the findings
of empirical moral psychology but then arguing that these findings don’t have any or
much skeptical punch after all. This section takes up the bulk of the chapter. In section
4.2 I conclude by briefly discussing the other non-skeptical way of responding to the
argument from empirical moral psychology, which involves contesting the (alleged)
deliverances of empirical moral psychology. What we will see in either case is that the
moral skeptic who wants to make use of work in empirical moral psychology won’t be
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able to find a set of premises, presuppositions, and supporting arguments for those
premises and presuppositions that isn’t epistemically inferior to the widely and firmly
held moral belief that recreational genocide is wrong (and other allied moral beliefs).
4.0 The Argument from Empirical Moral Psychology
What is the argument from empirical moral psychology? And what exactly is empirical
moral psychology anyway? By “empirical moral psychology” I shall mean findings, or
alleged findings, about moral cognition delivered to us from work in cognitive science,
neuroscience, psychology, and experimental philosophy. As with other arguments for
moral skepticism, such as the evolutionary debunking argument, there really isn’t any one
single thing that we might tag with the locution “the argument from empirical moral
psychology.” We thus face the potentially monumental task of reconstructing and
discussing a variety of skeptical arguments from a variety of findings in empirical moral
psychology. To make things more manageable I shall instead try to reconstruct an
argument that (hopefully) captures the core element of the shared worries that could be
pressed into service in the various and multitudinous arguments that could be
reconstructed on the basis of the voluminous work coming out of empirical moral
psychology.
I shall presently state and then briefly discuss “the” argument from empirical
moral psychology:
The Argument from Empirical Moral Psychology
1. Our moral theories and judgments are ultimately based on our moral intuitions
and emotions.
2. If we have good reasons to doubt that our moral intuitions and emotions are
reliably formed (i.e. to doubt that they track morally relevant features of the
world), then we are no longer justified in believing in our moral theories and
judgments.
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3. But findings in empirical moral psychology give us a good reason to doubt
that our moral intuitions and emotions are reliably formed.
4. So, our moral theories and judgments are unjustified.103
What does it mean to have a good reason to doubt that your moral intuitions and
emotions are reliably formed? As I shall understand things here, there are two ways to
have good reasons to doubt the reliability of these bases of moral belief. First, you might
have good reason to think that your moral intuitions and emotions were probably
unreliably formed. Second, you might have good reason to suspend judgment on the
proposition that your moral intuitions and emotions were reliably formed. In either case,
you have good reasons to doubt that your moral intuitions were reliably formed. And, in
either case, you thereby have a defeater for the moral theories and judgments which are
ultimately based on those intuitions and emotions. This is because it is true more
generally that having a reason to doubt whether a belief was reliably formed gives one a
defeater for that belief.104
What does it mean to have a good reason to doubt that your moral intuitions and
emotions are reliably formed? To have a good reason to doubt the reliability of your
belief it must be the case that you are or should be aware of the reason in question. You
might balk at this on the grounds that I can’t have a reason at all unless I am aware of that
reason: its merely being the case that I should be aware of a reason does not mean that I
have that reason. If you prefer this way of thinking about the matter, then when you see a
phrase like “if we have good reasons to doubt that our moral intuitions and emotions are
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unreliably formed…” simply read it as saying, “if we have or should have good reasons
to doubt that…”. It should be kept in mind that the fact that higher-order doubt regarding
the reliability of one’s belief that P has this defeating power does not imply that one is
thereby epistemically obligated to have, even in the absence of doubt, an argument for the
reliability of one’s belief that P. I don’t need an argument for the reliability of my
perceptual faculties to be justified in believing that I have hands. However, if a skeptic
raises a higher-order argument against the reliability of my perceptual faculties, and this
argument gives me a good reason to doubt or suspend judgment on the reliability of these
faculties, then arguably I do have a defeater for my hitherto justified belief that I have
hands. And if I do have such a defeater, then, arguably I need some reason to think that
the defeater doesn’t work, at least if my belief that I have hands is to remain justified. In
general, if I consider the higher-order question of the reliability of my belief that P (even
without a skeptic in the room pressing an argument against me), then to retain justified
belief that P I must be able to justifiably say that my belief that P was indeed reliably
formed.
Everything I have said in the last two paragraphs has been an explication of and in
support for the argument’s second premise. So, I won’t challenge that premise because I
think it’s true. I am also inclined to think that premise 1 is true as well, though in a later
section I will raise worries for the idea that our moral theories and judgments are based
on emotions. However, these worries will be limited to particular cases and studies and
will not apply to the more general claim that emotions sometimes and maybe even
oftentimes serve as bases for moral beliefs. For example, I will question the widely held
view that the emotion of disgust triggers moral judgment and will raise for our
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consideration the strong and alternative possibility that this emotion is rather an effect of
moral judgment. Most of my attention and ammunition, then, will be directed to and at
the argument’s third premise. In section 4.1 I pursue the option of conceding the findings
in empirical moral psychology that are put to use by the moral skeptic but then arguing
that these findings have very little skeptical firepower. In section 4.2 I briefly contest the
findings themselves; it is here that I will discuss such things as whether the emotion of
disgust triggers or is largely an effect of moral judgment.
4.0.1 The Putatively Problematic Findings
So what exactly are the findings that the skeptic might appeal to in order to justify the
third premise in the argument?105 Essentially, many scholars, from a number of
disciplines, seem to believe that studies in empirical moral psychology show that our
moral beliefs are based on intuitions and emotions rather than arguments. Many of them
further believe that these studies either show or imply that these bases of moral belief are
unreliable, giving us a reason to think that, ultimately, many if not all of our moral beliefs
are unreliable. Let me briefly canvass some of the (putative) findings and their allegedly
problematic consequences. In what follows I shall focus on those parts of the research
that seem to be most discussed by philosophers.
Joshua Greene and his colleagues and co-authors seem to have shown that (some
of) our deontological moral judgments are correlated with “emotion-related brain areas”
(2001: 2107) whereas (some of) our consequentialist judgments are not. Since our more
consequentialist judgments appear not to be correlated with emotions, this research may
well give us an empirical reason to favor consequentialist intuitions (and thus
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consequentialism itself) over non-consequentialist intuitions – or so argues Peter Singer,
anyway (2005).106 Obviously, this argument assumes that (i) the best explanation of the
correlation between activity in the relevant emotion-related brain regions and
deontological judgments is causal (in a particular direction): the emotions are causing the
deontological judgment; and (ii) the emotions in question represent an epistemically
problematic influence on our non-consequentialist judgments (more on this later). In
another piece Greene, this time in tandem with Jonathan Haidt, argues that “moral
judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning”
(2002: 517). In a subsequent stand-alone piece, Greene (2003) worries that
neuroscientific research about moral cognition, which shows that “moral judgments are
based largely on intuition” (847), presents us with reasons to be suspicious about the
reliability of moral cognition in general, and indeed to worry even about moral realism
itself: “Understanding where our moral instincts come from and how they work can, I
argue, lead us to doubt that our moral convictions stem from perceptions of moral truth
rather than projections of moral attitudes” (850). Subsequent work by Greene and his
colleagues emphasize the more modest contention that emotion and reason play dual and
competing roles in moral cognition.107 On this dual-process theory of moral judgment,
“characteristically deontological judgments” are supported by “automatic emotion
responses” while “characteristically consequentialist judgments” are supported by
“conscious reasoning and allied processes of cognitive control” (2014: 699). For Greene,
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this theory of moral judgment gives us some reason to favor consequentialist theories
over their deontological rivals.
Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment is one of the most prominent and
discussed empirically-based theories of moral judgment. Though the model itself is not
an argument for nor a statement of moral skepticism, it has been cited as providing us
with good reasons to embrace skeptical and revisionary theses. We’ve just seen that
Greene himself is congenial to the idea that his research implies trouble for realism.
Greene’s work is put to similar use by others as well, such as Sinnott-Armstrong (2008),
who cites and discusses Greene’s work as giving us evidence to think that “many moral
judgments result from emotions that cloud judgment” (352). Sinnott-Armstrong’s own
skepticism-threatening conclusion here is that unless we have available to us arguments
which can confirm the reliability of our moral intuitions in the face of this (and other)
defeater for their trustworthiness, we cannot rely on them.108 In a similar vein, Levy
(2006b) cites Greene’s work as part of his case for the conclusion that the cognitive
science of morality gives us a good reason to reject realism and embrace constructivism.
Likewise, Prinz (2006) cites Greene as part of his argument for sentimentalism, which he
defines as the view that “To believe that something is morally wrong (right) is to have a
sentiment of disapprobation (approbation) towards it” (33), a view he in turn takes to
support the metaethically revisionary claim that moral facts are response-dependent; in
particular, Prinz (2007) argues for constructive sentimentalism, the view that “sentiments
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literally create morals” (9) – “We, in effect, build morality; we don’t discover it” (168).
Prinz, then, takes work by Greene, and similar work by others, to provide us with good
reasons to adopt a sentimentalist model of moral judgment and a constructivist
sentimentalist view about moral facts.
Another body of research in empirical moral psychology that is oft-discussed by
philosophers comes to us from Jonathan Haidt and his collaborators. Haidt (2001, 2007,
2012) is the pioneer of the social intuitionist model of moral judgment.109 Haidt used to
subscribe to a dual-process model of moral judgment, which he calls the “Jefferson
model” (after Thomas Jefferson). However, over the course of the years he came to
embrace the Humean model, on which reason is mostly just a servant of our moral
emotions.110 On this model, our moral judgments are, for the most part at least, based on
intuitive gut reactions rather than on conscious moral deliberation. Moral reasoning is
mostly a post hoc, confabulatory affair: when challenged to justify our moral beliefs we
grope for and then give reasons that are not the actual bases of those beliefs; this post hoc
reasoning process is simply a “search for evidence to support our initial intuitive
reaction” (2007: 998). One of Haidt’s most interesting arguments for the “intuitive
primacy” of moral judgment is the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding. Moral
dumbfounding occurs in cases (studies) where the subjects’ initial intuitive reaction to a
moral situation is challenged, which prompts the subjects to reason in support of their
initial reaction. However, when the researchers shoot down their reasons, the subjects
stick to their guns – even though it’s clear that their post hoc, confabulatory reasons don’t
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actually work. The subjects are “dumbfounded” but retain their initial intuitive reaction
anyway. This seems to show that what’s really doing the work here, for the subjects, is
their intuitive gut reactions – their “intuitions” – rather than any conscious moral
deliberation.
As with Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment, Haidt’s social
intuitionist model is often cited in arguments for skeptical and revisionary thesis.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Levy, and Prinz also cite Haidt in their arguments for skepticism and
constructivism. Similarly, Nichols (2004b) cites and discusses Haidt’s work over and
over again in his case for the thesis that our moral judgments are based on emotions;
Nichols then argues that moral objectivism should be give up because we have no good
reason to trust those emotions (182-189). Clearly, then, as with the dual-process theory
of moral judgment, many interpreters of the social intuitionist model believe that its
tenets provide us with reasons to abandon commonsense morality in favor of skepticism
or some revisionary metaethic.
I have tried to briefly canvass some of the most important and oft-discussed work
in empirical moral psychology, work that could be taken to give support for the argument
from empirical moral psychology, sketched above. The literature, including the empirical
work and discussions of it, is truly gargantuan and a more thoroughgoing survey is
simply not possible here. My strategy here is not a comprehensive survey followed by a
comprehensive analysis, but rather to hone in on some specific research and some
specific models of moral cognition and then to examine whether these give us reasons for
moral skepticism. What I shall do in the next section is to argue that these findings do
not give us a reason to be moral skeptics; I shall try to accomplish this with the
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assumption that the findings are largely correct. In a later section I will more directly
(but also more briefly) challenge the findings themselves. It is important to keep in mind
the larger context here: what we are doing is putting metaethical Mooreanism to work –
putting it in the field, up against an actual skeptical argument. The purpose is to
showcase its claim that belief in Moorean facts, such as that recreational genocide is
wrong, is epistemically superior to skeptical arguments to the contrary, a claim which
implies that believers in R (and allied facts) have nothing to fear from findings, alleged or
real, in empirical moral psychology.
4.1 Why the Findings Aren’t Very Problematic
Fortunately, the canvassed findings do not undermine either belief in Moorean facts such
as the wrongness of recreational genocide (henceforth “R”) nor belief in metaethical
Mooreanism itself. I will discuss three problems with attempts to reason from the
canvassed findings to moral skepticism. The first problem is that there is simply no
reason to think that our beliefs in Moorean facts like R are based on the same (or same
sorts of) allegedly problematic emotions/intuitions implicated in the dual-process theory.
Call this the “generalization problem.” The second problem is that any attempt to draw
skeptical conclusions from the dual-process or social intuitionist models must –
erroneously – overlook or at least reject the possibility that unreliable emotions can be
corrected for. Call this the “correction problem.” The third problem is that attempts to
derive skeptical conclusions from the affect-laden character of moral cognition must –
again, erroneously – overlook or at least reject the possibility that our emotions, or at
least some nontrivial subset of them, are actually reliable guides to good, bad, right, and
wrong. Call this the “reliability problem.”
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4.1.1 The Generalization Problem
Let us begin with the dual-process theory of moral judgment. Suppose that
characteristically deontological judgments are based on affective states/intuitions and that
characteristically consequentialist judgments are not. And let us further assume that
some of these affective states are tracking non-moral rather than moral properties and
thus that some of our deontological judgments are based on off-track sources. This in
itself is no reason to doubt that my belief that R was reliably formed. To have such a
defeater I would need a reason to think that my judgment that R was formed on the basis
of the same sort of unreliable emotion as the subjects’ beliefs in Greene’s studies. But
why think a thing a like that? If we look a little more closely at Greene’s findings we’ll
see that they don’t generalize to and thus undermine belief in R.
Greene’s subjects were asked to respond to two different trolley problems, or two
different trolley thought experiments, in which the outcome is the same. In the switch
case you can, by flipping a switch, divert a runaway trolley onto a side track, a move
which will save the lives of five people stuck on the main track but kill one man stuck on
a side track. In the footbridge case you can only save the five people by pushing the one
man off a bridge and onto the track, into the path of the trolley; his body will stop the
trolley and save five lives.111 Though the consequences are the same in both cases – one
dies, five live – most people give different verdicts on the two cases: most people say that
you can divert the trolley but that you cannot push the man off the bridge. Neuroimaging
showed that when people were considering the footbridge case “brain regions associated
with emotion” were “engaged” while in the switch case “brain regions associated with

111

My terminology here, for the cases, follows Greene’s (2014).

136
controlled cognition” were “engaged” (2014: 700-01). Moreover, those few subjects who
said that it was okay to push the man onto the track in the footbridge case, though
showing the same emotional engagement, took longer to reach this verdict, a fact which
can be explained by the hypothesis that they were using reason to overcome their
emotional aversion to harming someone up close and personal. The interpretation given
to these results is that the subjects had an emotional aversion to harming someone in an
up close (personal) way. Because of this aversion they said it wasn’t okay to push the
man off the footbridge. So, in the footbridge case emotion was doing the work.
However, in the switch case the emotional aversion wasn’t there, or at least was much
weaker, and people were able to use reason to reach the verdict that it is okay to flip the
switch and divert the trolley.
It is difficult to see how these findings, even taken at face value, could undermine
my belief in R. For one thing, my belief in R is not, so far as I can tell, based on an
intuition to the effect that it is wrong to hurt people in an up-close way (and so wrong to
push someone off a bridge) but okay to do so in a more impersonal way (and so okay to
flip a switch that will start a chain of events in which someone will wind up getting hurt).
For another, R is a fact that can be endorsed by proponents of multiple different
normative theories, including both consequentialists and deontologists. So, if Greene’s
trolley studies give us a reason to favor one normative theory over another –
consequentialism over deontology – that in no way undermines belief in R. More
generally, the dual-process theory of moral judgment could undermine belief in R only by
showing that belief in R is based on epistemically unreliable emotions. It is very
difficult, however, to see how the dual-process theory could show that.
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To make the leap from the dual-process theory to the conclusion that my belief in
R is in the same troubling camp as Greene’s subjects, we would need one of two things,
neither of which we have. First, we would need a neuroimaging study to the effect that
my belief that R (or a group of subjects’ beliefs that R) is correlated with the same sort of
brain activity as the subjects in Greene’s case. Or, second, we would need a reason to
think that belief in R is a deontological judgment that couldn’t be supported by other
normative theories. For this second reason to do any work, however, we would also need
a reason to think that belief in R is based on epistemically unreliable deontological
intuitions since, arguably, not every deontological intuition is unreliable. Surely, we
cannot infer from the dual-process theory in general, nor from Greene’s trolley research
in particular, that all deontological intuitions are unreliable. The dual-process theory
doesn’t give us any of these things that we need to generate a worry about belief in R, so
there is no reason to infer, from the dual-process theory, that belief in moral facts like R
is undermined. The moral skeptic who would make this case would need a lot of
intermediate premises, which would themselves be highly controversial, between the
premises that present the dual-process theory and the conclusion that belief in R is
unjustified. It is difficult even to say what plausible versions those premises might be, let
alone to think that belief in their conjunction would be more justified than belief in R
itself.
These considerations bring to the fore the generalization problem for moral
skeptics who might want to make use of Greene’s dual-process model: namely, why
should we think the results would generalize in a problematic way? For starters, as Levy
(2006b) points out, maybe Greene’s research, and the dual-process model based on it,
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simply give us a reason to think that consequentialism is true. In fact, maybe
consequentialism is true. Clearly, that doesn’t imply moral skepticism. Nor does it
imply that belief in moral facts like R is unjustified – for, arguably, belief in R and allied
facts (love is good, pain is bad, parents ought to care for their children, etc.) will be fully
consistent with consequentialism. For another thing, maybe Greene’s findings wouldn’t
generalize in that they are unique to his subjects: American college students. Levy
suggests the possibility that Greene’s subjects just lacked the moral education necessary
to correct for off-track intuitions in this case. Suppose this is true: obviously it doesn’t
follow from this that everyone else is incapable of correcting for off-track intuitions in
this case, let alone in every other case. Nor does it follow that these same students have
off-track intuitions about other, easier moral cases. The fact that, say, my intuitions in
trolley cases are unreliable does not show that my intuitions in easier cases are unreliable.
After all, trolley cases are some of the most difficult and unsettled cases in all of moral
philosophy. The lack of convergence about how to resolve them in a consistent way
might be taken to show that no one is deploying a reliable set of intuitions when
considering trolley problems – or at least that we have no way of knowing whose trolley
intuitions are truth-tracking and whose aren’t.
Another possibility here is that in the trolley cases, or at least some of them, we
have on our hands a genuine moral dilemma, i.e. a case in which every option that we
could possibly take is morally wrong. So, if the footbridge case is a moral dilemma, then
it will be wrong to push the man off the bridge, but also wrong to not push him off the
bridge. If that’s the case, then it’s no surprise that our intuitions are pulled in different
directions. But how would that show that our intuitions in other cases which are not

139
dilemmas, such as cases where we are considering R and allied facts, are unreliable?
What the trolley cases show, if they show anything, is that some of our deontological
intuitions are colored by affective states in a way that is potentially misleading. But why
think this shows anything about other deontological intuitions or my deontological
intuitions in general, let alone about my moral intuitions in general? Again, it is very
difficult to see how the moral skeptic might take the tenets of the dual-process theory and
use them as premises in a good argument for moral skepticism.112
One final reason to worry about generalization: maybe Greene’s subjects gave the
right verdict in the footbridge case: maybe their deontological intuition was truthtracking after all. After all, as Kaufman (2016: 23) points out, 90% of people say it is
okay to flip the switch in the switch case; fascinatingly enough, however, 90% of people
say that it is wrong to push the man off the bridge. I’m inclined to say, “Maybe the folks
got this one right, philosophers.” (Considered on its face, after all, is it not somewhat
morally perverse, or at least highly counterintuitive, to suggest that the intuitions of those
who refuse to intentionally kill an innocent person are misfiring?) If Greene’s subjects
did in fact give the right verdicts on the cases, then any generalization that we might have
a reason to endorse would be a generalization that gives us precisely nothing to worry
about. The dual-process model itself, considered as a piece of pure empirical work,
cannot say that the intuition that we should not push the man off the bridge is off-track.
From this we can clearly see that in any argument for moral skepticism from Greene’s
trolley research in particular, or from the dual-process model more generally, it will by
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highly controversial philosophical theses that will do most if not all of the real work.
According to metaethical Mooreanism, belief in a moral fact like R has far more going
for it, epistemically speaking, than would belief in the philosophical theses needed by the
skeptic.
There are at least three ways that the intuition that we should not push the man off
the bridge could be truth-tracking. First, maybe it is after all true that while it is
permissible to allow a foreseen but unintended harm, to bring about a proportionately
good effect – and thus to flip the switch in the switch case – it is not permissible to
intentionally bring about that same harm in order to achieve the good effect – and thus it
is impermissible to push the man off the bridge in the footbridge case.113 In other words,
maybe the doctrine of double effect (DDE) is true, and maybe people’s intuitions were
tracking this principle. In fact, given that 90% of respondents to a trolley problem survey
gave the result that we would predict they would give on the assumption that their
intuitions were tracking the DDE, it seems a near certainty that people’s intuitions in the
two trolley cases were tracking the DDE or some near cousin of it. Now, this is
epistemically problematic only if we assume that the DDE is false. We have here, then,
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in Greene’s trolley research, no clear path to skepticism even about our deontological
intuitions: the road is blocked by the DDE.114
There is a second way that Greene’s subjects’ intuitions could’ve been truthtracking. Very many true moral principles admit of exceptions: a truly absolute, i.e.
exceptionless, moral principle is a rare artifact indeed. So, maybe the DDE, or some near
cousin of it, is true but admits of exceptions. And maybe certain trolley cases, such as the
footbridge case, are cases in which the DDE is excepted. If so, then maybe Greene’s
subjects’ deontological intuitions were tracking a true but non-absolute moral principle,
and perhaps they failed to notice that the footbridge case is one of those cases in which
the DDE is excepted. And who could blame them? After all, as Levy (2006b) points out,
Greene’s subjects may have simply lacked the moral education needed to see this. If this
is correct, then Greene’s subjects did not, after all, display reliance on an epistemically
unreliable deontological intuition. Rather, they were tracking a true moral principle but
made a mistake that is easy for anyone to make: they failed to notice, in a certain very
tough (hypothetical) moral situation, that this true moral principle is excepted in this
situation. And here is the payoff of this consideration: to justifiably say that Greene’s
trolley subjects were having an off-track intuition, the debunker (of morality itself, or just
of deontological normative ethics) needs to be able to justifiably say that the subjects’
intuitions were not tracking a true but non-absolute moral principle, one that happens to
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be excepted in certain trolley cases. But this will be a highly controversial philosophical
supposition, and not one likely to be agreed to by a majority of people since a majority of
people think that it is indeed wrong to push the man off the bridge in the footbridge case.
This means that, even if most people are wrong about the footbridge case, most people
probably share the intuition held by the research subjects, the one that led them to say
that you shouldn’t push the man off the bridge. So, most people are likely to say that the
subjects’ intuitions were not off-track. There won’t, then, be any clear path to skepticism
about deontological intuition just on the basis of the trolley case; controversial
philosophy will be needed. What we see, then, is that the empirical work isn’t doing any
heaving lifting here, in terms of debunking; rather, the debunking work is being done by
controversial philosophy – “spitballs,” as Lycan (2001: 41) would say.
Here is a third possibility for Greene’s subjects: suppose that some version of rule
consequentialism is the correct normative theory and that they were tracking a moral rule
that is endorsed by it, a rule to the effect that we should not intentionally kill innocent
people. If this is correct, then Greene’s subjects, though moved by a deontological
intuition, were actually tracking a true consequentialist principle. Maybe a better way to
say this is to say that their deontological intuitions were tracking a true moral principle
that is endorsed, not only by certain versions of deontological normative ethical theories,
but also by certain versions of rule consequentialism. And maybe one of these latter is
the correct normative theory, so that the subjects’ intuitions were tracking moral truth
after all. Or maybe we should think of it like this: their deontological intuitions were
tracking a deontological-sounding principle that is actually a true consequentialist
principle.
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Here is a potential problem with this third proposal: Why think that the subjects
were tracking, without careful reasoning, a true consequentialist moral principle that is
normally arrived at by moral deliberation? This is a good question; here is a plausible
answer. Rule consequentialism explains why the prohibition on killing innocent people is
a true moral principle. Our intuitions, or at least the ones we rely on when making quick
decisions in cases like the footbridge case, don’t track that explanation; rather, intuitions
track the prohibition itself, and this because we are sensitive to the value of human life
and thus to the morally problematic act of killing an innocent human being. Luckily, we
don’t need to track the normative theory in which the prohibition is embedded and
explained in order to track the prohibition itself. Here is an analogy. I have an epistemic
intuition that belief in the reality of the past is justified. It may be that belief in the reality
if the past is justified only because it meets the conditions on epistemic justification laid
down by theory T, the one true theory of epistemic justification. As it so happens, I can
reliably tell, in a large number of cases, whether a belief (say, in one’s hands, in other
minds, etc.) is justified without first having to have a theoretical appreciation of that
belief’s concord with T. Similarly, we can oftentimes tell that an action is wrong (right)
without having to have a normative-theoretical appreciation of the situation. Now, those
who also have a correct normative-theoretical appreciation of the situation will have,
arguably, a more reliable set of normative intuitions in general and will more often
engage in correct moral reasoning (by which I simply mean moral reasoning that
concludes to moral truth). But this doesn’t imply that those lacking the correct
normative-theoretical appreciation have, simply, unreliable intuitions; perhaps in a large
number of cases their intuitions are also quite reliable.
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To get a skeptical or even anti-deontological result from Greene’s study and the
dual-process model more generally we would need good reasons for ruling out all three
of the possibilities just canvassed. But the situation gets even worse, for skeptical
interpreters of Greene’s research and his dual-process theory, when we contemplate the
possibility that our DDE-style intuitions in the trolley cases may well be the result of an
internalization of prior moral reasoning. This is because of the more general possibility
that many of the intuitions that get put to use in automatic-style episodes of moral
judgment may have been formed through an elongated process of moral education and
reflection. This is precisely what Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) argue in the context
of responding to Haidt’s social intuitionist model:
[I]t may be that our moral responses in certain situations are now automatic and
nonreflective because we have reached a point at which habit has taken over the
need to engage in reflection each time we need to make a decision. Having
learned (or decided) how to respond to certain moral situations and having
responded subsequently to like situations in the same way over and over again, we
now no longer have to deliberate before responding. So moral judgments
currently made without appeal to moral reasoning may nonetheless be the product
of a deliberative process. Thus, although we do not deny that many moral
responses follow a script—indeed, this is what one might expect with respect to
social behaviors that involve well-practiced decisions…the fact that many social
behaviors are scripted provides no information as to how these behaviors were
initially formed. (279)115
The possibility that our intuitions in trolley cases are internalized, automatic
manifestations of principles arrived at through an elongated process of moral education
and reflection is fully consistent with Greene’s research data as well as the dual-process
model more generally. Perhaps a good number of our deontological intuitions are like
this; if so, then we shouldn’t make a fuss over the fact that deontological judgments seem
more intuitive and affect-laden than non-deontological judgments – unless of course there
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is a good argument for thinking that our moral education and reflection in general
produces unreliable moral intuitions. But it is no part of the dual-process model in
general, nor of Greene’s trolley research in particular, to claim such a thing.116
In general, the worst thing that the dual-process model could possibly show is that
some subset of our deontological beliefs is based on unreliable deontological intuitions.
Clearly, that doesn’t imply moral skepticism. We have no reason to think, just from the
dual-process model, that all or even most of our deontological intuitions are off-track.
Nor do we have a reason to think, just from the dual-process model, that all of our moral
judgments in general are based on unreliable intuitions. I conclude, then, that belief in
Moorean facts like R is safe from any debunking argument that would appeal to the dualprocess theory of moral judgment. To get from there to moral skepticism the skeptic will
have need of a number of highly controversial philosophical propositions, a conjunction
that won’t compare favorably, epistemically speaking, with Moorean facts like R. There
is no consensus about the philosophical implications of the dual-process model or the
empirical work on which it is based. There is no consensus about the trolley problem, let
alone a consensus that Greene’s subjects’ intuitions were off-track. There is not even a
consensus that the dual-process model is the right way to interpret the empirical work,
nor about how to understand the dual-process model itself – for example, is the model
consistent with the suggestion, by Saltzstein and Kasachkoff, that some of our intuitions
are internalizations of principles arrived at via education and reflection? The premises
the skeptic would need to get all the way to moral skepticism just don’t have the
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epistemic weight needed to do any real defeating work. And – importantly – it is
precisely these highly controversial philosophical theses that the skeptic needs to get any
real skeptical threat up and running in the first place. So, it is controversial philosophy
that is doing the real work here, not the empirical research.
4.1.2 The Correction Problem
The second difficulty, the correction problem, is that any attempt to draw skeptical
conclusions from the dual-process or social intuitionist models must – erroneously –
overlook or at least reject the possibility that unreliable emotions/intuitions can be
corrected for. For starters, let’s take note of the fact that, while the empirical research
and the empirically-driven models are interesting and worth fleshing out and discussing,
there is a sense in which they do not tell us nearly as much as we might initially think.
Many philosophers already believed, well before this recent empirical work, that moral
foundationalism is correct.117 Foundationalism is the more general thesis that some of
our beliefs are, to borrow a phrase from Plantinga (1993), properly basic, i.e. rationally
but non-inferentially held. Moral foundationalism is the view that some of our moral
beliefs are properly basic. Non-basic moral beliefs are then held on the basis of the basic
moral beliefs (and, in certain cases, also on the basis of certain non-moral beliefs). The
basic moral beliefs are themselves held on the basis of non-belief states, such as moral
intuitions, moral emotions, and moral perceptions. This moral foundationalist picture is
both descriptive and normative: descriptively, we hold some moral beliefs in the basic
way; normatively, it is rational for us to do this in some cases, hence some of our moral
beliefs are properly basic. This is a picture that was accepted by many philosophers long
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before Greene and Haidt (and their collaborators and empirically-minded colleagues)
came on the scene. Now, we already knew, well before these newer, empirically-driven
Humean-style models of moral judgment got off the ground, that our moral intuitions
(and emotions and perceptions) are not infallible, that some of them are misleading.
Virtually no one thought that that was grounds for moral skepticism.118 Instead, we
thought that it was the job of moral education, moral reflection, philosophical training,
moral maturation, and general intellectual virtue to help identify and correct for the
misleading intuitions. We now have empirical studies that, while interesting, tell us
something we already knew: your moral beliefs are based on intuitions, and they are not
infallible, some of them are misleading. Fine; but why can’t I – using moral reflection,
the findings of empirical moral psychology, dialogue with others, and so on – identify
and correct for erroneous intuitions? Indeed, why can’t I engage in a process of reflective
equilibrium: weighing intuitions about cases against intuitions about principles, sorting
through and weeding out bad intuitions, and using intuitions and sound reasoning to
“grow” my stock of justified moral beliefs? Empirical moral psychology could
potentially help us engage in such a task; so, rather than taking its findings as materials to
be used in an argument for moral skepticism, we should take them as materials that can
be used to help us acquire a more justified set of moral beliefs. Interestingly, empirical
moral psychology can be used to help acquire moral knowledge rather than to obliterate
it.119

118

It may be tempting to think that Hume was a moral skeptic, but that would be a mistake. The issue is
quite complicated, and many interpreters of Hume deny that he was a moral skeptic. See Fieser (1989).
119

This is basically what Huemer (2008), one of the most prominent of contemporary ethical intuitionists,
suggests that intuitionists do: use the science to help weed out problematic intuitions and move toward a
better moral theory.

148
Haidt does admit that it is possible for us to correct erroneous intuitions on the
basis of reason, but he claims that this is a rare process. There appear to be two reasons
that Haidt thinks this, both having to do with the functional role played by reason in
moral cognition. First, Haidt thinks that moral reasoning is mostly a post hoc affair that
we engage in to persuade others of the correctness of our own moral judgments. Haidt
(2001) writes, “The [social intuitionist] model proposes that moral reasoning is an
effortful process, engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches
for arguments that will support an already-made judgment” (818). More recently: after
summarizing some of the empirical work, Haidt writes, “We do moral reasoning not to
reconstruct the actual reasons why we ourselves came to a judgment; we reason to find
the best possible reasons why somebody else ought to join us in our judgment” (2012:
52). Second, Haidt (2001: 820-21) thinks that our reasoning is heavily biased by offtrack influences, such as the relatedness motive (we are motivated to “agree with our
friends and allies”) and the coherence motive (we accept evidence supporting our own
already existing beliefs “uncritically while subjecting opposing evidence to much greater
scrutiny”). Because of the ways that these biases afflict our reasoning, Haidt concludes
that in our use of reason we act more like “intuitive lawyers” than like “intuitive
scientists” (821). If Haidt is right, then reason won’t be a very effective tool for weeding
out misleading intuitions and honing and pruning a body of moral judgments.
Liao (2011) suggests, however, that Haidt is not right. First, Liao takes aim at
Haidt’s claim that moral reasoning is mostly just post hoc. Summarizing some of the
literature critical of Haidt’s social intuitionist model, Liao makes the following two
points. First, as noted above, some (perhaps many) of our intuitions may be
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internalizations of prior moral education and reflection. Haidt himself admits this
possibility and also concedes that the empirical data can’t tell us how often this does or
doesn’t happen. Second, Liao notes that conscious reasoning can slow down and correct
for “the automatic process of judgment formation described by the” (111) social
intuitionist model. Haidt also concedes this point, citing – of all people – work by
Greene and two of his collaborators.
Greene et al. (2012) ran Haidt’s famous incest case by their research subjects:
Julie and Mark are sister and brother. They are traveling together in France one
summer vacation from university. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near
the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making
love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe.
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that
night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other.
Greene et al. specifically say that they chose this example because “it is known for
eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion (Haidt,
2001).” Greene et al. gave half of their subjects a lousy argument for incest and the other
half a plausible argument for incest and found that, when the subjects were allowed to
respond right away, they were equally condemnatory of Julie and Mark’s incest.
However, they didn’t allow all of their subjects to respond immediately: some of them
were forced to wait two minutes before rendering a verdict on the incest case.
Interestingly, these subjects were more likely to adopt a stance of tolerance toward Julie
and Mark’s incest. Greene et al. take this as good evidence that reasoning can influence
moral judgment, even in the face of emotional aversion: “these results provide the
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strongest evidence to date for the influence of reflection and reasoning on moral
judgment” (172).120
So, Haidt himself concedes that intuitions can be internalizations of prior
reasoning and that reasoning can influence and even overturn intuition-driven moral
judgments. Haidt doesn’t appear to think these are frequent occurrences, but it’s entirely
unclear how much evidential weight we should give to this educated guess. Many of us
have given far more than two minutes of our time to think about moral issues. Many of
us make a conscious effort to use reason to slow down our automatic moral cognition and
take the time to reflect in a responsible way about our moral judgments, especially when
people we respect disagree with certain of those judgments; many of us have made a
concerted effort, with the use of our reason, to expand our body of moral knowledge by
engaging in moral learning. For example, once upon a time I had very few and very
naïve views about the morality of warfare. Then I studied just war theory (and realism
and pacifism). During that process, and as a result of it, I shed some bad (false) moral
views I used to hold about the ethics of war. I learned a lot of new moral truths that I had
never even considered before. I thought long and hard about ethics and war. It’s not
clear to me how my use of moral reflection in this process was simply a case of post hoc
reasoning trotted out to justify intuitively formed, pre-existing judgments, especially
when, in many of the cases, I was acquiring knowledge about things I had never even
thought about before, such as the jus post bellum criteria. In my naïve days, I never
thought about the just termination of a war; once I learned about the jus post bellum
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criteria I gained, not just new information, but brand spanking new moral knowledge
about matters that were previously unfamiliar to me. And I did this through the use of
my own reason, operating on ideas presented by others. How exactly, I’d like to know, is
this a case of post hoc reasoning? Most likely, Haidt would say this sort of thing
happens, but only very rarely. But that’s just his armchair guess – to speak frankly. And,
in any case, I know that I have gone through this process before, and still go through it;
and I know (anecdotally) that many others have as well. Why not think, then, that when
I, and others I know, do such things I’m acquiring a more rationally respectable set of
moral beliefs, some of which even amount to moral knowledge?
To return to Liao’s criticisms of Haidt, we’ve now seen that there is good reason
to call into question Haidt’s claim that moral reasoning is mostly a post hoc affair. Liao
also provides good reasons to call into question Haidt’s claim that moral reasoning is too
biased to correct for off-track intuitions. Regarding the relatedness motive (we are
motivated to “agree with our friends and allies”), Liao points out that this motive need
not always be a bias. The reason is simple: it can be rational to trust our friends and also
rational to not trust our non-friends. Liao makes the same point with reference to the
coherence motive (we accept evidence supporting our own already existing beliefs
“uncritically while subjecting opposing evidence to much greater scrutiny”). Liao
appeals to cases to show that it can be rational to more heavily scrutinize evidence
opposing something we already believe and to give less scrutiny to evidence supporting
what we already believe. For example: people have different background beliefs; these
different beliefs can make it rational to respond to the same evidence in different ways.
Thus, given my background beliefs, I might be justified in heavily scrutinizing an
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objection to my belief that P that arises from a body of mixed evidence E; and, likewise,
given your divergent set of background beliefs, you might be equally well justified in
heavily scrutinizing an objection to your belief that ~P that might also arise from E
(remember that E is a mixed bag). Furthermore, given our divergent background beliefs,
we might both be justified in easily accepting evidence that supports our own beliefs
about whether P. So, I might be justified in easily accepting pro-P evidence and in
heavily scrutinizing contra-P evidence; and you might likewise be justified in easily
accepting evidence for ~P and in heavily scrutinizing evidence against ~P. Though it is
certainly and obviously true that these two motives can be off-track biases, it is equally
true that the empirical data doesn’t tell us how often these motives function as off-track
biases and how often they function in a more truth-conducive manner. So, merely
pointing out that our reasoning is affected by these motives doesn’t tell us much.
One final point made by Liao that is worth mentioning here is that Haidt takes too
little notice of the fact that we are also motived by a desire for truth (114), i.e. that we
have an “accuracy motive” too. Surely this motive influences us as well and can
sometimes help to correct for off-track intuitions and misleading biases, and even lead us
to acquire moral knowledge. We even have examples of this on a large scale, such as the
success of the Civil Rights movement in changing the dominant view of whites in the
American south from one of racial prejudice toward black people to one that says that
black people have equal dignity and rights. My point is not that such racism has been
entirely eliminated, but that it is no longer the mainstream, accepted view; arguably, this
change in perspective is why people no longer advocate for Jim Crow laws. And,
arguably, this change in perspective was brought about in large part (but not solely) by
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moral reflection. One thinks, for example, of the powerful appeal made by Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”121 This moral revolution had
many other implications, such as a rejection of endogamy as a moral norm. We could
also point to other moral revolutions, such as the women’s suffrage movement in the
early twentieth century and the rejection of infanticide in the West in late antiquity.
Arguably, these monumental changes were spearheaded and driven by moral reasoning.
None of these changes took place overnight, and none without serious struggle. But the
point is that they illustrate that we can make important changes to our moral views on the
basis of moral education and reflection.122
4.1.3 The Reliability Problem
It is all too tempting for the skeptic, or for the non-skeptic who would make revisionary
changes in normative ethics and metaethics in response to the body of research I’ve been
discussing, to think that there is something epistemically awry with the research subjects
in many of these cases. After all, since it’s obviously true that the rational thing to do is
to push the man off the bridge, there must be some epistemic defect with those who
won’t: they must be emotion-driven rather than reason-driven, and thus epistemically
vicious instead of epistemically virtuous – or so thinks the revisionist. And likewise with
Haidt’s dumbfounding case; since the subjects persist in saying that incest is wrong, even
after the clever researchers shot down all their reasons, it’s obvious – Isn’t it? – that his
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subjects were not letting reason rule the intellectual roost, and were therefore not
displaying intellectual virtue.
But this just goes way too fast. Following Roberts and Wood (2004: 183-2014),
we should mark a distinction between the intellectual virtue of epistemic firmness and the
vices of flaccidity and rigidity (firmness being the mean between these two vices, one of
excess and one of defiency). In introducing the virtue of firmness, they tell us that:
Tenacity with respect to one’s own epistemic acquirements is natural and good.
We cannot and must not be open to change our deeper views at the first
appearance of contrary evidence. It is proper, then, that the first thing we do on
confronting a putative reason for deeper epistemic change is to look for ways to
refute the objection or accommodate the anomaly to our current understanding of
things. (183)
A person with epistemic firmness is willing to give up an important belief, but not at the
first sign of trouble. The firm person is therefore not flaccid, too easily changing her
mind (like the stereotypical underclassman in a first philosophy course), nor rigid,
refusing to change her mind or even to seriously consider reasons for doing so. When we
think of Greene’s trolley subjects and Haidt’s dumbfounded ones in the light of these
distinctions it becomes painfully obvious that the research subjects in these two cases
would’ve displayed the epistemic vice of flaccidity had they so easily changed their
minds on important and longstanding moral beliefs in such principles as the wrongness of
killing the innocent and the wrongness of incest. Do we really think that people should
so easily say, in the face of a long-held belief in the wrongness of taking innocent human
life, that it is after all morally okay to kill innocent people to save the lives of other
innocent people? Even if this pro-consequentialist verdict is the right one, surely this is a
result people should arrive at after a lengthy period of critical reflection. If people could
so easily change their minds about such a substantive moral matter, would that not be a
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sign of intellectual vice rather than of intellectual virtue? There is something to be said
for not changing one’s mind so quickly on matters of grave importance. An intellectually
virtuous person, a person with epistemic firmness, is not so weak-minded. The same
goes for Haidt’s incest case: do we really think that people should change their minds on
so weighty a matter as having sexual relations with a sibling after being presented with
one case? After having one conversation? After having thought about it for two whole
minutes? Again, intellectually virtuous people are not so flaccid. An intellectually
virtuous agent in one of these studies will realize that, in spite of the doubts being raised
against her long-held belief that incest is wrong, this is not something to give up so
easily, on the spot, as it were. Now, maybe what Julie and Mark did was, at the end of
the day, morally okay. But this is a conclusion to be arrived at after substantial moral
reflection over a period of time, not a claim to endorse because the researchers in the
moral psych lab stumped you. We could easily conclude, from this particular study, not
that the subjects were dumbfounded, but that those who think they were really just
haven’t thought carefully enough about what it means to be epistemically virtuous, let
alone what it means to be morally virtuous. A person who is intellectually and morally
virtuous will be quite reluctant – and properly so – to endorse the moral permissibility of
killing the innocent, or to change their views on the morality of incest, on the basis of one
encounter in a moral psych lab.
These reflections bring to the fore the reliability problem, which is that attempts
to derive skeptical conclusions from the affect-laden and/or intuitive character of moral
cognition must overlook or at least reject the possibility that our emotions and intuitions,
or at least some nontrivial subset of them, are actually reliable guides to good, bad, right,
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and wrong. Why not, for example, think that Greene’s killing-averse subjects are
intellectually and morally virtuous, instead of cognitively defective? Why not think that
Haidt’s dumbfounded subjects displayed epistemic firmness and moral integrity, rather
than rigidity? After all, wouldn’t a virtuous person display reluctance to endorse killing
the innocent and sleeping with a sibling? Isn’t this what we would expect? Why, then,
should we be wringing our hands about moral cognition when the subjects in these
studies do what we would expect virtuous people to do? The answer has got to be that
we just have no good reason to trust our moral emotions and intuitions. But why think a
thing like that? I shall argue that we have no good reason to think so dimly of our moral
emotions and intuitions. I will argue, first, that we have no good reason to subscribe to a
blanket condemnation of our moral emotions and intuitions. I will then bolster this
contention by arguing, secondly, that even in particular cases where the skeptic or
revisionist looks to have the upper hand, such as the case of the role of disgust in moral
cognition, the sledding is very tough: there is, once again, no clear route to skepticism.
Shaun Nichols (2004b: 182-189) does attempt to provide an argument that gives
us a reason to doubt the reliability of our moral emotions and intuitions in general. The
argument depends on two crucial premises (actually, it consists entirely of these two
premises): (i) that moral judgments depend on emotions and (ii) that we have no
independent reason to think that our emotions are reliable guides to moral truth.
Nichols’s first premise is basically just premise (1) of the argument from empirical moral
psychology, sketched above.123 It implies that if we had different moral intuitions, we
would have different moral beliefs; so, if we had evolved differently, we might’ve had
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different affections and thus different moral beliefs. But why does this matter? After all,
if I had different perceptual experiences, I would have different perceptual beliefs; if I
had different memory seemings, I would have different memory beliefs – different
rational intuitions, different mathematical beliefs. And so on. Nichols, pointing to
imaginary Martians and real psychopaths, argues that it seems possible (and actual, in the
case of psychopaths) to imagine rational creatures – imaginary Martians, real
psychopaths, hypothetical homo sapiens – who have different intuitions and thus different
moral beliefs. Because of this, we aren’t justified in relying on our intuitions as guides to
moral truth absent an independent reason to trust them.
Four things about this argument are worth noting. First, notice that the argument
essentially reduces to an argument from disagreement, real and imagined. We can
imagine rational Martians and differently-evolved homo sapiens, each of whom have
different intuitions and thus different beliefs; and we can see that there are psychopaths
among us who appear to be rational and who don’t share our intuitions and beliefs; thus,
to be justified in holding onto our beliefs we need an independent reason to trust our
intuitions. I have already responded to this worry in the last chapter, and I won’t repeat
those responses here; suffice it to say, the argument doesn’t work.124
Second, let us take the disagreement stuff out of consideration and focus instead
on the idea that, had we evolved differently, we would have different moral intuitions and
different moral beliefs; Nichols takes it that this fact implies that we need an independent
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reason to trust our moral intuitions in order to be justified in relying on them.125
Fortunately, this is just not a good argument: it implies rampant skepticism across the
board. For one thing, it undermines itself, for if we had evolved differently we might
also have had different philosophical intuitions and thus different philosophical beliefs.
If so, then, by Nichols’s lights, we need an independent, non-philosophical reason to trust
our philosophical intuitions. But this just looks like something that it would be nearly
impossible for us to have. But if we can’t trust our philosophical intuitions, then we
won’t be justified in believing Nichols’s philosophical premises. For another thing, as I
said, it implies rampant skepticism. For, if we had evolved differently, we might also
have different grounds for our beliefs in a variety of domains, and thus different beliefs in
those domains. This extends to mathematics and science too: had we evolved differently,
we might count different grounds as possessing epistemic weight than we currently do,
and thus might have formed different mathematical and scientific beliefs on the basis of
those different grounds. If so, then, by Nichols’s lights, we also need reasons
independent of our mathematical and scientific beliefs to trust the grounds on which
those beliefs are based; but what would that reason even look like? Commonsense is
entirely thrown under the bus here too: if we had evolved differently we might not
believe in other minds, a thought which implies – again by Nichols’s lights – that we are
not justified in believing in other minds until and unless we can find an independent
reason to trust that the grounds on which belief in other minds is formed are reliable.
After all, can’t we easily imagine rational creatures who did not believe in other minds?
In fact, the argument threatens complete global skepticism: if we had evolved differently

125

Now Nichols’s argument is starting to sound a lot like an evolutionary debunking argument. But if so,
then we can respond here as we did in chapter 2 to that argument. I won’t rehearse those responses here.

159
we might have had vastly different bases for our entire noetic structure, and thus very
different beliefs about almost everything; but if so, then we now need reasons,
independent of any reason we currently possess, to think that our current beliefs are
formed on reliable grounds. Clearly, there is no such reason to be had. Nichols’s
argument should thus be rejected as it implies rampant skepticism.126
Third, notice how little work is done in Nichols’s argument by empirical moral
psychology itself. As I said above, moral foundationalists have been around for a long
time, so for a long time we’ve believed that moral judgments are based ultimately on
non-belief states such as intuitions and emotions; in a sense, the empirical work just adds
more confirmation to something we already accepted. In any case, the point is simply
that the real work is being done by philosophical theses, such as that disagreement about
P, real or imagined, necessitates possession of an independent reason to trust one’s
ground for believing P (or that the possibility of a different evolutionary history makes
our actual belief-formation in some way suspect). This is a highly controversial
philosophical principle, not a deliverance of empirical moral psychology. The simple but
devastating truth is that the empirical work itself just doesn’t tell us that our moral
emotions and intuitions are untrustworthy.127 As it turns out, then, the skeptical punch
isn’t delivered by empirical moral psychology at all, but rather by philosophy. And, to
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repeat a point of Lycan’s (2001: 41) that I mentioned in chapter 1, philosophy can only
throw spitballs at common sense – so, the punch doesn’t do any real damage.
Finally, it seems that the disagreement-version of Nichols’s argument turns in on
itself. After all, many philosophers disagree with Nichols about the epistemic import of
possible and actual disagreement. So, by Nichols’s own lights, he needs a reason, one
independent of his philosophical intuitions, to think that his philosophical intuitions are
more reliable than his colleagues’ philosophical intuitions. But what independent reason
could Nichols have for the claim that his philosophical intuitions are more reliable than
his colleagues’? It’s difficult even to imagine what Nichols might say here. But, then,
Nichols’s argument falls through, for it rests on unsubstantiated philosophical
intuitions.128 I conclude that Nichols has not given us a good reason to doubt our moral
emotions and intuitions.
Now, one might be able to save Nichols’s argument from this fourth objection by
appealing to work done by conciliationists on behalf of conciliationism in response to the
self-incrimination worry. Recall (from chapter 3) that conciliationism is the view that, in
response to peer disagreement, rationality requires us to abandon, or at least drastically
reduce confidence in, a belief that suffers from peer disagreement. And the problem of
self-incrimination is simply that conciliationism itself is subject to peer disagreement, and
thus probably not something its proponents can continue to rationally believe.
Conciliationists have not taken this lying down, however. Elga (2010) and Pittard
(2015), for example, have given sophisticated responses to it. Decker (2014) responds to
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Elga’s defense as well as to a number of other pro-conciliationist defenses.
Unfortunately, there is no interaction between Decker and Pittard, nor has the debate on
conciliationism and the self-incrimination worry been effectively “decided” in any one
direction. Alas, this is not something we can adjudicate here.
We can only say that a successful conciliationist response to the selfincrimination worry will not actually rescue Nichols’s argument. Recall his two
premises: (i) that moral judgments depend on emotions and (ii) that we have no
independent reason to think that our emotions are reliable guides to moral truth. The
disagreement-based version of the argument still relies on both of these premises.
Unfortunately for Nichols, both premises are subject to peer disagreement. Some
scholars, such as Hauser (2006), argue that emotions are the result of moral judgment
rather than their causes. (ii) is also subject to peer disagreement. Recall, from chapter 2,
Wisdom’s (forthcoming) proper function moral realism proposal, on which facts about
what we ought to do are grounded in facts about what conduces to human flourishing.
On such an account, emotions may well reliably track, at least in some cases, facts about
what conduces to human flourishing, and thus also be sensitive to facts about what we
ought to do. Such an account could provide an independent reason for thinking that
emotions are reliable guides to moral truth. Recall also, from chapter 2, the possibility
that God is the ultimate source of our basic evaluative dispositions; if so, then God could
see to it that our moral emotions track moral truth. This would also appear to be an
independent reason to think that our moral emotions are truth-tracking. If either sort of
proposal is correct, and emotions track moral truth, or at least some moral truth, then,
arguably, we can use reason to extend our body of moral beliefs, jettison moral beliefs
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that are based on clearly unreliably emotions, figure out what our true moral beliefs
presuppose and imply, and so on. The bottom line: since there is substantial peer
disagreement over (i) and (ii), Nichols – by his own lights – is not justified in believing
the premises required by his own debunking argument (and neither are we).
In general, the truth of conciliationism would probably prove fatal to the
argument from empirical moral psychology. For, absent substantial peer agreement on
the findings themselves, their proper interpretation, and their philosophical implications
(which we do not have), conciliationism implies that we won’t be justified in believing
the premises of any debunking argument that makes use of empirical moral psychology.
Of course, conciliationism potentially raises its own moral-skeptical concerns, which I
have already dealt with. But the point is simply that the argument from empirical moral
psychology would simply collapse into the familiar argument from moral disagreement.
Thus, a successful defense of conciliationism would “save” Nichols’s own particular
argument at the expense of eradicating the larger argument from empirical moral
psychology. This is not a result that Nichols or other debunkers (who appeal to empirical
moral psychology) will be happy with.
The doubts that I have just cast on Nichols’s contention that we can’t trust our
moral emotions and intuitions in general can be bolstered by looking at a particular case:
the emotion of disgust. If there isn’t a good “top-down” reason for a blanket rejection of
our moral emotions and intuitions, then maybe the moral skeptic could go from the
“bottom up”; that is, maybe the moral skeptic could point to particular moral emotions
and intuitions, and to particular cases, and then argue that these cases are problematic and
that we have reason to worry that the problematic features of these cases are widespread
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throughout our moral cognition. Even here, the skeptic runs into trouble, as we have
already seen: generalizing from Greene’s trolley cases and Haidt’s dumbfounding cases
is tough sledding indeed. But maybe there are better cases the skeptic could use, such as
the case of disgust. It is widely alleged that disgust plays a significant role in moral
cognition, i.e. that it often leads us to make moral judgments.129 Now, insofar as it looks
like we should not base moral judgments on the emotion of disgust, it looks like a
nontrivial subset of our moral beliefs are based on an off-track emotion. And very many
philosophers who work in this area do seem to think that disgust is epistemically
pernicious; Kelly (2011) probably speaks for many when he writes, “the fact that
something is disgusting is not even remotely a reliable indicator of moral foul play.
Disgust is not wise about or acutely attuned to ethical considerations, and ‘yuck’ deserves
no special moral credence; rather, repugnance is simply irrelevant to moral justification”
(148). But if all our moral beliefs ultimately trace back to emotions and intuitions,
wouldn’t this give us a reason to worry about our moral beliefs in general?
By way of response, I shall reverse the charge: even in this case, which appears at
first glance to be a slam dunk for the debunker of commonsense morality, the hill is
simply too steep to climb. And, if the debunker cannot succeed here, where her chances
seem so good, how likely is she to succeed in undermining other moral emotions and
intuitions? We will assume for now that the critics of disgust are correct in thinking that
disgust plays a causal role in certain quarters of our moral cognition (but we will question
this line in the next section). There is reason to question, though, whether the influence
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of disgust is always and everywhere epistemically pernicious to moral cognition.
Whether disgust is always epistemically pernicious is not a matter that can be determined
by empirical moral psychology alone; rather, it is something to be determined on the
basis of one’s broader philosophical commitments in ethics and epistemology. Again,
then, it is controversial philosophy that is doing the real work, and not the science.
We can see that this is the case by considering moral epistemological accounts
that make room for disgust as a morally appropriate emotion that can do positive
epistemic work. Besong (2014a, 2014b) has developed a moral epistemological view that
he dubs the “Prudent Conscience View” (PCV). On PCV, a moral seeming that P can
provide epistemic justification for a belief that P provided that it was produced by a
properly functioning conscience. The proper function of an agent’s conscience is
determined (at least in part) by how prudent that agent is, and whether an agent is prudent
will in turn depend on whether that agent possesses other virtues, such as temperance,
fortitude, and justice. Agents with a prudent conscience will have moral emotions and
intuitions that are fitting responses to their elicitors; these responses will produce moral
seemings in those prudent agents, and because the responses are fitting, moral beliefs
based on them are justified.
Besong (2014a) deploys his PCV explicitly in response to Kelly, conceding that
sometimes it is epistemically inappropriate to base a moral belief on disgust but also
maintaining that there are other cases in which it is clear that it is epistemically
appropriate to form a moral belief on the basis of disgust. An example of the former
(from Besong): a mother who forms a judgment that her baby is wicked on the basis of
disgust at her baby’s dirty diaper (132). An example of the latter (also from Besong):

165
judging that pedophilia is wrong on the basis of revulsion at a pedophile’s sexual desires
for small children (142). Though disgust can misfire – as can any source of belief
(testimony, perception, memory, etc.) – a prudent agent’s experience of moral disgust
will be properly calibrated, and thus a prudent agent will experience moral disgust when
that is a fitting response to the elicitor of disgust. So, contrary to Kelly, disgust is not
always epistemically pernicious; in prudent agents it is a reliable basis for moral
judgment. Now, no one is perfectly prudent, so no one is infallible here. But we don’t
need infallibility to get justified true beliefs, and unless infallibilism is correct, we also
don’t need infallibility to get moral knowledge. To maintain that disgust is, simply,
epistemically pernicious, Kelly will have to engage Besong’s PCV and show either that it
is an inadequate moral epistemology or that, even assuming PCV, it cannot be
successfully deployed to defend the epistemic appropriateness of disgust. Kelly will not
be able to do this just by rehearsing empirical data; rather, he will have to deploy
philosophical arguments. But, once again, that tells us everything we need to know: it is
the controversial philosophy stuff – “spitballs,” Lycan would say – that is doing the real
debunking work here, not the empirical moral psychology itself. Believers in R (and
allied propositions), then, have – once again – nothing to fear from empirical moral
psychology (nor from the spitballs).130
And here is the dialectical relevance of our consideration of the Kelly-Besong
exchange: even in cases where the debunker appears at first glance to have a knock down
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argument against an item of putative moral knowledge (e.g. a moral judgment based on
disgust), we see that there is in fact no clear path to revision. Thus, not only is there no
clear top-down reason for a blanket rejection of the epistemic worth of moral emotions
and intuitions, there is no clear-cut, non-controversial bottom-up argument either. Nor is
Besong’s account the only one that could be appealed to here. As I’ve already pointed
out, moral foundationalism was up and running long before empirical moral psychology,
and long before any skeptic or metaethical revisionist could get his or her hands on its
findings. Many of these accounts explicitly make room for the moral emotions and
intuitions and include carefully worked-out accounts of the positive epistemic role that
they can play.131 More generally, psychologists and philosophers alike have defended the
view that emotions are, in general, not a hindrance to rational judgment, but rather
essential to it.132 To get to moral skepticism from the descriptive thesis that moral
judgments are based, ultimately, on moral emotions and intuitions (again, something we
already knew), the debunker of commonsense morality will have to show us that these
bases of belief are not to be trusted in general, and to do that the debunker will have to
engage the moral epistemologies of those who say otherwise. At the end of the day, then,
the real battle will be fought at the level of philosophy, and to embrace skepticism about
our moral judgments we shall have to first embrace a conjunction of controversial
philosophical theses which pale in comparison, epistemically speaking, to our
commonsense moral judgments themselves.
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4.2 Will the Real Findings Please Stand Up?
I do not have the space to properly explicate a wholly different but equally challenging
criticism of the argument from empirical moral psychology: namely, that the findings on
which its Humean-style models of moral judgment are based are not, after all, findings.
The empirical work itself, and the Humean-style models of moral cognition based on
them, have been challenged over and again. In closing I’ll briefly mention some of these
challenges. The upshot of these, from the perspective of metaethical Mooreanism, is that
the argument from empirical moral psychology is vulnerable not just at premise 3 (that
was the burden of the previous section) but also at premise 1. Though in most of the
work emanating from empirical moral psychology no distinction is made between
emotion and intuition – a convention I have largely followed up to this point – we need to
mark that distinction here (though we can’t spend much time on that distinction).
Intuitions can be completely free of affect, such as my intuition that 1 is an odd number;
emotions are not affect-free, however. Conceivably, I could have a moral intuition that is
completely free of affect, such as my intuition that if A is better than B, and B is better
than C, then A is better than C. Another difference is that emotions are not, as Audi
(2013: 124) puts it, “intrinsically motivational.” There are good reasons, then, to
distinguish emotions from intuitions. What I say below is directed, not at the view that
moral judgments are based ultimately on intuitions, but that they are in large part, if not
wholly, ultimately based on emotions.
Some – e.g. Hauser (2006), Sauer (2012), Hindriks (2014), and Kennett and
Gerrans (2016) – have challenged the models based on the findings and have argued that
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the findings themselves are consistent with a rationalist model of moral judgment.133
Hauser’s model is particularly interesting as he argues that emotions are responses to
moral judgments. There is no space to go into the details here, but suffice it to say that
there is no easy route to a Humean-style model of moral judgment from empirical moral
psychology. The empirical work that has been done is simply too inconclusive to permit
such a move; as Kelly, Nado, and Stich (2009) concede: “The use of empirical methods
to explore traditional questions in moral theory is still very much in its infancy, and there
is a great deal yet to be learned” (632). In fact, it seems safe to say that the empirical
work has not yet resolved (and maybe never will) the old debate that we’ve always had
with us: that between rationalists and sentimentalists. Some of those who develop
rationalist models incorporate a role for affective states, so the dilemma may turn out to
be a false one anyway: maybe some sort of sentimentalist rationalism is the way to go.
Hindriks (2014), to take an example, defends a view he calls “sentimental rationalism,”
according to which “both affect and cognition can contribute to the justification of moral
beliefs, and they often do so together” (208). Clearly, the empirical work seriously
underdetermines the models based on them. A lot of philosophical legwork is needed to
get from the data to any model of moral cognition.134
Others challenge the findings themselves. When it comes to disgust, for example,
May (2014, forthcoming) argues that the science actually shows, not that disgust
produces moral judgment, but rather that: (i) disgust is often a product of moral judgment
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A rationalist model of moral judgment is one that gives reason a significant role to play in moral
judgment.
134

Sauer (2011) provides an overview of the territory as well as a number of criticisms of attempts to move
from the data to the social intuitionist model of moral judgment. Importantly, Sauer shows that the model
requires crucial but controversial and potentially problematic philosophical assumptions.
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and that (ii) disgust at best only “slightly amplifies” the severity of some of our
preexisting moral beliefs. May thinks that the evidence for (i) and (ii) are so strong that
he recommends against making rhetorical appeals to disgust to try and change people’s
minds; disgust just doesn’t play that kind of formative role in moral judgment.
Remember that the case of disgust is supposed to be one of the easy cases for the
debunker of commonsense morality. But not only is it possible that disgust is
epistemically appropriate at times (in the context of moral judgment formation), it might
well be that disgust just doesn’t play this judgment-producing role at all, or at least not
very often. The data are indeterminate.
A second and final example: Berker (2009) provides a number of serious
objections to the empirical research itself (i.e. to what it allegedly shows about moral
cognition). I will mention just one. Greene et al. (2001) predicted that the response
times of subjects who said that it was okay to harm someone in a personal way (such as
by pushing the man off the bridge in the footbridge case) would be longer than those who
said otherwise; the explanation for this given by Greene et al. was that these subjects
would be using reason to overcome an emotional aversion to up-close harming.
According to Greene et al., this prediction was confirmed: respondents who said “yes” to
up-close harming took, on average, 1.8 seconds longer to reach their verdict than those
who said “no” to up-close harming. Now, we may well wonder how much proconsequentialist, conscious reasoning is going on in those 1.8 seconds, but let us pass
over that. Berker points out that Greene et al. have conceded that when the data are
reanalyzed more properly, “they reveal ‘no reliable differences in RT [response time]’
between those who gave a response of ‘appropriate’ and those who gave a response of
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‘inappropriate’ to personal moral dilemmas” (310).135 In Greene et al. (2008) Greene and
his collaborators cite numerous studies and then concede that, of the studies conducted at
least up until 2008, “none establish a causal relationship between controlled cognitive
processes and utilitarian moral judgment.” In Greene et al. (2008) they try to fix this by
providing yet another study for the claim that consequentialist judgments are driven
cognitively rather than affectively. Did they succeed? Berker (2009: 310) remains
critical. What did they find? Well, they found that pro-consequentialist judgments took
“three quarters of a second” (2008: 1151) longer than non-pro-consequentialist
judgments. Is that strong evidence that consequentialist judgments are based on
reasoning whereas non-consequentialist judgments are not? It may provide a little bit of
evidence, but it underwhelms, to say the least.
In the last chapter I argued that philosophy, in virtue of the fact that it is itself
riven by disagreement, is in no position to be trying to debunk commonsense.
Philosophy needs to get its own house in order: to take the plank out of its own eye
before it tries taking splinters out of others’ eyes. In view of the reliance of the argument
from empirical moral psychology on controversial philosophical ideas, that point remains
germane in this chapter as well. We can make a related point here, however, about
empirical moral psychology itself. We’ve seen that the findings in empirical moral
psychology can be and have been challenged. We’ve also seen that the models (of moral
cognition) based on those judgments can be and have been challenged. The data we have
are problematic, and in any case, they underdetermine the models. But in addition to
these difficulties there is additional reason to worry: namely, the replication crisis in
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Berker here is quoting from Greene et al. (2008: 1146).

171
psychology. One study, by Makel, Pluckert, and Hegarty (2012) found that, of all the
studies published in the top 100 psychology journals (dating back to 1900), only 1.6%
were replications. They then did another replication analysis on 500 randomly selected
articles and found that only 1.07% of those were replications. In another study, by Open
Science Collaboration (2015), the authors surveyed 100 articles from three journals and
found that while 97% of original studies in the psychological sciences featured
statistically significant results, only 36% of replications did so. There is reason to worry
that these methodological issues affect the very research we have been at pains to
consider here. May (forthcoming) says, for example, that many studies on disgust have
failed to replicate results from studies that appear to show that disgust plays a significant
role in moral cognition. May also notes that when one takes into account unpublished
studies on disgust, the effect of disgust vanishes, suggesting that there is a publication
bias in favor of positive results, i.e. results which indicate that disgust plays a role in
moral cognition. I’m moving fairly quickly here, but the point is not hard to see: we are
on shaky grounds in claiming that empirical moral psychology shows us that moral
judgments are emotion-driven episodes of automaticity. Without more confirmatory
replication it is difficult to say what, if anything, empirical moral psychology shows us
about moral judgment.
The relevance of the replication crisis in psychology, and the methodological
problems canvassed by Berker and May, should not be overlooked. The argument from
empirical moral psychology is a philosophical argument that tries to use findings from
empirical moral psychology to overturn some or all of commonsense morality. But can
we trust those findings? There is good reason to worry that we can. And can we trust the
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controversial philosophy which attempts to use the controverted findings? There is
reason to worry here as well. Better stick to commonsense morality for now. There is no
good reason not to.
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